



# 警察庁

National Police Agency

## Mission English - Exercise Book



### Language and Communication Tools:

- International Police Cooperation & Interoperability
- Strategic Communication & Intercultural Competence
- Comparative Policing
- Integrity, Ethics and Code of Conduct
- Policing, Rights and Protection
- Human Relations: social cohesion & engagement strategies
- Human Terrain Mapping & Analysis
- Security Sector Reform & Governance



**SAINT | Security Sector Development**

*- the Human Dimension*

**Human Security, Human Terrain, Human Relations**

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# Police Mission Partner Interview

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## Personal Details

1. What is your name?
2. In which town/city/area do you live?
3. What are your main interests? (sports, hobbies etc.)

## Profession

4. What other employment have you had before joining the police?
5. What is your current assignment with the police and where? (i.e. your specific role)
6. What year did you join the police?
7. Why did you join the police?

## International Experience (leave blank if 'No')

8. Have you ever worked with police from another country in your State?  
Yes / No - if yes, please provide details:
9. Have you ever been assigned to work in another country (Mission, Posting, Embassy etc.)?  
If yes, where and what was your job:

## Course Needs and Expectations

10. Do you have any specific police-related language needs from this seminar (e.g. tactical, legal, criminal, procedural, small-talk etc.)?
11. What are your expectations from this seminar?



1. Explain:
  - a. Rule of Law (RoL)
  - b. Security Sector Reform (SSR)
  - c. Security Sector Governance (SSG)
  - d. Democratic Policing
  - e. Human Rights
  - f. International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
  - g. Human Security
  - h. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
2. What is the International Bill of Rights?
3. A common argument is that Rule of Law and Human Rights mechanisms are “Western” – and therefore not relevant. Agree or Disagree?  
Are there any similar instruments in Muslim countries?
4. What international or regional Human Rights instruments (guidelines) specifically determine the *conduct of law enforcement*?
5. What is the difference between *institution building* and *capacity building*?
6. Why is gender such an important theme?
7. What is Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)?
8. How does corruption undermine the aims of a Security Sector Reform?
9. What is the difference between a *refugee* and *internally displaced person*?
10. Many guidelines and policy papers use the phrases “*human rights-based approach*” and “*integrated approach*”. What do these two phrases mean?

# Crime and the Media



## Section 1: Discussion

### Explain the headlines:

- First impression: What do you understand from these headlines? What has happened?
- Why is certain language (words) used to describe an incident?

1. 4 bodies found in Camden County house; 6 arrested in drug raid nearby
2. Student kidnap case against bus driver on hold for mental review
3. Two arrested in woman's slaying
4. Search on for gunman in triple-killing
5. Robbery suspect takes hostages at Paris bank
6. Gunman Kills 2 Men; Mother, Unborn Baby Shot
7. Articles Hurt Search For Yates' Jurors
8. Life or Death for Cop Killer?
9. Five Killed In Murder-Suicide

## Section 2: Discussion

1. The number of copycat suicides is proportional to the amount of media coverage.  
**True or false? Why?**
2. The media influences public perception to crime and criminality (e.g. terrorism, sexual assault, burglary, racially motivated etc.).  
**True or false? How?**
3. The *London Riots of 2011* saw the use active use of Social Media Apps to inflame, incite and direct civil strife and public disorder. **How can the police counter these strategies?**
4. Terrorist groups are often nothing more than:
  - A. Angry, disenfranchised young men?
  - B. Fundamentalist and/or Radicalised Muslims?
  - C. Organised Crime Syndicates (drugs, weapons, trafficking, migrant smuggling)?
  - D. Thugs and petty criminals?
5. In the public domain *crime statistics* list crimes committed by domestic residents, but do not reflect crimes committed by transient groups or external parties based abroad.  
Why? Should the public be given the real criminal statistical facts?
6. Based on media coverage, what is the main difference between the US Police approach to *Incident Management* (tactical, strategic, negotiation) to that used by your Police?
7. Does immigration have a direct influence on criminality?  
**True or false? Why?**
8.
  - A. Custodial sentences are the most effective means to punish / rehabilitate criminals?
  - B. What other options exist to the traditional prison system?
9. Should the police have a monopoly over policing, enforcement, law and order?



**To:** Amnesty Committee Advisors  
**From:** The Office of The President  
**Re:** List of Prisoners

## MEMO

**Note:** To protect the prisoner's identity from the media, names have been withheld. All are considered of comparatively little risk to society. With the exception of Prisoner No.7, all have already served 6 months of their sentence.

Also consider what steps could be taken as an alternative to or follow-up from the grant of Amnesty e.g. parole, probation, community service, fine etc. Please inform the President of your final decision.

<p>1. <b>20-year-old Student.</b> He broke into the police computer system and tried to erase his previous criminal record (some parking tickets). He was also charged with fraud after police discovered he had hacked into a pizza company's computer and ordered himself free pizzas for over a year. He is serving a five-year sentence.</p>
<p>2. <b>55-year-old Engineer.</b> He was charged with manslaughter* after he hit and killed a child while driving drunk. He has no previous criminal record. He is serving a 10-year sentence.</p> <p>* = involuntary manslaughter, negligent killing (UK) / 3<sup>rd</sup> Degree Murder (US)</p>
<p>3. <b>30-year-old solo mother of two.</b> She was charged with drug dealing when police found 500g of marijuana in her apartment. She says it was for personal use. She is serving a five-year sentence.</p> <p>Consider: quantity vs. national law; effect on family; role model.</p>
<p>4. <b>24-year-old student and activist.</b> He was arrested during an anti-globalisation protest and charged with terrorism. He is a leader of a non-violent social movement and did not participate directly in any violent acts during his protests. He is serving a three-year sentence.</p>
<p>5. <b>40-year-old businessman.</b> He was charged with fraud when police discovered that he had stolen over €2 million from his company using a false system of accounting. He is serving a 10-year sentence.</p> <p>Consider: <i>criminal intent and pre-meditation</i></p>
<p>6. <b>Unemployed woman.</b> She was arrested for stealing food from a supermarket. This was not the first time that she had stolen food, and she had been warned. She is serving an eight-year sentence.</p>
<p>7. <b>Prisoner of War.</b> He was taken prisoner during the last war with the country's neighbours six years ago. He was a marine and engineer and was responsible for bombing a small village in the mountains. He says he was following orders. The two countries are now at peace. He is serving a twenty year sentence.</p>
<p>8. <b>Landlord.</b> He was arrested for keeping a block of flats in very dirty, and some cases dangerous conditions. He was also renting the apartments to illegal immigrants and charging a lot of money for them. He is serving a seven-year sentence.</p>
<p>9. <b>Politician.</b> She was a leading member of the Ultra political party, an extremist group that believed criminals should be executed and immigrants expelled from the country. The Ultra party is very weak now. She was arrested for stealing party funds and is serving a 10-year jail sentence.</p>

*Adapted from onestopenglish.com (2002)*



## Case Studies

Although names have been changed, these are based on real scenarios.

### Discussion Exercise:

1. What are the issues facing the police?
2. Ethically, what options do they have?
3. What should they do?
4. What would they do?
5. What would you do?

### Case 1

(Germany)

Smith has kidnapped Susan and secured her in a sealed concrete drain. He has left her with very limited water; the summer sun is slowly turning the drain into a hot-box. He demands a large ransom from her millionaire father who promises not to contact the police in return for his daughter's life. Despite this, the father contacts the police, who persuade the father to let them control the handover of the money. Due to time pressure, in the handover Smith is immediately arrested, instead of more usual post-ransom surveillance. He is taken to a police station where he is questioned but refuses to admit his involvement in the case, or disclose Susan's location - but does state that he can imagine that she must now be dying from dehydration. Police are unable to locate Susan and are running out of custody time. They discuss whether they should exclude the solicitor from the interview and use some stronger tactics.

### Case 2

(Australia)

Jones is a serious offender whom police believe is part of an organised paedophile ring. The police are desperate to catch him and his network before they kill a child. They are contacted by Jones' daughter, aged 15, who offers to provide information to the police 'covertly'. The police debate whether to use the daughter as an on-site informant in view of her age, reliability, the family relationship to their suspect and the possible dangers to her.

### Case 3

(United Kingdom)

John is a local community-based police patrol officer. He is dealing with a series of complaints against an 11-year-old boy, who is racially harassing and abusing elderly residents in a housing estate. They demand that John takes some action and suggests a "good clip round the ear". The boy, when spoken to is rude, abusive and spits at John. John, angry and convinced that the boy will not respond to reason, slaps him hard. The boy's parents file an assault complaint against the officer. The local residents and local media support John's actions. Police Management have to decide what action to take against him.

# Police and Community Relations



## - The London Riots

Between 6 and 11 August 2011, thousands of people rioted throughout Greater London. The resulting chaos generated violence, **looting**, **arson**, and the mass deployment of police.



Protests began in the North London suburb of Tottenham, following the death of Mark Duggan - a local and **alleged** drug dealer - shot dead by police on 4 August 2011, during an **intercept** operation. As an ongoing investigation, transparency over the circumstances surrounding Duggan's death was drawn-out and murky, with police quickly accused of a cover-up.

The protest became **inflamed** after police **restrained** a sixteen-year-old girl who was alleged to have been acting in an aggressive and disorderly manner. Multiple violent clashes with police followed, along with the destruction of police vehicles, a courthouse, public transport and dozens of homes, as well as vandalism and looting businesses within the protestors own communities. In an environment of poor police response, gangs of vigilantes took to the streets to defend their homes and community against hooliganism.

The London Riots were also called the "Blackberry Riots" due to the role Blackberry Messenger (BBM), smartphones and social media played in **inciting** and strategically directing civil disobedience. Chaos reigned supreme.

In the aftermath some 4000 people were arrested, 2200 were formally charged. But the destruction and cost went well beyond material goods, damaging the relationship between the police and the communities it was sworn to serve and protect.

### Vocabulary Building 1: Match the word with the correct definition.

- |                     |                     |                     |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| A. <b>looting</b>   | B. <b>incite</b>    | C. <b>vigilante</b> |
| D. <b>arson</b>     | E. <b>restrain</b>  | F. <b>inflame</b>   |
| G. <b>intercept</b> | H. <b>aftermath</b> | I. <b>allege</b>    |

- |          |   |
|----------|---|
| 1. _____ | to arouse or intensify violent emotion                |
| 2. _____ | one who takes law enforcement into one's own hands    |
| 3. _____ | a consequence, especially due to disaster             |
| 4. _____ | to hold back; control, prevent; to deprive freedom    |
| 5. _____ | the crime of unlawfully setting fire to a building    |
| 6. _____ | to accuse/claim that someone has done something wrong |
| 7. _____ | to provoke, stir up or urge on to action              |
| 8. _____ | to pillage and plunder                                |
| 9. _____ | to seize, obstruct, impede, interrupt, block, detain  |



## - What caused the London Riots

Of course, Mark Duggan's death was not the true reason behind the riots, merely the catalyst.

It is important to note that unlike civil disorder from years before,

*"There was no sense among the rioters of being part of a collective, no desire to change society, just an immature, anarchy-based desire to cause chaos and to profit from looting. The riots were not a protest in any way, but a mixture of confused rage, gang thuggery and teenage mayhem".*

Those who have no self-worth fear no consequence.

Root causes have been summarised as:

### 1. Social and Economic Inequality

Marginalisation, deprivation, lack of social mobility (ability to move up) and social capital (of little worth in society).

### 2. Weak Police Response

This outbreak of mass criminality was *"unleashed by an weak police reaction to the initial incident"*. Because the police didn't crack down right away, it essentially *"gave permission for dozens of thugs to come and loot and burn the neighbourhood."* When a mob sees that police can't control a situation, it *"leads to adrenalin-fuelled euphoria"*.

### 3. High Youth Unemployment

Given the range and coordination of the rioting, *"this was clearly an event with far deeper causes than simple random hooliganism"*. Most of the looters and vandals were under 20, destroying the same low-income neighbourhoods they live in. With few prospects, these kids clearly *"had nothing else to do with themselves, and no reason to fear or feel responsible for the consequences of their actions."*

### 4. Moral Poverty and Opportunism

What set these riots apart is the deliberate, consumer-like looting. Whereas all riots loosen inhibitions, *"looting tends to involve a wider range of people - children, women, older people - because it does not involve physical violence."* And as more people get involved, more damage is done, with little sense of responsibility or guilt.

### 5. Racial Profiling

To anyone who asked them, the rioters made it very clear what their motives were: *"repaying years of police mistreatment."* That's especially true in *"communities where there is a relatively high percentage of blacks"*. The anger black people felt at being stopped and searched more often, combined with *"continuing deprivation, growing unemployment, a feeling of lack of opportunity"* made for a *"toxic mix."*





## - Hypothesis: Culture

Culture can be defined as the “*the shared inherited and learned ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes and knowledge which characterises a society, group or organisation*”. This is most commonly expressed through national, ethnic and religious identity - and is often the source of stereotype.

Another form of culture is *organisational culture*, which is commonly seen in specialist professional closed environments, such as the police and military. A culture to which you do not belong can be experienced but you'll seldom be part of it.

Sociocultural beliefs and attitudes become **entrenched** over generations, therefore cannot be easily changed or altered. To an extent, the same can be said with organisational culture (e.g. institutionalised sexism, racial profiling etc.). Factors influencing behaviour are often associated with social expectation, custom, peer pressure, and certain **Pavlovian** conditioning traits.

London's boroughs have large concentrations of both lower socio-economic and immigrant communities - communities which often display disproportionately low income, high unemployment, a largely unqualified workforce and **disenfranchised** youth. In examining London's immigrant groups, all have their own language, culture, perspective, and attitudes. As immigrants, integration and acceptance by the wider [host] community is slow, if not reluctant; similarly adopting local norms by these new groups are also slow, if not actively discouraged.

The London Riots exhibited a clash of two cultural types, represented by two unlike cultural groups: mixed lower socio-economic [groups] vs. an organisational culture - the “System”, **embodied** by the police.

In the eyes of the British public, police ideally serve the interests of the community - ‘policing by consent’, performing their role in a ‘*transparent and accountable*’ manner. However, by those on society's fringes, London's Metropolitan Police were seen to **personify** the attitudes of *white middle class England* – a class and lifestyle the lower socio-economic groups can only dream of.

“White middle class” England had the social expectation of the ‘others’ to **conform** and integrate. Those groups who did not (or could not) were looked down on with **disdain**, or treated with suspicion and fear. In London, those clearly of immigrant background, within the lower socio-economic areas, were regularly targeted by the police using ‘*stop and search*’ tactics. Such tactics were seen as hostile, racist and repressive – strengthening the idea that these groups and the immigrant community were barely tolerated ‘outsiders’ – of little worth or social standing.

What was not considered before or after the riots was how the police were seen as an organisation by those on society's fringes. Many immigrants originated from countries where police corruption, violence and victimisation are considered normal. Therefore, any police presence was viewed with distrust and fear, reinforced by MPS *racial profiling* and *stop-and-search* practices. However, other parties viewed the British police and justice system with disrespect, regarding it as soft and **impotent**.

Mark Duggan was shot during an armed police intercept as part of *Operation Trident*. Operation Trident targeted gun crime in London, with special attention to shootings relating to the illegal sale of drugs and crime in Afro-Caribbean communities.



At the time it was not clear if Duggan had a criminal connection, nor was it clear if he had a gun, or indeed if he had actually shot at a police officer. But the lack of police transparency, past experiences of racial profiling, and suspicion that it was a police cover-up was enough to spark protest.

With large elements of the community turning against them, the police did not know how to respond. The tactic of letting the situation ‘burn itself out’, and not provoking the crowd by keeping a discrete distance had the opposite desired effect: it reinforced the belief of police impotence, leading to an escalating of the situation.

After five days, and the deployment of over 44,000 police officers in London, the riots did eventually burn themselves out. But the financial and social costs were heavy. And community trust in the police – as an organisation and partner – disappeared as quickly as flat screen TVs during the looting.

In the aftermath the ‘blame game’ was played, but ultimately the riots were a monumental failure to re-connect with the communities and identify their priorities.

A bulk of the responsibility was shouldered by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) for lack of forewarning, poor preventative measures and weak response. However, immediately following Mark Duggan’s shooting (prior to the riots), the MPS did attempt to gauge the mood of the public by consulting community contact groups. But with budget cuts impacting Community Policing reliable engagement had been lost.

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## Vocabulary Building 2: Match the word with the correct definition.

- A. **impotent**
- B. **marginalise**
- C. **entrench**

- D. **Pavlovian**
- E. **personify**
- F. **disenfranchise**

- G. **embody**
- H. **conform**
- I. **disdain**

- |    |       |  |
|----|-------|--|
| 1. | _____ | to deprive a person of their rights as a citizen       |
| 2. | _____ | to push to the side specific groups of people          |
| 3. | _____ | lacking physical strength to act effectively; helpless |
| 4. | _____ | automatic behavioural response due to conditioning     |
| 5. | _____ | an idea or philosophy fixed in the cultural mind       |
| 6. | _____ | represent or symbolise [police as government]          |
| 7. | _____ | to become a visible form of an idea                    |
| 8. | _____ | to social fit in, to follow local customs              |
| 9. | _____ | to look down on a person or social group               |



## Comprehension Check:

Which statement is **True (T)**, **False (F)**, or **not stated (NS)** in the article?

1. People in Tottenham came together to protest after police shot Mark Duggan \_\_\_\_\_
  2. Mark Duggan was considered a threat by police \_\_\_\_\_
  3. The police were accused of covering up facts relating to Mark Duggan's death \_\_\_\_\_
  4. The protest turned to riots over the alleged police assault of a 16-year-old girl \_\_\_\_\_
  5. Urban poverty and social deprivation have nothing to do with the riots \_\_\_\_\_
  6. It's stated that police practiced *racial profiling* and *stop-and-search* tactics \_\_\_\_\_
  7. UK law enforcement is done so with the *consent* of the community they police \_\_\_\_\_
  8. The lower-class view police as a tool of repression \_\_\_\_\_
  9. Immigrants either fear or don't respect the role and authority of the police \_\_\_\_\_
- 

## Group 1: Discussion

1. How would your police have dealt with the riots (before, during, after)?
2. At present British police do not have large scale Riot Units, instead maintaining small rapid response teams, supported by all uniformed officers as and when required.  
What is your opinion of such a system? Is it an effective use of manpower?
3. Do you think rioting like this could happen in your state or country? Why? Why not?
4. What is the role of Community Police in preventing/deescalating such situations?
5. How does ethno-cultural diversity effect police relations in your community?
6. Are your police seen as a reflection of society?
7. Do such social conditions contribute to home grown *radicalisation* and terrorism?  
What are the typical identifying traits?
8. As a backdrop to the riots were allegations of police corruption, disproportional use of force and racial profiling (incl. stop-and-search tatics), leading to lack of trust.  
What measures would you take to reestablish faith and trust in the police?
9. What parallels do you see between the London Riots, and those witnessed in the US?

## Group 2: Assignment

At the request of the London Metropolitan Police, you have been assigned to give advice on how they should to deal with such civil disturbances in the future.

*Key issues:*

- trust
- community partnerships
- prevention
- intervention
- social media
- crisis communication
- de-escalation
- limitation/confinement
- strategies and tactics

# Police and Community Relations

## *Democratic Policing and the Social Contract*

An important function of the State is to provide *security* and *public order*. To do so, the State claims sole **monopoly** in *legitimate* physical **coercion** within its geographical and political **jurisdiction**. Police functions in a democratic society must:

- be operationally independent from the state and be responsible towards the needs of citizens; *and*
- be transparent, **accountable**, and guided by the rule of law & human rights standards.

In **autocratic** and fragile states, police are closely associated with maintaining the government - often 'securing order' through the misuse of force. Under these conditions law enforcement adopts a **militarised** approach, where normal civilian police duties (crime prevention) have been downgraded in favour of State Security (public order). Such practices are seen as obstacles to well-functioning policing and community engagement.



In liberal democracies, police are authorised to use proportionate force against the public - when considered necessary. On the whole, the public regard this arrangement as reasonable under the *social contract* - a theory which regards *use of force* as necessary to **uphold** law and order in maintaining a safe society.

Under the *social contract* individuals are understood to voluntarily surrender some of their rights to the State. Although government officials, police are seen as politically **impartial** in their role, themselves governed and restricted by rules and the same laws. The social contract views police as a protective force against crime and social disorder. This view is held widely by the general public, and even when faced with scandal (corruption, racism, disproportionate use of force, and abuse of powers), the police remain respected as both a public service and institution.

The social contract – and goodwill - is essentially the public's '**buy-in**': a socio-political and cultural relationship that often does not exist in international police interventions.

# Police and Community Relations

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## Vocabulary Building

a. monopoly	b. legitimacy	c. coercion
d. jurisdiction	e. accountable	f. autocrat
g. uphold	h. impartial	i. at large
j. buy-in	k. militarised	l. Human Terrain

1. Having a \_\_\_\_\_ means the exclusive control, by one group, of a service.
2. \_\_\_\_\_ is the territory and range of legal authority of the judiciary, law-enforcement, or governmental body.
3. To \_\_\_\_\_ support and defend an idea, principle or structure.
4. An \_\_\_\_\_, a ruler who possesses absolute and unrestricted authority.
5. \_\_\_\_\_ means to be responsible to someone or for some action; answerable.
6. Being \_\_\_\_\_ is not having a prejudice or bias towards or against any particular side or party.
7. The \_\_\_\_\_ refers to the target population within a specific area.
8. To be \_\_\_\_\_ means to be *at liberty*, or refers to a group *in general*.
9. Police become \_\_\_\_\_ by adopting military practises normally used in war zones: tactics, weapons, uniforms, vehicles and force.
10. \_\_\_\_\_ is being authorised and acting in accordance with the law, whilst the having credibility and trustworthy to do so.
11. If you \_\_\_\_\_ to an idea, you actively agree and become a stakeholder.
12. \_\_\_\_\_ is governing by force.

# The Crisis of Police Militarisation

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## *“Do Not Resist”*

Based on articles by: Dexter Filkins, The New Yorker, 13 May 2016, and Stuart Miller, The Guardian, 30 September 2016

When the Chechen-born Tsarnaev brothers set off a bomb at the finish line of the 2013 Boston Marathon, killing three people and wounding 264, New York filmmaker Craig Atkinson looked on with as much horror as anyone else. But he noticed something else, too: Boston Police Department armored vehicles and heavily armed officers - dressed like combat soldiers - deployed onto the streets, fanning out across neighbourhoods as though they were an infantry division engaged in Afghanistan. Atkinson asked himself, when did local police forces, in their equipment and tactics, come to resemble armies of occupation?

The answer Atkinson came up with is “Do Not Resist,” a documentary film that traces the transformation of police departments across the United States into forces that often look like occupying ground troops - and all too often act like them. Watching “Do Not Resist,” is an eye-opening experience. The film takes a series of events that might appear unrelated - the heavy-handed police response to the demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014; the use of heavily armed SWAT teams in South Carolina to carry out routine drug arrests - and shows that they are part of a pattern that has taken hold in many police departments across the country. *“What we discovered is that there had been a massive change in the tactics used by SWAT teams,”* Atkinson told me. *“And that happened as the federal government was giving away military equipment to police departments.”*

Atkinson is not the first person to detail the militarization of America’s police<sup>1</sup>. But he is the first to provide a visual account of how police forces across the country have changed - and how they are using the extraordinary weapons they’ve been given by the Pentagon.

This is demonstrated in a scene in which the Richland County Sheriff Department’s Special Response Team (SRT) practice close quarter combat (CQC) with assault rifles and submachine guns. It shows the SWAT teams enjoying the adrenaline rush of military-style training with heavy weaponry and armoured vehicles. One officer justifies it all by stating the need to be ready for ISIS, WMDs and *“situations like what they had in Missouri”*, saying that civil protests necessitate the use of armour and assault rifles.

The practice of donating unused military equipment to local governments began in 1997, when the *1033 program* was included in an otherwise unremarkable Department of Defense (DOD) budget authorisation. Under the 1033 program, the DOD publishes a list of surplus equipment that is available to local governments. But the turning point - as with so many other issues - came after 9/11. Since the 90’s, the DOD has donated some \$5bn worth of equipment. But the over-all value of military equipment acquired by police forces is actually much higher: local governments have received approximately \$34bn in grants from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to buy their own military equipment from private suppliers<sup>2</sup>. That brings the total to \$39bn - more than the entire defence budget of Germany.

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<sup>1</sup> The *Times*, the *Washington Post*, *USA Today*, and the *Marshall Project* did it earlier.

<sup>2</sup> Oversight of who receives the equipment, and type have proved to be non-existent, with criminal organisations posing as law enforcement – as uncovered in a media sting

## The Crisis of Police Militarisation

The 1033 and DHS programs have resulted in local governments around the country acquiring an astonishing range of military equipment, including armoured personnel carriers, assault helicopters, M-16 assault rifles, grenade launchers, and infrared gun sights, all of which were designed for combat. Among the vehicles routinely given to police departments is the MRAP (mine-resistant ambush-protected), designed to survive roadside bombs. According to the *Marshall Project*, some 600 MRAPs have been handed out to local authorities around the country; they cost about a million dollars each.



The Marshall Project has broken down DOD donations by county and city<sup>3</sup>. It turns out that NYPD has acquired surprisingly little under the 1033 and DHS programs: just two armoured personnel carriers and some non-lethal gear. The Brevard County Sheriff's Department (Florida) scored big, getting its hands on nearly \$7m worth of equipment, including thirteen helicopters, two armoured personnel carriers, and 246 assault rifles. In 2014, the Los Angeles Unified School District announced that it would return the three grenade launchers it had acquired but would keep its armoured personnel carrier and 61 assault rifles.

As the Pentagon was gifting free military equipment, something else was happening, too: there was explosive growth in SWAT team deployments, often armed with the same military equipment that was obtained from the federal government. According to Atkinson, SWAT teams were deployed about 3000 times a year across the country in the 1980's. By 2005, they were deployed 45,000 times a year; in 2015, as much as 80,000 times.

In one scene, the Richland County Sheriff's Department deploys its Special Response Team (SRT) to raid a home in a run-down neighbourhood where the inhabitants were suspected of keeping marijuana. The SRT members, who are dressed in military uniforms, helmets, vests, and assault rifles - smash the doors and windows, enter the house, and arrest the tenant's son. SRT seize \$873 in cash from the suspect, which he tells police is needed to purchase gardening equipment for his landscaping business<sup>4</sup>. They end up finding 1.5 grams loose marijuana (enough to fill a teaspoon). The suspect's mother tells the filmmakers, "they tore down the house. My son went to jail for a gram and a half that they shook out of a bottom of a book bag." The lead TRT officer says with a shrug that drug raids are a "50-50 proposition in terms of finding something worthwhile".



<sup>3</sup> <https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/03/the-pentagon-finally-details-its-weapons-for-cops-giveaway#dod-graphic>

<sup>4</sup> Surveillance had misinterpreted frequent references to *grass* and *weed* as meaning marijuana

## The Crisis of Police Militarisation

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Atkinson states that the raid in South Carolina was typical of the dozen he went on with law enforcement officers from across the country. Atkinson shows that particular raid because he wanted to demonstrate how *civil asset forfeiture*<sup>5</sup> has spiralled out of control. For all the military equipment and tactics that were used, very little in the way of criminal activity was ever discovered. “*We kept going out, but we never found much of anything,*” he said. “*Do you know the type of ill-will generated in these communities?*” he says. “*It makes the police seem like an occupying force.*”

The picture that emerges from “*Do Not Resist*” is that the acquisition of military equipment and the use of SWAT teams for routine arrests are feeding on each other - that heavy weapons are encouraging police to act in ways they otherwise would not.

Defending militarization, FBI Director James Comey gives a speech about “*so-called warrior cops, a term I have heard, and the militarization of police*”. Through an anecdote he states that “*monsters are real*”, to justify the need for these weapons. Unfortunately, the editing is selective: the clip ends before Comey importantly adds that “*the issue is the way in which we use it – when and how we deploy advanced equipment; when and how our officers are trained to use that equipment. The way we do it matters enormously.*” But Comey does not speak out for stronger gun control as a means to reduce the need for such equipment and attitudes.

“*Do Not Resist*” is interspersed with scenes from Ferguson, Missouri, where large demonstrations began after a police officer shot and killed Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager. When people gathered in the streets to express their anger, police moved in with armoured vehicles, riot gear, pepper spray and tear gas. Not surprisingly, events escalated.



Garry McCarthy, then Chief of the Chicago Police Department, told President Obama’s *Task Force on 21st Century Policing* that the heavy-handed response by the police had recklessly provoked Ferguson residents. “*What happened in Ferguson - the actual practice of how the demonstrations were handled - I think we were all embarrassed, quite frankly, in law enforcement,*” McCarthy said. “*In my book, if you fire tear gas, you’ve got a riot right now. You don’t have a demonstration.*”

For more than a century, US Federal Law has prohibited the military from being deployed inside the United States against American citizens. The far-sightedness behind that distinction is obvious, not least because while the military is trained to use maximum force, the police, ideally, should only use as much as is necessary to protect themselves or local citizens. “*Do Not Resist*” shows that the distinction between the two has been severely eroded.

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<sup>5</sup> where police confiscate goods and money for their own use before a suspect is even found guilty

# The Crisis of Police Militarisation

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## Class Discussion: *Warriors vs. Guardians*

1. What are the issues at play?
2. What is the consequence of Police Militarization?
3. In the film, Dave Grossman plants the image of law enforcement as “*Super Heroes - constantly under threat - who need to meet force with superior force*”. What are your thoughts?
4. How do you view the US Defense Department’s 1033 programme and DHS grant?
5. How does militarized civilian law enforcement affect Community Relations?
6. What role does culture play?
7. How is a *search warrant* conducted in your country? When do you think an aggressive *no-knock* search warrant should occur?
8. What strategies would you employ to reform US Law Enforcement? What would be your priorities and focus areas?

# Cultural Competence

## - A Tool for Knowledge, Intelligence and Understanding



“Those who understand others as well as themselves will be granted success in a thousand encounters”.  
(Chinese proverb)

### Introduction

Up until the early 2000's the US military had a very simplistic and limited understanding of countries undergoing intervention and assistance, causing a negative impact on stability (especially **counter-insurgency**) and capacity building assistance programmes (donor nation view of host nation wants). *Cultural Competence* provided an effective tool to gain a practical understanding of cultural behaviour for use in intelligence, mission management, the decision-making process, and **strategic** planning – similar to the needs of any police operation.

Of course, the role of the military and civilian law enforcement are worlds apart. Police do not face an enemy; and any force used is done in proportion to the threat. Also, unlike deployed soldiers, police officers are already on their ‘**home turf**’ – and have been authorised by the community to police *that* community.

### Part One: Domestic Policing

#### **Community Disconnect**

In the past police officers were known members of the community in which they worked – having in-depth local knowledge; nowadays an officer generally doesn't live in the area in which they police - that ‘connection’ and ‘intimate knowledge’ is lost. Communities requiring ‘special’ police attention are no longer from one social group, instead being a **multicultural melting pot** or **ethnic cluster** – typically with low income, high unemployment, social poverty and few prospects. By comparison, most police personnel come from middle-class backgrounds, meaning they do not represent or understand the communities they police.

Class, cultural and geographic differences lead to a **disconnect** in **engagement**, communication, understanding and shared objectives. Due to their **diverse** makeup communities can view police as friend or **foe** – or both, negatively effecting police partnerships, cooperation and flow of information. To solve these issues, police authorities ‘attempt’ to **reflect** the makeup, values and wants of society through a number of strategies.

“Police need vs. community want” are the issues facing police officers both in-mission and at home in their domestic duty stations, most often using a form of Community Policing.

Although approach differs across the world, in general terms *Community Policing* focuses on the police building ties and working closely with communities within their *area of responsibility*. This cooperative approach creates relationships and promotes trust.

Community Policing focal points being:

- cause and prevention
- reassurance
- hotspot identification
- problem solving
- information and intelligence
- local engagement and partnerships



Although an ideal solution, Community Policing face regular operational challenges:

- personnel shortages
- financial limitations
- political **prioritisation** (e.g. terrorism)
- community agreement (“**buy-in**”)

Community buy-in is vital, however through our shared sense of values, all parts of society are relatively ‘open’ to the idea of police cooperation.

Police cooperation means developing strong community networks, relationships and resources. Developing these relationships requires both ongoing efforts and constant renewal of relationships through clear communication and trust between local law enforcement and multicultural community members.

But - as was clearly the case in London and Chicago – half-hearted and improvised attempts at community “buy-in” were less than successful.

## Cultural Competence as Policy

*“by the people, for the people”* (Abraham Lincoln)

Cultural Competence is no different than any other required skill, it needs to be **integrated** as a core part of police philosophy, through policy, management, training, and field operation. This means:

- needs assessment,
- developing community-policing strategies and active partnerships,
- resources, and
- ensuring field officers are prepared and supported.

The objective is to develop officers who can understand and adapt, and who can skilfully use this knowledge in their daily work. Police officers often engage in ‘on-the-spot’ social work and mediation.

As Cultural Competence is essential to grow meaningful stakeholder engagement (community groups, business, local government), knowledge base should include:

- Intercultural communication
- local history
- demographics and ethnography
- multiculturalism / community relations
- sociological changes
- behavioural influences
- culture-based crime (e.g. honour killings)
- community support institutions
- public relations
- conflict resolution skills
- religion and beliefs
- role of gender in the community
- putting knowledge into practice

The aim is to support police officers’ interpersonal skills in:

- engaging, communicating and passing on information;
- developing sensitivity, interpreting emotion, reactions and body language;
- being open (not assuming); and
- mediation and conflict resolution.



## Part Two: International Policing

### *International Assistance*

Cultural Competence raises understanding of how culture impacts on your work within the Mission area relating to your international colleagues, the organisation itself, and locals.

*“...peacebuilding and SSR programmes should aim at the empowerment of peoples and be based on local traditions and experiences, rather than forced foreign methods of conflict and crisis management and governance...”*

The purpose of international police cooperation is to support a Host Nation in their transition from crisis/conflict/disaster to peace, stability and normalisation, through the establishment of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and democratic policing programmes. International Police Advisors (IPAs) work closely with their local counterparts, as investigators, monitors, mentors and trainers. Due to this close daily contact natural working relationships develop.

The biggest problem for an IPA is the inability to understand the culture, language, local customs, practices and mentality of the people in the mission area – not just locals but also fellow ‘internationals’. Very often stereotypes exist regarding professionalism, capability, skills and ethics.

A professional attitude and open mind will help overcome this:

- Do not generalise and stereotype;
- Do not “label” others;
- Do not display prejudiced attitudes;
- Do not display a sense of superiority of your own status, social system or way of life;
- Do not speak critically of the politics of others.

Outside of their duty IPAs are often accommodated directly in the communities in which they serve – sometimes as a boarder with a local family, sharing an apartment with a fellow officer, or renting purpose-made housing (depending on operation area, security issues and accommodation availability). Because of this closeness, IPAs learn first-hand about the local people - their culture, their beliefs, their views, and their differences - simply by living among them. And the exchange is two-way, breaking down barriers and creating a foundation for understanding, if not trust. Through the simple act of living, shopping, socialising and working among the local population - these officers become familiar with their target **Human Terrain**, gaining workable cultural **insight**. With such knowledge, officers can more easily establish practicable SSR programmes - and gain local ‘buy-in’.

# Cultural Competence

## - Mitrovica: Burning Bridges



*The following scenario is based on a real event from 2011.*

Jason (29), from New York City, is a newly appointed Human Rights Officer to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). As it's Jason's first assignment, he wants to create a good impression through results.

Not long after his arrival at UNMIK Headquarters in Pristina, Jason becomes aware that Kosovo Police (KP) Officers from the northern city of Mitrovica refuse to work together due to ethno-politics. Two ethnic-based precincts have been established in Mitrovica to police their own communities: Mitrovica South (Kosovo Albanians) and Mitrovica North (Kosovo Serbs). Although separated by the River Ibar, the divide has little to do with geography and all to do with historic ethnic hatred.

Seeing this as a golden opportunity for bridge-building between the two ethnicities, Jason calls Andreas, the UNMIK Senior Police Advisor for Mitrovica, asking for a meeting with the two police commanders of the divided city.

Andreas (52), an experienced German Police Officer on his second deployment with UNMIK, diplomatically explains what lies behind the level of mistrust and hostility between the two communities, and further states that pushing such a plan will create unnecessary political tension, as well undermining UNMIK's role of **impartiality**, and losing all **credibility** for Jason.

Jason strongly disagrees, accusing Andreas of being too cooperative with the parties, and blocking **proactive** measures. Reluctantly Andreas agrees to call a meeting between Bekim (Police Commander, Mitrovica South) and Nenad (Police Commander, Mitrovica North).

Before the war Mitrovica was a unified city, neither men had strong feelings about ethnicity – their family clans yes, but not ethnicity. Then the war came: Serb **oppression** was fought with equal brutality by the Albanians, and the cycle of violence followed - with all its **atrocities** and crimes committed by both parties in the name of ethnic identity.

Bekim (47) and Nenad (53) fought on opposing sides in the Kosovo Conflict. Both lost family and friends, and witnessed the destruction of their way of life by those on the "other side" of the river. Nothing is forgotten; nothing will be forgiven. The River Ibar represents more than just a natural geographic barrier: it's the final ideological battle-line between those who claim an independent Kosovo and the sizeable area that wants to remain Serbian.

As Andreas is respected by both Kosovo Police Commanders, they agree to meet Jason at Andreas' office. Jason presses for an active role as **negotiator**; to ensure UNMIK's impartiality Andreas agrees to act as **mediator**.

Immediately before the meeting, Andreas again urges caution against pushing the two parties to work together, but Jason is convinced that bringing the parties together will clear the air, and that they will see the logic and advantage of actively working together to *protect and serve* their "Kosovar community".

# Cultural Competence

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Upon the Commanders' arrival, the mood becomes tense and icy, though both officers maintain their professionalism.

Blind to the cold hostility, Jason immediately states his proposal: having KP officers from both ethnicities conduct joint patrols, covering all parts of the city, starting at the symbolic "Peace Bridge". The result is predictable.

Both commanders flatly refuse, stating numerous safety issues.

Nenad reacts bluntly stating that an Albanian presence in his community would be seen as **invasive** and **provocative**, and adds that he would also need "*permission from the Serb Minister for Kosovo*".

Jason replies that "*this issue has nothing to do with Serbia – this is Kosovo*". Jason stubbornly presses forward his argument, highlighting the advantages of his plan, stating that this would be "*a shining example for all Kosovars and the State of Kosovo*". These words demonstrate his misunderstanding on the politically sensitive issue of statehood, undermining his role as an impartial actor - and compromising the role of the United Nations. He fails to follow to advice, listen, read body language, and pick up on cultural cues. It quickly becomes clear that Jason lacks a true understanding or **empathy** for the issues that caused such strife.... a dangerous mixl of enthusiasm, arrogance and ignorance.

Nenad gets up and leaves without a further word, followed by Bekim soon thereafter.

Both Kosovo Officers do silently agree on one point: regardless of Jason's good intention, they are now convinced that United Nations seems ignorant to ground realities and challenges - political, cultural, religious, and ethnic - and adding *insult to injury* they "*send a boy to do man's work*".

Therefore, as per Andreas' warning, the result undermines UNMIK's ability to be taken seriously as a broker for stability, peace and development. Bridges are burned, divides become wider.

*Footnote:* In 2013 the city of Mitrovica was official divided into two separate municipalities, Mitrovica and North Mitrovica (Serb enclave) - both operating under the Kosovo Government's political and judicial framework.

## **Discussion Questions:**

1. Identify and describe two or more barriers of the intercultural conflict
2. Identify and describe two different strategies that could have or should have been used to prevent or resolve the conflict

# Corruption - *Sleeper Threat to International Security*

Based on an article by Viola Gienger, U.S. Institute of Peace (3 July 2014)



In non-violent uprisings and full-scale revolutions ranging from the *Arab Spring* to the overthrow of the President of the Ukraine, one common underlying theme was **rebellion against government corruption**. Corruption fed the fires of chaos in post-revolutionary Libya and undermined Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram. Yet the role of severe corruption in provoking protests and violence is underestimated.



In the Ukraine, frustration with government corruption and profiteering was among the factors that drove citizens into Kyiv's Independence Square in November 2013 and led to the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovich. The events sparked a geo-political crisis when neighbouring Russia intervened militarily.

*"Corruption is often seen as system failure, as something broken in a system, or [as] individuals who are doing bad things within a system that's supposed to be operating on behalf of the people".* (Sarah Chayes, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Operating with this perspective, Western aid donors and investors sometimes view corruption as a necessary inconvenience or even as a means to ensure stability within transitional countries because it divides the plunder among local competing elites.

However, *"corruption **is** the system in certain countries. Governments in countries like this ... are highly effective criminal organisations that are achieving their primary aim, which is the extraction of resources for personal benefit, and governing is either a way to achieve that end, or a [platform for a corrupt] front operation."* The system works fine for those with the 'right' connections.

## Channels

Corrupt government officials extract their revenues in a variety of ways, including the purchase of office, kickbacks, extortion, plundering the country's natural resources, and often through misuse of Western donor aid. Western governments end up enabling these trends, knowingly or not, and are hated by the local populations as a result.

The *ruling elites* also ensure their own impunity by hijacking the justice systems, either through controlling police or courts or through direct intimidation mechanisms.

Corruption in the legal system is particularly destructive. *"The institutions that are supposed to safeguard the state and citizens against such harms are contaminated by abuse of power and lack of integrity,"* Chayes said. *"When the justice system is corrupt, you literally don't have a place to take these matters."*

Still, the past five years have shown that the elites in these societies may not hold all the control. The victims can take action too, but they might do so through the use of direct violence - by joining insurgencies, by sparking revolutions or taking other measures that can turn into violent conflict.

# Corruption - *Sleeper Threat to International Security*

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In the Balkans, Latin America and Africa, some governments have aligned with "criminal superpowers" such as drug or weapons traffickers whose networks cross continents.

In Libya, many clashes since the 2011 overthrow of Gadhafi have been misdiagnosed as continuing skirmishes for political power and territorial control between pro- and anti-Gadhafi forces. *"Actually, when you dig a little bit deeper, they have a whole lot more to do with the trafficking networks and consolidation of routes and markets"*, said USIP.

## **Undercutting in Both Ways**

Nigeria is home to one of the worst insurgencies on the African continent, and the government is effectively fighting three conflicts - against Boko Haram in the north, as well as separate clashes in central and southern parts of the country. And yet corruption not only fuels those conflicts, but also erodes the fighting will and capability of Nigeria's military, the largest on the continent.

Nigeria spends a quarter of its budget on security forces, and yet there is widespread evidence that Nigerian military officers are stealing oil directly or conspiring with oil smugglers. Corruption prevents basic supplies such bullets and transport vehicles from reaching the front lines, as they are sold to the insurgencies. Soldiers go without food and water, as these supplies too can be diverted to enhance the profits of military leaders.

*"Nowhere is the link between corruption and insecurity greater than in Nigeria today,"* said Johnnie Carson, former US Assistant Secretary of State. In Mali, too, the 2012 coup was sparked by outraged military officers over stolen money meant for them to carry out operations. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, low morale in the military is due in part to a shortage of weapons and munitions because officers were pocketing the funds.

The resulting deprivation, elevated risk and sense of injustice was given as the reason a group of Nigerian soldiers in May 2014 fired at a vehicle carrying one of their commanders.

## **Western Attitudes, Options**

Carson suggested that one solution might be legislation prohibiting foreign aid for militaries found to engage in severe corruption, similarly to the way the U.S. blocks assistance for foreign militaries found to commit human rights violations.

*"Foreign assistance also can be structured to provide incentives for reducing or preventing graft or to ensure that it isn't funnelled through corrupted channels"*, Chayes said.

Contrary to Western assumptions that Afghans accept corruption as a way of life, she said, they often criticise what they see as a failure by foreign donors to understand that they are sustaining a criminal organisation that exercises illegal power over its citizens.

Afghans often say, *"We thought you were going to bring the rule of law to this country, and instead you brought a mafia."*

Western donors too often deliver aid via corrupt government agencies in receiving countries, prioritising good relations with the authorities over concerns about corruption.

## Corruption: *Afghan Forces 'Ghosts'*

By Lynne O'Donnell and Mirwais Khan, The Associated Press, 10 January 2016



Afghan forces are struggling to man the front lines against a resurgent Taliban, in part because of untold numbers of "ghost" troops who are paid salaries but only exist on paper.

The nationwide problem has been particularly severe in the southern Helmand province, where the Taliban have seized vast tracts of territory in the 12 months since the U.S. and NATO formally ended their combat mission and switched to training and support.

*"At checkpoints where 20 soldiers should be present, there are only eight or 10," said Karim Atal, head of Helmand's provincial council. "It's because some people are getting paid a salary but not doing the job because they are related to someone important, like a local warlord."*

In some cases, the "ghost" designation is more exact - dead soldiers and police remain on the books, with senior officials pocketing their salaries without replacing them, Atal said.

He estimates that some 40% of registered forces don't exist, and says the lack of manpower has helped the Taliban seize 65% of the province - Afghanistan's largest - and threaten the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah. Those men who do serve face even greater danger because of the "no-shows". In the last three months alone, some 700 police officers have been killed and 500 wounded, he said.

The province's former deputy police chief, Pacha Gul Bakhtiar, said Helmand has 31,000 police officers on the registers, *"but in reality it is nowhere near that."*

Nearly 15 years after the U.S.-led invasion that toppled the Taliban, and despite billions of dollars in military and other aid, corruption remains rife in Afghanistan and local security forces have struggled to hold off insurgent advances across the country. In 2015 the Taliban seized the northern city of Kunduz for three days, marking their biggest incursion into a major urban area since 2001.

The Defence Ministry declined to comment on ghost security forces. Interior Ministry spokesman Sediq Sediqqi acknowledged the problem and said an investigation has been launched, the results of which should be made public in about a month.

He said investigators had checked police numbers and status in 200 districts, 30 of which could only be reached last week with the help of U.S. forces due to security problems. He said 86 percent of Afghanistan's 157,000 police were digitally registered and received their salaries through banks; the remaining 14 percent were in the 30 districts "where there are threats," and are paid in cash by "trusted agents."



*"If you have a roster of 100 people, not all of them will be there 100% of the time - there is leave, training, and we take casualties. And it takes time to replace them," Sediqqi said.*

Iraq has also struggled with the ghost soldier phenomenon, a factor in the Islamic State group's rapid conquest of much of the country's north and west in the summer of 2014. In December of that year, Iraqi officials said the payment of tens of millions of dollars in salaries to non-existent forces had been halted.

But Afghan lawmaker Ghulam Hussain Nasiri, who has been researching the problem for more than a year, said his government is ignoring the issue. *"When we say we have 100 soldiers on the battlefield, in reality it is just 30 or 40. And this creates the potential for huge catastrophes when the enemy attacks,"* he said. *"It is an indication of massive corruption - the reason Afghanistan is one of the most corrupt nations in the world,"* he added. Afghanistan consistently ranks among the most corrupt countries in indices released by global watchdog Transparency International.

Nasiri said the government *"doesn't seem to want to know about it,"* and that he received death threats after revealing the names of parliamentarians who are allegedly in on the scam. He said he handed a list of 31 names of corrupt parliamentarians to the Interior Ministry but has so far received no response.

Cash-strapped Afghanistan's security forces are entirely funded by the international community, at a cost of some \$5bn (USD) per year, most of which comes from the United States. The U.S. government's auditor told a congressional hearing in 2015 that Afghan government figures on security personnel and pay *"could not be regarded as accurate"*.

*"No one knows the exact numbers of the Afghan National Defence Forces,"* an Afghan official said on condition of anonymity. He said the best internal estimates put the number at around 120,000, less than a third of what's needed to secure the country.

The heaviest cost of the ghost soldier phenomenon is being played out on the battlefield. Neither the government nor NATO publicises casualty figures for local security forces, but NATO calculates casualties are up 28 percent from 2014, when some 5,000 members of the Afghan forces were killed.

In December 2015, an army base in Helmand's Sangin district was besieged by insurgents for almost a week before reinforcements were brought in, supported by U.S. airstrikes and British military advisers.

In the northern Helmand district of Kajaki, soldier Mohammad Islam said many of his comrades deserted their posts because they didn't believe their bodies would be sent back to their families if they died. In the absence of a body, the family would not be eligible for compensation payments.

*"Everyone knows that we are facing this fight alongside 'ghost soldiers', and that's the reason we don't have enough men,"* he said. *"The Taliban know it, too. When they attack us, and we're unable to protect ourselves, the big men then ask why."*

# Afghan Forces Ghosts: Cultural & Corruption

## - Helmand Province: Walking a Diplomatic Tightrope



*This scenario is based on real events (2011) - and is sometimes the type of problem facing an International Police Advisor.*

You have been deployed to Helmand Province in the dual role of International Police Monitor *and* Mentor. As part of your duties you have been requested to conduct an assessment on local police capacity (ability, strength, facilities, equipment, vehicles, ammunition, morale) in two towns, five isolated village posts, and several highway checkpoints.

The audit proves to be time consuming and difficult, made worse by disturbing results. Upon completion you note a large difference between listed officer numbers, their abilities, equipment, ammunition reserves, vehicles and supplies in all posts. You believe the security shortfalls are at a level that place the local community at risk.

The local Police Chief, Aziz Andish, who is directly responsible for the posts, tolerates your presence, but is generally unfriendly and uncooperative. But under his management the sector has been comparatively well protected and orderly. During the war Chief Andish was a Mujahedeen Commander - who remains feared by the Taliban and commands the loyalty of local fighters and militia. The government regards him as a powerful and useful asset.

As his Advisor, you have a responsibility to inform, question and advise him about the shortfalls. From your perspective, this is less about corruption and more about meeting the needs of local protection, safety and security... something that has to be diplomatically discussed and solved.

Although living a comfortable lifestyle, Chief Andish does not display the material wealth normally associated with someone of his rank, status and position, but his tribe doesn't seem to be suffering the same levels of poverty as those in surrounding areas.

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### Questions:

1. How would you approach the issue?
2. What cultural cues do you need to be aware of?
3. If you find he is responsible for the shortfalls, what would be your next step(s)?
4. What are your considerations? What would be his motive?
5. In the context of post-conflict environments, what is more important: the maintenance of peace or pursuit of justice?
6. As was the case in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and numerous other war-torn and conflict affected countries, it's often a strategy to collaborate with known warlords and [suspected] criminals to broker peace and maintain security – often legitimising these players by including them in the transitional government.
  - a. What are the pros?
  - b. What of cons?
  - c. What do believe will be the long-term effect?

# Security Sector Reform

## - A Path to Normalisation



**Security Sector:** the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the delivery, management and oversight of security in a country.

**Security Sector Reform (SSR):** the process of rebuilding and reforming a state's security sector through monitoring, evaluation, review and improvements.

SSR includes **Rule of Law, Human Rights, Democratic Policing** and **Integrity** practices – positively influencing **Human Security** and Development.

### SSR Concept

The aim of Security Sector Reform is to increase a country's ability to face security and justice challenges, *“in a way that meets international democratic standards, accepted principles of good governance, and the rule of law”*.

Improvements made through SSR help create a secure environment that encourages other political, economic and social developments, through the reduction of **corruption**, crime and armed violence.

The focus for international donors is to support partner *host countries* in achieving four primary objectives in the security sector:



1. Establishment of effective **governance, oversight and accountability;**
2. Improved security and justice services;
3. Development of local leadership and their ownership of the reform process; and
4. **Sustainability** of justice and security service delivery.

Basic working principles to support the SSR process:

- People-centred, locally owned and based on democratic standards, human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear and reduction in armed violence and crime.
- Seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges facing states and their populations, through integrated development and security policies, and through greater civilian involvement and oversight.
- Based on a broad assessment of the range of security and justice needs of the people and the state.



## Section 1

### Vocabulary Building 1: Match the definition to the correct word

A. Rule of Law	B. Human Rights	C. Democratic Policing
D. governance	E. integrity	F. oversight
G. reform	H. sustainable	I. corruption
J. Human Security		

1.	honesty, truthfulness, honour
2.	is all processes of governing (rules, standards and actions, structures, regulations, and accountability)
3.	is dishonest behaviour by an official that violates their duty
4.	means the ability to run something and maintain it over time
5.	is the principle that no one is above the law
6.	means to improve, modify, restructure
7.	More than traditional physical security, all aspects that contribute to security and well-being e.g. food, water, employment, health education etc.
8.	are the moral principles which describe certain standards of human behaviour, protected as legal rights in international law
9.	is the action of overseeing something; monitoring
10.	“policing by consent”, enforcing only laws which have been adopted democratically

### Democratic Policing

Democratic Policing is an increasingly important activity in the peacebuilding and development process as it supports demilitarisation, democratisation, boosts economic growth, reduces poverty, and improves respect for human rights.

However, the process is often not easy. Case studies from Latin America highlight the difficulty of achieving reform where violent crime is on the rise: government support may be inadequate, and citizens may be suspicious of law enforcement officers due to their role in past conflicts.



**Accountable policing** is more effective than **repressive policing**. However, where crime is rising, police effectiveness is often seen as requiring a forceful approach, which more than often bypasses the safeguards of human rights.



## Key Points to Police Reform

- Reforms are often implemented under difficult conditions, where societies are suffering from rising levels of violent crime, corruption, mistrust - and where external influence is limited.
- The way in which reforms emerge – through government or police initiatives, or political agreements initiated by **civil society** – shapes the process.
- Confusion and waste occurs where international donors: 1.) do not adapt reform programmes to local conditions, or 2.) fail to co-ordinate their efforts.
- Police Reform is rarely successful unless accompanied by Judicial Reform.
- To be effective, reforms must be understood and supported by society, but traumatised and split communities are not always willing or able to get involved.
- Overly-ambitious reform programmes sometimes overlook short-term needs, so when immediate objectives are not met, the result is a sense of failure. International donors must be sensitive to local realities, and should be prepared to sacrifice speed and efficiency to adapt to these.

**Solution?** Efforts should be made to promote inclusive dialogue and engagement. Actors should recognise that their programmes may face shifting public and political concerns, especially where there is rising crime or the origins of conflict have not been solved. In addition, institutional limitations may result in a gap between policy and what is realistically achievable.

To increase the chance of police reforms succeeding:

- Basic standards could be established for police training, but donors should not try to impose standard models;
- Co-operation should be increased between professional police experts, development professionals and country experts;
- **Donor** efforts should be better co-ordinated, and progress measured against clear benchmarks covering both achievable output and outcomes;
- To prevent disillusion, reforms must deliver short-term service improvements, even where they are intended as long-term programmes; and
- **Local ownership** of reform needs to be enhanced, both among local government institutions and civil society.

A typical Police-focused SSR Mission, will include:

- observing, monitoring and reporting
- executive policing (*incl. war crime investigations, formed police units, patrols etc.*)
- *Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration* (DDR)
- strengthening policy and procedural reform
- mentorship of senior police management
- skills transfer and training of frontline personnel (patrol service, formed police units, investigations, organised crime, community policing etc.), and
- public information and community outreach



Some nations prefer a “*train and equip*” approach to SSR, however developing a state’s security sector is more complex, involving the engagement of civil society, growing leaders, developing institutions and professionalism. SSR programmes need to balance local politics, policy, **legitimacy**, accountability, and interrelationships - between the government and its people. SSR needs to consider and balance ‘local want’ and local solutions already functioning well.

As an example, in Timor-Leste the United Nations Mission (UNMIT) *initially* criticised **customary law** due to its community-level administration and regional irregularity (ref. criminal definitions and penalties), instead solely favouring standardisation and use of formalised **legal instruments**. Beyond the impracticalities of following UN guidelines, this went against community practice, wishes, traditions and sense of legitimacy - creating tension in UN-community cooperation. The UN failed to understand that Timorese customary law prioritises community rights and harmony over those of the individual. Therefore, any offence against an individual is a wrongdoing against the entire community. Although not formally included in the Constitution, customary law has since been granted backing and informal recognition as a **broker** for conflict management and local enforcement.



In Somalia’s north, customary tribal councils are recognised by the regional authorities in Puntland and Somaliland to judge cases and settle inter-tribal disputes. Western judiciary focuses on offender punishment and/or **rehabilitation**, but most often little thought is given to the victim; under Somali customary law (Xeer) - a ‘blood price’ is taken in the case of libel, theft, physical harm, rape and death, as compensation to the injured party.

For example, if a married male was murdered, the entire family (or whole tribe) of the offender would be **liable** to pay the blood price - to ensure that the victim’s wife can provide for her family in the long-term (two cows, a goat etc.). International development agencies working in both provinces quickly realised that in a country torn apart by over thirty years of civil war, this system of providing justice works, significantly easing local tensions and conflict - and should not be interfered with. That simple act of understanding gained international agencies acceptance, credibility and opened doors.

*“An **interventionist** force [...] which does not quickly gain acceptance and confidence of the people is likely to face impossible obstacles on its pathway to full reformation as valuable resources which could otherwise be directed towards state building will be required to suppress uprising and call into question the very legitimacy of the intervention itself”.*



## Vocabulary Building 2

Match the definition to the correct word

A. <b>Accountable Policing</b>	B. <b>Repressive Policing</b>	C. <b>Civil Society</b>
D. <b>local ownership</b>	E. <b>legitimacy</b>	F. <b>Customary Law</b>
G. <b>legal instruments</b>	H. <b>broker</b>	I. <b>rehabilitation</b>
J. <b>liable</b>	K. <b>intervention</b>	L. <b>donor</b>

1.	legally responsible, answerable, accountable
2.	any law(s) passed by a recognized legislative body in national or international law
3.	“what has always been done and accepted as law”; standards of a community that have been long-established as law
4.	Initiatives driven by the local community, for the local community
5.	intercession, interference, to become involved
6.	holding police officers and policing agencies responsible for effectively delivering basic services of crime control and public order, while treating individuals fairly within the law
7.	negotiate, deal, advise
8.	supporter, patron, contributor
9.	policing actions which by-pass laws and restrict civil freedoms to ensure public order and State security
10.	legality, acceptability, real
11.	social re-education and reintegration
12.	Non-governmental organisations, community groups, the “third sector” (not government nor business)



## Liberal Democratic Programming

SSR is most often started utilising the *Liberal Democratic* programme of rule of law, human rights, **transparency**, accountability and other Western-orientated governance mechanisms – some of which may seem forced. The use of such mechanisms is an ‘exercise in **compromise**’ due to **compatibility issues** with established local governance structures, customs, laws, or religion. However, the result of regime change, through **popular overthrow** or international intervention<sup>1</sup>, calls for a political process of **inclusion**, **equal representation** and justice. No other modern political system offers this except democracy. Although the Arab Monarchies<sup>2</sup> survived the Arab Spring, the *winds of change* that swept through neighbouring countries also forced them to modify domestic policy, granting more rights and freedoms to their citizens. Fittingly, in the words of Winston Churchill,

*“Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time....”*

Security Sector Reform is both deeply cultural and political – requiring the active “buy-in” of the Host Nation - as it re-wires existing authority structures and practices, requiring four cultural knowledge areas:

- **Organisational Culture**
- National Identity
- Police Culture
- Community

## Vocabulary Building 3

Find the correct word or words (highlighted above) and match them to the definition below

1.	A.	values and behaviours that are unique to a professional group e.g. police
2.	B.	negotiation given-and-take
3.	C.	meaning that all groups are fairly represented
4.	D.	are not well-matched, cannot work or fit together well
5.	E.	revolution, coup, takeover by the masses
6.	F.	the ability to see everything, no activity is hidden
7.	G.	the process of involving and improving the ability and opportunity of minorities to take part in society

<sup>1</sup> Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya

<sup>2</sup> Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates



## Section Two:

### Discussion Questions

1. How does corruption undermine the aims of “Security Sector Reform”?
2. Rule of Law and Human Rights mechanisms are “Western” – and therefore not relevant in many countries. Agree or Disagree? Why?
3. Do similar instruments exist in Buddhist, Hindi and Muslim countries?
4. What role does Human Rights play in law enforcement?
5. Why is gender such an important theme in SSR programmes?
6. What role does culture have in mentoring, advising, and training police officers from the host nation?

### Project

Your group has been sent as Police Advisors to help re-establish, train and empower a National Police Service in Myanmar.

As a result of a short but brutal civil war there are no recognised or functional national security forces.

Apart from assisting with the normalisation process through the establishment of a state security sector, ultimately your Mission's aim is to limit - if not end - the refugee crisis and the trafficking of persons.



Based on your knowledge discuss:

- A. What steps you will need to take
- B. Focus areas
- C. Partners
- D. What challenges and obstacles you believe you'll face
- E. How will you solve them



### “Justice at the Barrel of a Gun: Vigilantes in Mexico”

A rapid expansion in 2013 of vigilante militias – unauthorised civilian armed groups that claim to fight crime – has created a third force in Mexico’s ongoing cartel-related violence. Some of these militias contain well-meaning citizens and have detained hundreds of suspected criminals. However, they challenge the government’s necessary monopoly on the *use of force* to impart justice. As the militias spread, there is also concern some are being used by criminal groups to fight their rivals and control territory. The Federal Administration needs to develop a coherent policy for dealing with the vigilantes, so that it can work with authentic community policing projects while stopping the continued expansion of unregulated armed groups; this also requires demonstrating that the state has sufficient capacity to restore law and order on its own. If the government fails to deal with this issue, militias could spread across the country, triggering more violence and further damaging the rule of law.

President Peña Nieto had expected to have to cope with the well-armed, ruthless cartels that dominate portions of the country, as well as the problems presented by uncoordinated national, state and municipal law enforcement bodies and a legacy of *impunity*. The appearance of a growing number of armed groups in at least nine of the 31 states, from close to the U.S. border to the south east, however, has added another dangerous level of complexity to the security challenge. Their epicentre is in the Pacific states of Guerrero and Michoacán, where thousands of armed men participate in a range of vigilante organisations. There have been more than 30 killings there since January 2013, either by or against the vigilantes, and they have become increasingly worrying hotspots of insecurity. While the vigilante killings are still only a fraction of the more than 5,000 cartel-related murders that took place across Mexico in the first five months of Peña Nieto’s administration, the concern is that this new type of violence could expand across the land.



The violence has coincided with protests against government reforms in these states, including road blockades and looting of food trucks that are part of a broader challenge to authority. The government launched a major security offensive in Michoacán in May that has weakened the militia presence there, at least in the short term. In Guerrero, the state government has made agreements with some militia leaders in an attempt to lessen their impact. However, various vigilante groups are still active, and some of the core problems of insecurity that led to their presence are unresolved.



The vigilantism issue is complicated by the fact that many communities, particularly indigenous, have a centuries-old tradition of *community policing*. Many groups have shown themselves to be successful and have demonstrated legitimate ways of providing security. However, it is legally ambiguous how far such community groups can go in bearing arms and *imparting* justice. Furthermore, many of the new militias copy the language and claim the same rights as these community police, even though they do not come from a local tradition or are not even rooted in indigenous communities.

The government needs to work with the authentic and unarmed community police and clearly define the boundaries of what they can and cannot do. Some rules can be guidelines that are being developed under state and federal laws or by expanding agreements being worked out between state governments and community leaders. In some cases, the government needs to require the disarmament of vigilante groups; in yet others, it needs to more aggressively detain and prosecute militias with criminal links. But the government also needs to significantly improve security in all the communities where militias have been formed. Many residents have taken up arms because the state has systematically failed to protect them. The outcry for security is legitimate; but justice is better served through functional state institutions than the barrels of private guns.

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### ***Citizens become Armed Vigilantes to take on a Drug Gang***

By Patrick J. McDonnell (Los Angeles Times), 17 DECEMBER 2016, MEXICO

The self-proclaimed good guys, masked men carrying shotguns and hunting rifles, kept guard last week outside what used to be the town police station, back when the town still had a police force. “Movement for Peace” is now written on the police station wall.

*“The people couldn’t take it anymore,”* said one of the men, who hid his face behind a yellow handkerchief and identified himself only as Jose, a 42-year-old father of three. *“The government does nothing to help, and we want peace for the future generations. “Maybe in the end, they will kill us all, including our families,”* he said. *“But we are in this till the end.”*

Inside the building, fellow townsfolk were holding at least 17 hostages they say were members or allies of the local drug gang.



After years of violence and intimidation, the fed-up citizens of San Miguel Totolapan, population 4,000, had taken the dangerous step of fighting back against Los Tequileros (“the Tequila drinkers”), the syndicate that dominates drug trafficking and other illicit activity in this stretch of Guerrero state in southwestern Mexico. Their tactics included kidnapping the mother of a gang kingpin.

The violence-ridden region is a major production zone of the opium poppy, the raw material used to produce heroin smuggled north to the United States. The zone is also a blackhole of lawlessness.

Armed bands, including Los Tequileros, battle for control of the lucrative smuggling trade in the so-called tierra caliente, or hot land. The phrase refers to the area’s overwhelming heat and humidity but has taken on additional meaning as organized crime has soared.

Guerrero state authorities reported a record 2,068 homicides between January and November 2016. November topped the list with 231 killings.

The fragmented drug gangs also traffic in extortion, kidnapping, robbery and murder. Los Tequileros boasts its own “special forces” of professional killers with colourful nicknames. Last year, police arrested an alleged tequilero enforcer, Juan Vargas Macedo, a.k.a. “El Garfield.”

The chaos has left some towns, including San Miguel Totolapan, as virtual no-go zones, where residents say police and the army are seldom seen. Taxi drivers in the nearby market town of Altamirano refuse when asked for a lift here.

*“Demasiado peligroso,”* they say. Too dangerous.

The town cops were in bed with the criminals, according to state authorities - who solved that problem two years ago, by disbanding the police force. No one filled the law enforcement void.

Some nearby communities are abandoned because residents fled in fear. Scars from high-calibre rounds mark a few buildings along winding roads through corn and bean fields, and dense brush where cows and goats graze.

In June 2014, the bullet-riddled body of Maria Felix Jaimes, a former councilwoman in San Miguel Totolapan, was found with a sign, presumably from Los Tequileros.

*“This is going to happen to anyone who passes information to ‘the fish,’ ”* said the sign, referring to the head of a rival gang known as the Michoacan Family. *“You are next.”*



Last week, things reached a boiling point here. It started with the kidnapping last Sunday of 37-year-old Isaura de Paz Duque, a widely respected engineer whose firm is one of the area's few regular sources of employment. In retaliation the next day, townsfolk launched a risky strategy. Calling themselves a "self-defence force," they took up arms and abducted the mother of Raybel Jacobo de Almonte, known as El Tequilero ("the Tequila Drinker"). The vigilantes abducted at least 17 others who they said were linked to his mob.

The drama played out on videos posted on YouTube. Yadira Guillermo, wife of the kidnapped engineer, appeared in a clip urging the Guerrero governor to intervene to secure the release of her husband. *"We have here ... the mother of the man called Tequilero,"* the wife declared. *"I ask for an exchange: I will deliver his mother if they deliver my husband. ... But I want him safe and sound."*

The gaunt-looking mother, Maria Felix de Almonte, was videotaped in captivity pleading with her infamous son to do the right thing. *"Look, son, if you have the engineer, turn him over, please,"* she said in a chastising tone as she looked into the camera. *"If you have him, I'm confident that you will release him. Do it, please."*

Her son is a figure of dark legend here. Authorities say he is wanted on suspicion of murder, kidnapping and extortion, among other crimes. Last month, he eluded a massive manhunt.

*"All indications are that he is hiding out in caves,"* the state's top prosecutor, Xavier Olea, told local radio at the time. *"He's not someone who can be walking in the mountains for two or three hours,"* added the prosecutor, noting that de Almonte suffers from a bullet wound to a leg and sometimes must be carried by his associates.

By late Wednesday, the vigilantes and Los Tequileros struck a deal. News footage showed the engineer being reunited with his wife and children. A separate clip documented El Tequilero's frail mother stepping into a pickup, surrounded by heavily armed state police.

Even with the other hostages still captive, some measure of calm returned to San Miguel Totolapan by the next day. State and federal police pickups rumbled up and down largely abandoned streets. In the central plaza, the doors to city hall were opened, but no one was inside. A plastic Christmas tree towered above the mostly vacant plaza.

Women with scarves concealing their faces waved white flags and occasionally chanted, *"We want peace!"*



*“Really, we are all just tired of the lawlessness and violence,”* said one of them, who identified herself only as Maria out of fear, she said, that the gangs would retaliate against her for taking part in the vigilante uprising. The mother of three, said she was familiar with kidnapping, having been a victim two years ago when she was held for a week until her family paid a ransom. *“I am fortunate to be here alive today,”*.

The armed “self-defence” militiamen patrol outside the former police headquarters, their hostages inside. They conceded that in confronting the thugs, they had resorted to their tactics. But the vigilantes said they had no choice: It was the only way anybody would listen to them.

On Friday, the state police and army met the demands of the townsfolk and agreed to establish a strong local presence and hunt down the fugitive El Tequilero. In return, the citizens released the hostages. The crisis appeared to have passed, for now.

De Paz, the engineer whose kidnapping sparked the confrontation, has been welcomed back as a hero since his release. Outside his home, ecstatic neighbours embraced him and celebrated his survival.

*“The people of this pueblo never raised arms till now,”* he said. *“The people took to the streets, and that is their right,”* added a smiling de Paz. *“They have had enough with what is going on in this country. ... It’s like when a person has a fever. That means something is wrong, no? Or when a car overheats. Eventually it explodes. That is what happened here in San Miguel.”*

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## Discussion

1. In the Mexican context, what is *Community Policing*?
2. What strategic role does community police play in your state?
3. What civil society–police partnerships exist in your state? Benefits/Drawbacks?
4. Does your State recognise the role of customary/traditional justice?
5. What tools are used to open and maintain dialogue, and relations?

## Project

A senior officer from the Mexican Federal Police is visiting your Police seeking advice, strategic ideas and concepts on how to resolve the vigilante issue. He is especially interested to hear suggestions from officers working on the streets, as this is the level where such ideas are implemented and practiced; ultimately the work is the same.

What would you advise? What works in your State? Would it work in Mexico?

Resulting from the visit, your country has been invited to establish a bilateral advisory SSR Mission. Based on the article, what areas would you concentrate on, and what stakeholders would you involve?

## The Gladbeck Hostage Crisis

The Gladbeck hostage situation unfolded over 54 hours in the summer of 1988, after Dieter Degowski and Hans-Jürgen Rösner, both already convicts and armed, robbed a branch of Deutsche Bank in the Ruhr valley town and took hostages away in cars and a hijacked bus. Three people, including two teenage hostages, and a police officer whose vehicle crashed, were killed.



The gangsters' odyssey, from 16 to 18 August 1988, involved a road chase from the Ruhr, northwards to Bremen, and into the Netherlands before they were intercepted by police special forces on a motorway near Bonn.

The incident is notorious for becoming a media circus in Germany and the Netherlands.

### Chronicle

#### 16 August

In the early morning two armed and hooded offenders broke into a branch of the Deutsche Bank in Gladbeck before opening hours.


At 8:04 am an emergency call was made by a witness to the police. A parked police car was seen by the offenders as they left the branch. They went back into the bank and took two bank clerks hostage, demanding a car and ransom money, firing their guns into the air several times.

A radio station was the first to conduct an interview with them as the hostage crisis was happening. After several hours of negotiations, the abductors were given 300,000 DM and a white Audi 100 as a *getaway* car. At 9:45pm the getaway started. Marion Löblich, the girlfriend of Hans-Jürgen Rösner, boarded the car in Gladbeck.

#### 17 August

After driving on the autobahn to Bremen, the abductors stopped and hijacked a public-transit bus with 32 passengers at 7:00 pm on 17 August. The media interviewed the abductors and the hostages without any interference from the police. Some hostages had a pistol pressed against their throats.

After the release of five hostages, the bus was driven to the autobahn service area of Grundbergsee, where the two bank clerks were released.



Two police officers arrested Marion Löblich, who was using the toilet. Demanding an exchange, Degowski and Rösner threatened to kill a hostage every five minutes. After the expiration of the ultimatum they shot a 15-year-old Italian boy, Emanuele Di Giorgi, in the head; he was said to be protecting his sister. Löblich was about to be released by the police on demand of the abductors but arrived too late because of a broken handcuff key and poor police communication. An ambulance arrived 20 minutes later, but the shot teenager died two hours later in hospital.

After this incident the bus was driven to the Netherlands. During the chase a police car collided with a truck, leaving one police officer dead and another injured.

# The Gladbeck Hostage Crisis

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## 18 August

At 2:30am on 18 August 1988, the bus entered the Netherlands. At 5:15am two women and three children were released, after the Dutch Police refused to negotiate as long as children were being held hostage. At 6:30am Rösner and Degowski were given a BMW 735i. The new getaway car had been prepared with a "kill switch", so that the engine could be stopped by remote control. While attempting to escape, Löblich and the bus driver were injured.

During a stop in Wuppertal the abductors went shopping at a pharmacy.

After stopping in a pedestrian area in Cologne at 10:30am, the car was surrounded by media and shoppers. Some reporters offered to guide the abductors on their way or to hand them pictures of police officers to prevent trickery if hostages were exchanged. A reporter - Udo Röbel - guided the abductors to a nearby rest area on the autobahn and accompanied them for several kilometres.

On the A3 close to Bad Honnef, a few kilometres before the state border between North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate, a police car rammed the getaway car at 1:40pm and rendered it immobile, triggering a gunfight. During the firefight, one of the hostages, Ines Voitle, was able to exit the car, the other - 18-year old Silke Bischoff - was fatally shot (presumably by Rösner). Soon after the abductors were arrested.



The remote control intended to stop the car engine was not used as the responsible police officers had forgotten to take it with them. Across the state border in Rhineland-Palatinate, Federal Police Special Forces (GSG9) were in position waiting to take action.

## Trial

On 22 March 1991 Rösner and Degowski were pronounced guilty by the regional superior court of Essen, receiving life sentences. Löblich was sentenced to nine years. In 2002 the Higher Court in Hamm ascertained "*guilt of a very serious nature*" and Degowski's sentence was increased to 24 years. In 2004 the same Higher Court refused an application for parole and a request by Rösner to shorten his sentence. The court also declared a state of "preventive detention" ("Sicherungsverwahrung"). In October 2015, Rösner was allowed to leave prison for four hours the first time in 27 years. In November 2017 he went into a resocialization programme. Degowski was released from prison on 15 February 2018 with a new identity.

## Aftermath

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On 20 November 1988, the Bremen Minister of the Interior Bernd Meyer resigned over mistakes by the police. Several years after the incident, there was a public discussion at a local police academy about the incident with the judge who had sentenced Rösner and Degowski to life in prison and journalists including Udo Röbel, the reporter who had got into the vehicle with the hostage-takers and went with them, giving them directions out of Cologne. The judge praised Röbel for having prevented a potential bloodbath in Cologne. This was not a view expressed in the official report into the incident by a parliamentary enquiry in the state of the North Rhine Westphalia, which commented negatively on the journalists' ethics.

Emanuele de Giorgi was buried in Italy; his family returned there to live in late 1988. Silke Bischoff was buried in the family grave of her grandfather. Ines Voitle survived, but suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression.

# The Gladbeck Hostage Crisis

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## Exercise – Lessons Learned



### Group Discussion A:

1. Identify what went wrong with the police decision making process, including interagency cooperation and coordination.
2. What role did politics and public opinion play?
3. What effect did the media have on the case?
4. Make recommendations for the future handling of such cases.
5. If your group had been responsible for establishing the Incident Command System (BAO):
  - a. What steps would you have taken?
  - b. What would your priorities have been?

### Group Discussion B:

Your group are on duty and have been informed that a 15-year-old girl - Jessica Sims - has been reported missing (for the last 18 hours). She left home upset after arguing with her parents about not being allowed to go to a party. The parents have had little luck in finding her: she's not answering her cell phone, and as they are new to the area (6 months) don't know their daughter's friend's last names.

1. What are the first steps you would take to discover her whereabouts?
2. Through enquiries you've established that *foul-play* may be involved? What happens now?

# Kings of Cocaine: How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade



***'They're sophisticated, clever – and they always deliver': from the ports of Europe to the streets of London, one criminal network is now at the top of the UK's £5bn trade***  
(based on an article by Mark Townsend, *The Guardian*, 13 January 2019)



Something had happened the night before and the guys on the corner were keen to offer advice: *"You don't want to be hanging around here too long,"* one said, refusing to elaborate. They were standing near Crispe House, a tower block on east London's "Gascoigne housing Estate", undisputed territory of **Hellbanianz**.

The gang, an Albanian street crew of drug dealers, is known locally for its violence and more widely for a social media output featuring Ferraris, piles of £50 notes and gold Rolex watches to help enhance its reputation and recruit "youngsters". The Gascoigne Estate, built in the 1960s, is its historical home turf.

It was getting dark, another two men appeared and, when asked if they were Hellbanianz, one said: *"You should go."* The reporters were escorted off the estate and told not to return.

Hellbanianz belong to the "retail arm" of the cocaine trade. They are the street dealers and enforcers of the **Mafia Shqiptare**, the Albanian organised criminal syndicates who, the National Crime Agency (NCA) believe, are consolidating power within the UK criminal underworld and on their way to a near total takeover of the UK's £5bn cocaine market.

The gang's glossily produced rap music videos remind viewers *"HB are ready for violence"* and that they possess the necessary manpower and firearms. Even so, police sources say, Hellbanianz occupy the lowest rung of the Albanian mafia.

To better understand the Albanians' remarkable rise in the UK one might climb to the 12<sup>th</sup> floor of the Gascoigne Estate's high-rise blocks. From there, the skyline of London, where much of their cocaine will be snorted, stretches west. In the opposite direction, several kilometres along the Thames, lie the mammoth container ports where their cocaine is offloaded in multi-kilo shipments. But it is across the Atlantic, to the jungles of Latin America, where the story of the Mafia Shqiptare starts.

How Albanians came to conquer the UK's cocaine market is a lesson in criminal savvy; the value of making friends with the world's most dangerous mafias; and the absolute threat of violence.

It began with a business model that was simple in concept, but sufficiently bold to subvert the existing order. For years cocaine's international importers worked separately from its wholesalers and the gangs. Pricing structure varied, depending on the drug's purity; the higher it was, the more it cost.

The Albanians ditched the entire model. They began negotiating directly with the Colombian cartels who control coca production. Huge shipments were arranged direct from South America. Supply chains were kept in-house.

## Kings of Cocaine: How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade



Intelligence obtained by British experts revealed that the Albanians were procuring cocaine from the cartels for about £4,000 to £5,500 a kilo, at a time when rivals thought they were getting a decent deal using Dutch wholesalers selling at £22,500 a kilo. The Albanians lowered the price of cocaine – and increased its purity. More massive consignments were brought into the UK.



Tony Saggars, the former head of the Drugs Threat and Intelligence Unit at the National Crime Agency, who has spent 30 years analysing the rhythms of the global narcotics economy, said: *“What they have done very intelligently is say: ‘OK, we’ve got these margins to play with and we’re going to give a good slice of that to the customer.’”*

The Albanian effect has profoundly shaped the use, production and economy of cocaine. The drug is at its cheapest in the UK since 1990 and purer than it has been for a decade, which has caused record fatalities. The UK has the highest number of young users in Europe. More broadly, far bigger and more frequent shipments of the drug have been seized entering the UK as cocaine production in South America has hit record levels - up 31% on 2016.

Rivals to the Albanian gangs like Hellbanianz initially struggled to compete because they had an inferior, more expensive product. Their only option has been to buy cocaine sourced from the Mafia Shqiptare.

Saggars said: *“They have shown that you don’t have to be greedy to dominate drug markets. They’ve gone down the route of sustainable prices, good quality.”*

Mohammed Qasim, a Leeds Beckett University researcher in the drug trade, described the Albanian business approach as “fantastic”, adding: *“if they were a traditional listed business, they would be considered a Fortune 500 company.”*

Yet for the Albanians’ model to truly work it required control of Europe’s ports. For that the Mafia Shqiptare needed to collaborate with the **‘Ndrangheta**, the most powerful and globalised of the Italian mafias, which controls mainland Europe’s cocaine trade.

There is considerable evidence that not only are the Albanians working with the ‘Ndrangheta, but that they have formed the tightest of alliances. Sources say the Italian mafia consider the Albanians as equals. Saggars said: *“There’s a strong Italian-organised mafia link with Albanians now, Albanians are working with them – not in competition with them. Plus, historically, the Italians have good contacts in Latin America.”*

## Kings of Cocaine: How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade



Rotterdam in the Netherlands is Europe's largest seaport, with eight million containers passing through each year. Many arrive via the direct "Colombian express" route before crossing to Harwich in Essex or Hull.

The second busiest European port is Antwerp in Belgium, which connects to the Thames port of Tilbury, 24 kilometres from Hellbanianz territory.

Collectively, the Belgian and Dutch ports employ 240,000 people, an army of whom, police intelligence indicates, work for the 'Ndrangheta and Mafia Shqiptare.

*"This gives the Albanians based on the near continent, direct access and control of it [cocaine] at the ports,"* said Saggars.



NCA describes Belgium and the Netherlands as "key nexus points of consolidation and onward trafficking of illicit commodities" and confirmed Albanian groups were "expanding their influence upstream" – police-speak for strengthening their grip on international cocaine supply.

Anna Sergi, a University of Essex specialist in mafia relationships, confirmed Albanians and the southern Italian crime group have joined forces. *"Whenever the 'Ndrangheta is shipping things over, they work a lot with the Albanians,"* she said.

Last month *Operation Pollino*, named after the area of southern Italy where the 'Ndrangheta has its roots, arrested 90 suspects. Anti-mafia prosecutors described how the 'Ndrangheta relied on "permanent groups working in ports and harbours" along with Albanian criminal networks.

In 2017 an Albanian cocaine dealer was caught at a London petrol station with false Italian identification documents on his car and two kilos of the drug hidden in its boot.

The most vulnerable point for drug smugglers is the port of entry. Security is tight, options are finite. Sources say that the 'Ndrangheta has outsourced this element of the supply chain to the Albanians.

## Kings of Cocaine: How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade

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*“You need the best people to get it out of port. If you are good at moving things then you stay ahead of your competitors – and the Albanians are good at this,”* said Sergi.

Yet even the most senior Albanians are caught sometimes. Klodjan Copja, 30, who ran a £60m cocaine imports syndicate, was jailed in 2017 after his couriers were intercepted meeting drug-laden lorries arriving in Kent.

One striking facet of what the NCA term the Albanians’ *“increasing prominence”* is their having – so far – avoided becoming embroiled in tit-for-tat feuds with rivals. The latest UK criminal threat assessment says that the Albanians are unusually skilled at developing relationships and *“forging links with other OCGs [organised criminal gangs]”*.

Such relationship-building has left Liverpool as the only part of England not routinely selling Albanian-sourced cocaine. Not only has the Merseyside port its own direct access to South America, Siggers says that its turf is jealously guarded by the city’s own criminal gangs.

Also working in the Albanians’ favour is their reputation for violence. Siggers says the backdrop of the Kosovo conflict has given them a *swagger* comparable to that of Irish criminals during and after “the Troubles”.

*“They are quite charismatic and known to prioritise relationship-building rather than competitive feuds. Also, when you come from a country where there’s been conflict and you have a reputation for ruthlessness the charisma is underlined with an element of ‘actually, we do need to get on with these people’,”* he said.

Qasim also points to how the Albanian are regarded in criminal circles. *“They are sophisticated, professional and they do what they promise. They always deliver,”* he said.

This has much to do with the Albanian code of **besa** – “to keep the promise” – but Sergi adds that the reputation of the Mafia Shqiptare must also be viewed through the ancestral code of **kanun**, the right to take revenge: that blood must pay with blood.

*“You must trust the ones similar to you,”* she said. The concept was meant to keep things internal, close.

Then the younger generation began making flashy videos and waving money around, and along came Hellbanianz.

The Gascoigne Estate is bordered on its south and west by the A13 motorway and the North Circular roads, urban barricades against neighbouring gangs such as Newham’s Beckton Black Squad. In the mid-1990s the estate was run by white working-class crime families. *“If you were black and went there you’d come out in an ambulance,”* said David, a former resident.

Locals say Hellbanianz has moved operations north, to a prime spot near the Kings Lounge pub. *“They gather at 9pm, same faces, same lot,”* one said. Some might recognise the faces from YouTube where Hellbanianz posts footage to try to lure “falcons” – fresh recruits - with shots of scantily clad women, wheel-spinning Bentleys and abundant wads of money.

## Kings of Cocaine: How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade



Saggers said: *“The retail market is the get-rich-quick environment. If they’re importing kilos for a few thousand dollars, imagine how much money those youngsters are turning over if they’re selling at £40 a gram?”*

Before its account was closed in November, Hellbanianz had 115,000 Instagram followers. The video for “Hood Life”, which opens with a drone shot of the Gascoigne Estate, has been watched more than 7.5m times. The gang’s lyrics discuss defending the area

with “kallash” (AK47s) – and dishing out threats to rival Albanian outfit OTR (On Top of the Rest) and a fair few others. Their latest video, released in late October 2018, states they are “ready for war”.

One resident called Hellbanianz the “stabbers”. He said: *“You’d be walking home and feel a little prick on your leg and later you realised you’d been stabbed by one of the Albanian kids.”*

Such disregard was evident in the case of Hellbanianz member Tristen Asllani, who in 2016 lost control during a high-speed police chase in North London, and ploughed into a shop. In the crumpled car, officers found a suitcase full of cocaine and later, at the 29-year-old’s home, another 21kg of the drug and a Skorpion machine pistol with a silencer. Such reckless behaviour helps explain why Albanians are the third largest foreign nationality in UK prisons. The figure is even more startling when considering the tiny number of UK organised criminals the NCA believes are Albanian – 0.8%.

Hellbanianz’s high life – the bling, the violence – has created tensions within the Albanian community, particularly the provoking of police. The “Hood Life” video shows gang members surrounding a Metropolitan Police patrol car. *“This goes against the Albanian culture. Some of their higher end drug dealers, international traders, don’t like this behaviour. It exposes their activities. They want to be low-key, making profits without being caught,”* said Qasim.

On Longridge Road, home to the local Albanian restaurants, some scowl when the gang or names of prominent members are mentioned. Others deny its existence.

Another repercussion of the Albanian model has, say some, helped fuel knife crime and drug disputes by making cocaine affordable to smaller, younger street gangs. A recent report by the London borough of Waltham Forest said gangs were moving from *postcode rivalries* to commercial enterprises focused on dealing cocaine. In the New Year, 14-year-old Jayden Moodie was killed in the borough during a targeted attack.

Meanwhile, so long as Mafia Shqiptare keeps delivering their cocaine, recruiting teenagers to the Hellbanianz gangster life has never been easier.

*(edited for length and content 17 January 2019)*



## Honour among thieves: gang's sacred oath of loyalty

The concept of Besa is extremely important in Albanian culture, especially in the rural North where many of the gangs come from.

- Just as the Italian mafia has the law of **Omerta** – silence – Albanian mobsters are governed by a code of honour they call **Besa**.
- Besa is the highest ethical code in Albanian culture.
- Besa means “keeping a promise”.
- It is considered a verbal contract of trust.
- Muslim Albanians were honouring Besa when they helped protect Jews from the Nazis.
- Today, gangsters use the term Besa as a name for their “code of honour”.
- New recruits are required to take an oath that means each man gives his life to the rest.
- The close-knit nature of the gangs insulates them from outsiders and prevents police efforts to infiltrate their networks.
- Albanian gangsters have a much looser structure to their crime networks than their more famous Italian counterparts.
- Much like the Russian Mafia, Albanians are thought to work with a Leadership Council at the top of their criminal network.
- Each crime family will have a leader, known as the “**krye**” who chooses “**kryetar**” to work below them as underbosses.
- The krye runs an executive committee known as a **barjack** from which decisions are made on what businesses needs doing.
- Once decided, the orders are filtered down to the gangsters on the ground.

## Discussion

1. What parallels and differences do you see to the drug trade in your jurisdiction/area of operation?
2. Organised crime gangs tend to operate either in dedicated geographic territories or in specific criminal activities (e.g. prostitution, drugs, counterfeit/fake merchandise etc.). In your jurisdiction, which “gangs” are known to operate in specific crime?
3. What strategies do your police use to tackle gang and organised crime? Do they work? Could the approach be improved, and how?
4. How do you deal with/approach *codes of honour* such as Besa?
5. What kind of relationship/dialogue does your police have with crime gangs?



**INSTRUCTIONS:** STUDY THE IMAGE BELOW **VERY CAREFULLY** FOR FIVE MINUTES. YOU WILL BE ASKED DETAILED QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS IMAGE THROUGHOUT THE NEXT 12 QUESTIONS. ONCE YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO TURN THE PAGE, YOU WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO LOOK BACK AT THE PHOTOGRAPH.



# NYPD Entrance Exam - Sample



## YOU MAY NOT LOOK BACK AT THE PHOTOGRAPH

Answer questions 1 through 12 based on the photograph you previously studied

1. What were the letters indicated on the subway?

A. D G H J	B. B J M L
C. B M Q R	D. D N Q M

2. How many air conditioners are in the photograph?

A. 1	B. 3
C. 0	D. 2

3. What does the sign directly above Hair 4 You say?

A. Hair	B. Wigs
C. Sale	D. Open

4. What is the address of Down Town Shoe Repair?

A. 1408-14	B. 1509-16
C. 1416-09	D. 1409-14

5. How many light poles are in the photo.?

A. 1	B. 2
C. 0	D. 3

6. Which store indicates they make keys?

A. Keys R Us	B. Jay St. Deli
C. Store For Rent	D. Down Town Shoe Repair

7. What is the address of the Jay St. Deli?

A. 1413-18	B. 1418-16
C. 1411-18	D. 1407-14

8. Which store has the following address 1415-20 Jay St.?

A. U.S. Auto School	B. Rapid Refund\$
C. Lawyers	D. Shoe Repair

9. What is the phone number of U.S. Auto School?

A. 646-251-4403	B. 846-351-4403
C. 846-251-4403	D. 846-239-8580

10. The bus stop is in front of which of the following stores?

A. Jay St. Deli	B. Hair 4 You
C. Shoe Repair	D. Store For Rent

11. How many people can you see in the window on the second floor?

A. 2	B. 1
C. 0	D. 3

12. The ATM sign is hanging from which stores awing?

A. Downtown Shoe Repair	B. Jay St. Deli
C. Hair 4 You	D. Store For Rent



Answer questions 13 through 16 solely on the basis of the following passage.

Police Officers Bret Clemens and Sam Harte are dispatched to 83-67 Richardson Boulevard, Apartment 23F, at 8.53pm, on 18 November 2018, in response to a burglary reported by a Mr. Kegler. They arrive at the apartment at 8.58pm, ring the doorbell and are greeted by Mr. and Mrs. Kegler. Mr. Kegler tells the officers that he left for his foreman's job at the telephone company at 7.00am and that his wife left for her secretary's job 10 minutes later. After work, Mr. Kegler picked up his wife and they returned to their apartment at 8.40pm, having eaten dinner out. When Mrs. Kegler entered the bedroom, she noticed her jewellery box on the floor. She told her husband, who then called the police. While the Keglers waited for the police to arrive, they discovered that all of Mrs. Kegler's jewellery and Mr. Kegler's coin collection, as well as approximately \$175.00 in cash, were missing.

While Officer Harte begins to fill out a crime report, Officer Clemens goes to other apartments on the same floor to interview neighbours who might have additional information about the burglary.

Mrs. Johnston, age 35, who lives in Apt. 23C located directly opposite the elevator, tells Officer Clemens that she heard voices in the hallway outside her apartment door at 4.30pm. She thought that the voices were those of a neighbour's children who sometimes play in the hallway. She opened her door to chase them away but, instead, saw two strange males standing by the elevator. They wore green work clothes. She noticed that the taller man was Caucasian, about 28 years old, 180cm, 75kg, with brown hair, carrying a square leather case. The other man was Hispanic, about 21 years old, 170cm, 68kg., with black hair and a scar on the left side of his face.

Officer Clemens then contacts other residents at apartment 23D, 23E, and 23G. All of them tell the officer that they did not see or hear anything unusual. Officer Clemens then returns to the Keglers' apartment to tell his partner what he learned. In the meantime, Officer Harte had been told by Mr. Kegler that his coin collection was in a square brown leather carrying case.

Officer Harte was also told that Mr. Kegler is 42 years old. His work telephone number is (718) 827-6138 and work address: 273 Eastern Avenue. Mrs. Kegler's work telephone number is (718) 746-3279 and work address: 131 South Moore Street. The Kegler's home telephone number is (718) 653-3946. Mrs. Johnston's home telephone number (718) 653-2714.

Officers Harte and Clemens finish their investigation and complete the crime report.

13. Which one of the following apartments is directly opposite the elevator?

A. 23B	B. 23C
C. 23F	D. 23G

14. Which one of the following was not stolen during the Kegler apartment burglary?

A. \$175.00	B. jewellery
C. coin collection	D. Credit cards



15. What is the approximate age of the taller of the two strangers seen near the elevator?

A.	21	B.	28
C.	42	D.	57

16. Which one of the following identifying marks is part of the description of the shorter male stranger seen standing near the elevator?

A.	Scar	B.	Tattoo
C.	Birthmark	D.	Mole

17. While on patrol, Officer James responds to a traffic accident. The following details were obtained at the scene:

- Place of Accident:** Intersection of 3rd Ave. and 43rd St.
- Time of Accident:** 4.30pm
- Vehicle Involved:** 2017 Volvo
- Driver:** Joe Bedford
- Damage:** Vehicle struck a lamppost causing a dented front bumper.

Officer James is completing a report of the incident. Which one of the following expresses the above information most clearly, accurately and completely?

- A. A 2017 Volvo driven by Joe Bedford struck a lamppost at the intersection of 3rd Ave. and 43rd St. at 4.30pm, causing a dented front bumper.
- B. A car was involved in an accident at the intersection of 3rd Ave. and 43rd St. at 4.30pm. It struck a lamppost causing a dented front bumper. Joe Bedford has a 2017 Volvo.
- C. At 4.30pm Joe Bedford was at the intersection of 3rd Ave. and 43rd St. A 2017 Volvo was involved in an accident when it struck a lamppost causing a dented front bumper.
- D. A 2017 Volvo struck Joe Bedford causing a dented front bumper at the Intersection of 3rd Ave. and 43rd St. at 4.30pm.

18. While on patrol, Officer Jones responds to a robbery. The following details were obtained:

- Place of Crime:** In front of 1430 5th Avenue
- Time of Crime:** Between 8.30am and noon
- Victim:** Andrea Jason
- Crime:** Purse Snatching
- Suspect:** Unidentified



Officer Jones is completing a report of the incident. Which one of the following expresses the above information most clearly, accurately and completely?

- A. Between 8.30am and noon, Andrea Jason was in front of 1430 5th Ave. A purse was snatched by an unidentified person.
- B. A purse was snatched in front of Andrea Jason at 1430 5th Ave. between 8.30am and noon by an unidentified person.
- C. An unidentified person in front of 1430 5th Ave. snatched a purse between 8.30am and noon. Andrea Jason has a purse.
- D. An unidentified person snatched Andrea Jason's purse in front of 1430 5th Ave. between 8.30am and noon.

19. While on patrol, Officer Andre responds to a robbery. The following details were obtained:

<b><u>Place of Crime:</u></b>	In front of 118-92 Shore Avenue
<b><u>Time of Crime:</u></b>	Between midnight and 8.30am
<b><u>Victim:</u></b>	Richard Alvin
<b><u>Crime:</u></b>	Car Theft
<b><u>Vehicle Stolen:</u></b>	2006 Ford
<b><u>Suspect:</u></b>	Unidentified

Officer Andre is completing a report of the incident. Which one of the following expresses the above information most clearly, accurately and completely?

- A. A 2006 Ford was stolen in front of Richard Alvin at 118-92 Shore Avenue between midnight and 8.30am by an unidentified person.
- B. Between midnight and 8:30am Richard Alvin was in front of 118-92 Shore Avenue. A 2006 Ford was stolen by an unidentified person.
- C. An unidentified person in front of 118-92 Shore Avenue stole a car between midnight and 8.30am Richard Alvin has a 2006 Ford.
- D. An unidentified person stole Richard Alvin's 2006 Ford in front of 118-92 Shore Avenue between midnight and 8.30am



Answer question 20 solely on the basis of the following information.

A police officer is prohibited from either accepting awards, gifts, loans or things of value to cover or reimburse any fine or penalty, or accepting a reward for the performance of police service except:

- I. Awards from the City of New York Employees' Suggestion Board.
- II. Official awards of Departmental recognition
- III. Awards to a member of an officer's family for a brave or meritorious act, from a metropolitan newspaper.

20. Police Officer Gold captures a bank robber in the act of holding up a bank. To show appreciation, the bank manager gives the officer a check for \$100.00. Officer Gold accepts the check. Officer Gold's action in accepting the \$100.00 is:
- A. Proper, because the money was given for performance of a brave act.
  - B. Improper, because the capture of the bank robber was not a meritorious act deserving of a reward.
  - C. Proper, because the money was given as a substitute for Departmental recognition.
  - D. Improper, because a police officer is not allowed to accept a reward from a bank for performance of his duties.

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Answer questions 21 and 22 based on the definitions given before each question.

**Burglary:** The crime of burglary is committed when a person enters or remains in a building in which he has no right to be, intending to commit a crime.

21. Which one of the following is the best example of a burglary?
- A. Mr. Jones enters a local drug store to buy a toothbrush. While the sales clerk is busy in the rear of the store, Jones places a toothbrush in his pocket and leaves without paying.
  - B. Bartholomew, a teenager, passes the open door of an electrical power station. An "AUTHORIZED PERSONS ONLY" sign is on the door. He does not see anyone, but notices a portable radio on a desk. Although he does not work at the power station He enters the station with the intention of stealing the radio. When he hears footsteps, he leaves without taking the radio.
  - C. Mr. Smith's car breaks down on a lonely road at night. He forces open the door of a nearby unoccupied house in order to get out of the rain.
  - D. Watson, a mechanic, during working hours enters the mechanics' locker room of the factory where he is employed, and steals tools from another mechanic's locker.



**Missing Person:** The NYPD classifies a missing person as any person missing who is:

- I. Under 18 years of age, or
  - II. Likely to commit suicide, or
  - III. Mentally or physically handicapped, or
  - IV. Absent under suspicious circumstances, or
  - V. A possible victim of drowning.
22. Which one of the following should not be classified as a missing person?
- A. Glen Greber, an 18-year-old male, is reported missing from his home in lower Manhattan. He had just returned home from vacation.
  - B. Bobby Brody, a 22-year-old man, is reported missing from his Queens home. He was last seen swimming at a Coney Island beach in very choppy waters.
  - C. George Gilliam, a 17-year-old male, is reported missing from his Brooklyn home by his parents. He had an argument with his mother and walked out of the house 4 days earlier.
  - D. Sally Sanders, a 15-year-old female who is mentally challenged, is reported missing after she wandered away from her Bronx home.
- 

**Answer question 23 solely on the basis of the following information.**

While making an arrest, a police officer may find that the prisoner has a substance which the officer suspects to be narcotics. After the arrest has been made, the following procedures concerning the suspected narcotics should be used, in the order given:

- I. The arresting police officer should notify a ranking officer that the suspected narcotics will be taken to the Police Laboratory for analysis.
  - II. The police officer must record such notification in his Activity Log.
  - III. A ranking officer must sign the Activity Log under police officer's name.
  - IV. At the Police Laboratory, the police officer will complete a Narcotics Analysis Request Form in duplicate:
    - a. The *original copy* should be given to Police Laboratory personnel.
    - b. A duplicate should be retained by the arresting police officer and given to a ranking officer upon return to the police station.
23. Police Officer Ferris, while making an arrest, found a substance that he suspected to be narcotics. Ferris has already notified a ranking officer that he intends to take the substance to the Police Laboratory for analysis. Which one of the following actions should Police Officer Ferris take next?
- A. Complete Narcotics Analysis Request Form in duplicate.
  - B. Record notification in his Activity Log.
  - C. Ask a ranking officer to sign Activity Log.
  - D. Have copy of Narcotics Analysis Request Form forwarded to a ranking officer.



Answer questions 24 and 25 solely based of the following information.

Police officers may find it necessary to stop the driver of a vehicle in order to give the driver a summons, or to arrest or question the occupants. In such situations, police officers should follow the following procedures, in the order given:

- I. Inform radio dispatcher of location, reason for stopping the vehicle, and description of vehicle and its occupants.
- II. Position the police vehicle 6 to 10 feet behind the stopped vehicle.
- III. Each police officer is to watch for any suspicious actions by the stopped vehicle's driver or passengers before approaching the vehicle.
- IV. Determine whether driver is to be summonsed or arrested.
- V. If driver is to be given a summons, one police officer is to write the summons while the other observes the driver and passengers for any suspicious action.
- VI. If arrest is necessary, and additional police officers are required, the additional officers should be summoned by informing the radio dispatcher.

24. Police Officers Fenster and Dickens stop the driver of a 2012 Dodge in order to issue a summons for a traffic violation. There are two passengers in the car. If all appropriate steps have been taken prior to the issuing of the summons, while Police Officer Dickens is writing a summons for the driver, Fenster should be:

- A. Checking to ensure that the police vehicle is 2-3 metres behind the stopped vehicle.
- B. Summoning the radio dispatcher for additional police officers.
- C. Watching the driver and passengers for any suspicious action.
- D. Informing the radio dispatcher of their location, reason for stopping vehicle, description of vehicle, and description of occupants.


25. Police Officers Benson and Jenson stopped a vehicle in order to question the driver and three occupants. The officers have already completed all appropriate actions through determining that the driver and other occupants should be arrested and that additional police officers are needed. Which one of the following actions should the officers take next?

- A. Inform the radio dispatcher that additional police officers are to be summoned.
- B. Inform the radio dispatcher of location and reason for stopping the vehicle.
- C. Write out summons and give it to the driver.
- D. Position police vehicle 2-3 metres behind stopped vehicle.

# NYPD Entrance Exam - Sample



Answer questions 26 through 29 solely on the basis of the following map. The flow of traffic is indicated by the arrows. You must follow the flow of traffic.



26. If you are located at Manchester Row and Desert Blvd. and travel east on Manchester Row to Valley Drive then turn south onto Valley Drive to Clark Street, and then turn east on Clark Street you will be closest to point:

A.	2	B.	3	C.	6	D.	5
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27. If you are located at point 4 and travel north on Spring View Drive to London Street, then west on London Street to Desert Blvd., you will be closest to point:

A.	1	B.	7	C.	5	D.	2
----	---	----	---	----	---	----	---

28. You are located at Astor Street and Spring View Drive. You receive a call of a crime in progress at the intersection of Beck Street and Desert Boulevard Which one of the following is the most direct route for you to take in your patrol car, making sure to obey all traffic regulations?

- A. Travel north on Spring View Dr. to London St., then west on London St. to Desert Blvd., then south on Desert Blvd. to Beck Street.
- B. Travel west on Astor St. to Desert Blvd. then south on Desert Blvd. to Beck Street.
- C. Travel south on Spring View Dr. to Beck St., then west on Beck St. to Desert Blvd.
- D. Travel south on Spring View Dr. to Eagle St., then west on Eagle St. to Desert Blvd., north on Desert Blvd. to Beck Street.



29. You are located on Clark Street and Desert Boulevard and must respond to a disturbance at Clark Street and Spring View Drive. Which one of the following is the most direct route for you to take in your patrol car, making sure to obey all traffic regulations?
- A. Travel north on Desert Blvd. to Astor Street, then east on Astor St. to Spring View Dr. then south on Spring View Dr. to Clark Street.
  - B. Travel south on Desert Blvd. to Beck Street, then east on Eagle St. to Spring View Dr., then north on Spring View Dr. to Astor Street.
  - C. Travel north on Desert Blvd. to Astor Street, then east on Astor St. to Valley Dr., then south on Valley Dr. to Eagle St., then east on Eagle St. to Spring View Dr., then north on Spring View Dr. to Clark Street.
  - D. Travel north on Desert Blvd. to Astor St., then east on Astor St. to Valley Dr., then south on Valley Dr. to Clark St., then east on Clark St. to Spring View Drive.
- 

**Answer question 30 solely on the basis of the following information.**

On 17 April 2016, several drug-related homicides were committed at different locations. Based on the descriptions of eyewitnesses, it is believed that the same person committed all of the homicides. Police officers are provided with the following description: The suspect is a Hispanic male, with long curly black hair, approximately 68kg, missing two fingers on his left hand, and is wearing a purple wind-breaker.

30. Officer Lopez has stopped four Hispanic males for questioning. Which one of the items of information provided by the witnesses should Officer Lopez consider the most helpful in identifying the suspect?
- A. The suspect is missing two fingers.
  - B. The suspect is wearing a purple wind-breaker.
  - C. The suspect has long hair.
  - D. The suspect weighs approximately 68kg.
- 

**Answer questions 32 and 33 solely on the basis of the following information.**

Officer Duggan is assigned to the Evans Housing Development on West 259th Street and April Avenue. Duggan familiarises himself with the crime statistics of the four buildings in the development for September. All of the robberies took place at 20 West 259th Street. All of the assaults took place at 5 April Avenue. Mailboxes were broken into only at 7 April Avenue. All of the rapes took place at 22 West 259th Street. All of the assaults happened between 3pm and 4pm. Robberies occurred between 11am and 1pm. The mailboxes were broken into shortly after the mail delivery between 1,30pm and 2.30pm. Rapes occurred early in the morning when women left for work from 8am to 9am.

When Duggan is working the 8am to 4pm shift, he must divide his time among the four buildings to prevent these crimes.



31. To reduce the number of rapes he should patrol
1. 20 West 259th St. from 11am to 1pm.
  2. 5 April Avenue from 10.30am to 2.30pm.
  3. 12 West 259th St. from 8am to 9am.
  4. 22 West 259th St. from 8am to 9am.
32. To reduce the number of assaults he should patrol
- A. From 3pm to 4pm at 5 April Avenue.
  - B. From 8am to 9am at 7 April Avenue.
  - C. From 11am to 1pm at 5 April Avenue.
  - D. From 3pm to 4pm at 7 April Avenue.
- 

**Answer questions 33 and 34 on the basis of the following:**





A police officer may have to place barricades or signals on a roadway to warn motorists of hazardous spots on the road.

33. For which one of the following should an officer place a barricade on the roadway?
- A. A one-lane country road.
  - B. A road with several sharp turns.
  - C. A road with two filled-in potholes.
  - D. A road with a broken water main.
34. For which of the following should an officer place a barricade on the roadway?
- A. A 4-lane road with no emergency phone.
  - B. A narrow 2-lane road with construction in the middle of the road.
  - C. A road recently repaved.
  - D. A road covered with dry leaves.
35. A police officer may have to evacuate people from a dangerous area. From which one of the following areas should a police officer evacuate people?
- A. A crowded nightclub.
  - B. A crowded subway station.
  - C. A building where gas is leaking.
  - D. A parking lot where a minor traffic accident has occurred.

# NYPD Entrance Exam - Sample

Answer questions 36 through 39 on the basis of the following sketches.

The first face, on the left, is a sketch of an alleged criminal based on witnesses' descriptions at the crime scene. One of the four sketches to the right is the way the suspect looked after changing appearance. Assume that NO surgery has been done on the suspect. Select the face which is most likely that of the suspect.



### **Mali: Thinking More Broadly About Security Sector Reform**

David Law, Centre for Security Governance,  
10 November 2016  
(*edited and condensed 12 March 2018*)

For the UN, the Mali deployment has been one of its most important to date, one of its largest in terms of numbers of deployed personnel, and one of its most deadly in terms of personnel losses. At the time of writing, MINUSMA also appears to have been one of the least successful.



Overall, implementation of the peace agreement has been slow, uneven and flawed. The ongoing violence has made it difficult for armed groups to withdraw from certain areas, let alone disarm, and has prevented the development and implementation of new power-sharing arrangements, as agreed in Algiers. Mixed Units - to be composed of previous opponents - have not got off the ground as violence among these groups continue. It appears that the political ground work needed to make possible cooperation among Malians from the centre and the North has not been undertaken.

While it is far too soon to draw definitive conclusions from the situation in Mali, the crisis and the efforts to address it raise a number of points that may be instructive for the overall SSR/SSG agenda.

1. The Mali situation confirms that mainstream SSR programming is spot on. This calls for the country's security actors to be capable of:
  - defending the population;
  - using security resources responsibly, and;
  - being subject to effective supervision and oversight (by the executive, the parliament, the judiciary, civil society and the media).

The Malian security sector has traditionally been ineffectively overseen. It has also been grossly under-equipped and financed. It has had little capacity in the North. It was totally unprepared for the challenges that emerged in the country after 2011. Had the Malian security sector been more functional, the country would have had a reasonable chance of neutralizing the destabilizing elements that descended on it as Libya was plunged into chaos and region-wide terrorist ambitions took root.

2. Mali must redouble its efforts to develop a power-sharing formula that respects both the authority of the central government and decentralises the decision-making across its different communities and regions. In a country like Mali, a federalism of sorts, even if basic, needs to take shape. Security sector governance in any national entity needs to ensure that sub-national identities are taken into account and effectively addressed.

## *International Police Crisis Management*

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3. The security situation in Mali cannot be addressed without considering how regional and international developments impact the country. The Tuareg community is a prime example. The Tuaregs are connected with fellow Berber communities across the Sahel and in neighbouring regions. The central government in Mali and their supporting donors need to factor this more prominently into their security sector decision-making. Any national SSR process needs to take into consideration regional interests.
4. The Malian crisis has highlighted how badly prepared the international community is to stage a Mission when intervention becomes the only option. In Mali as many as seven different Missions – local, regional, European, UN – have been engaged in an effort to find a viable response to the crisis. Not only has valuable time and resources been lost in the process of mounting successive overlapping operations, but the credibility of these efforts have suffered.

It seems that MINUSMA was ill-prepared for its missions. A former UN Assistant Secretary General made the following statement about the UN role in Mali:

*“Our most grievous blunder was in Mali. In early 2013, the United Nations decided to send 10,000 soldiers and police officers to Mali in response to a terrorist takeover of parts of the north. Strangely, we sent a force that was unprepared for counterterrorism and explicitly told not to engage in it. More than 80 percent of the force’s resources are spent on logistics and self-protection. Already 56 people in the United Nations contingent have been killed, and more are certain to die.”*

The credibility of the intervention has also been diminished by broad and overlapping mandates. MINUSMA has been criticized for having too wide a mandate, which has led to disagreements over its interpretation, especially given the great number of states involved. MINUSMA has also been criticised for catering to the priorities of the international community



instead of prioritizing the needs and expectations of the Malian people. This may point to a local ownership deficit in responding to the crisis. However, it may also mean that the Malian capacity to deal with the crisis has been so weak and dysfunctional that external actors have had to assume greater responsibilities than they would normally undertake.

At the same time, there has been conflict among international stakeholders about who should take the lead in coordinating the actions on the ground in Mali. In principle, this is the UN’s task. In practice, the EU has been trying to play this role.

In conclusion, there are two all-encompassing issues that come to the forefront when looking at the Malian crisis (from a *security sector* perspective):

## *International Police Crisis Management*

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1. While external actors can play a decisive role in suffocating conflict and helping a country instigate the necessary reforms, over the longer-term security must come from within. A country cannot systematically rely on external actors for support in the reform process, and the support it receives will be limited in volume and in time. At the end of the day, it will have to depend primarily on its own efforts.
2. The Malian experience also points to the need for external actors – ECOWAS, AU, EU, UN – to review the course of events in Mali and how their efforts could have been made, individually and collectively, more effective. In particular, it appears that many of the Missions were implemented without an effective appreciation of the socio-cultural and political realities at work in the country, and how they would need to be reshaped as a requirement for any successful peace and reconstruction process.

It is to be hoped that national, regional and international actors will all come away wiser from their Mali experience. That said, Mali looks increasingly like a state that lacks the material and political capacity to maintain itself as a viable entity. If the latter is true, this will have major implications for neighbouring states and the situation in West Africa – and perhaps adjoining regions of the continent as well.

### **Group Project: MENASTAN**

Your group has been assigned to an OSSG-led International Taskforce to assist with pre-deployment planning and implementation for an upcoming Police Mission in MENASTAN.

1. Provide a Background Brief:
  - *Geopolitical Overview* - demographics, history, politics, government, justice system, state of the economy (*incl.* resources), corruption, infrastructure, communications, human security (rights, protection, food, employment, health, education etc.), state security and current situation (internal/external).
  - *Human Terrain Analysis*, providing ethnic makeup, languages, culture, prominent traditions and customs, religious practices, gender, community roles etc.
2. Draft a *Mission Mandate* featuring purpose and specific aims, mission type, personnel required (numbers, skill-sets etc.), and mission length.
3. The Host Government has agreed – in principle – on an international police mission, however some influential internal actors need convincing. Present a brief explaining how the Rule of Law, Democratic Policing practices, and Security Sector Reform will move the State towards stability and peace, and potentially create the conditions for developing meaningful Human Security.
4. Corruption is entrenched in all levels of local society: present a strategy paper on how corruption undermines good governance, suggesting possible reduction initiatives.
5. Local police *Basic Training* is currently 4-6 weeks long, focusing solely on security orientated-tasks. As part of the SSR package, create a new Basic Training curriculum (consider standards, procedures, legal knowledge, field skills and course length).



During your MENASTAN Mission, your team has been asked to give a brief presentation on policing in your country.

As a lecture in comparative policing, your audience is interested in differing practice and methodologies, e.g. structure, objectives, what works, professional challenges, problems, solutions, lessons learned, change management, recent developments, and the future.

You are expected to:


- Provide a general overview of your Security Sector on the:
  - the National level; and
  - the Regional level
- Briefly discuss individual departments and their responsibilities
- Give an overview of the daily routine i.e. shifts, typical cases etc.
- Prepare relevant vocabulary, charts, maps etc.

Collecting Information

- General information on the National Security Sector
- Structure
- Incident Management
- Crime Scene Management
- Crisis Communications
- Tasks / what areas you concentrate on/ what you are legally required to do
- Problems / lessons learned / developments
- Community engagement
- Education / vocational training / career development
- Pay standards / conditions of retirement
- Rank structure and promotions
- Equipment
- Facilities and Premises



**Fonsamnis** a district of Bellagri, in the east of **Menastan**



Total Area:	1,245.27 km <sup>2</sup>
Population (31/12/2016)	
Total:	305,198
Density:	250/km <sup>2</sup>



## Uniformed Patrol Shift Strength

Area Station	Population	Operating Hours	Patrol + Shift Leader(s)	Patrol Vehicles	Alert Status
<b>Fonsamnis HQ</b>	148,677	24/7	24 + 1	6	
<b>Airport</b>	* 1,200±	24/7	2 + 1 +1	1	
<b>Arce Domum</b>	25,757	24/7	12 + 1	2	
<b>Byron</b>	21,657	0600-2200hrs	2 + 1	1	
<b>Del Pontem</b>	31,949	0600-2200hrs	2 + 1	1	
<b>Aquam</b>	15,695	0600-2200hrs	2 + 1	1	

## Alert Status Legend

<b>Hot Spot (violence, drug-related crimes)</b>
<b>Raised Awareness</b>
<b>Former Crime Hot Spot</b>
<b>Normal</b>

\* 8-hour average of 850,000 passengers per year + Flight Crew + Airport Service Personnel.

## Task:

As a move to tackle increased criminality in the District's south, the District Administrator (responsible for all local governmental services) has authorised the reallocation of Patrol Service personnel and resources. In the past the Fonsamnis HQ Station has provided additional cover for Day Stations (as required), at a loss of a patrol team/vehicle within their own area of responsibility (AOR). Travel times from Fonsamnis HQ to satellite areas vary from 20-40 minutes.

The District Administrator has tasked you with composing workable suggestions and recommendations for:

1. the creation of a *new* Police Station;
2. the strengthening and expansion of an existing station; or
3. an alternative "third" option not previously examined.

*Considerations:* you may only draw on existing personnel and resource strengths (i.e. to build up a new solution, numbers need to be drawn from other stations within the district).

*Note:* Abovementioned strength numbers exclude non-Patrol Service Personnel:

- Community Police Officers i.e. one seasoned officer based in all satellite towns
- All Criminal Investigation Departments and Traffic Police are based in Fonsamnis HQ
- Fonsamnis does not have its own Formed Police Units (Riot Police) or Police Special Forces, but can call upon those of Bellagri - the regional authority (50km north).



## Republic of Ichkeria



<b>Political Status</b>	Country Republic
<b>Established</b>	11 January 1991
<b>Government</b>	(as of March 2012)
<b>Head of State</b>	Aslan Mashtikov
<b>Legislature</b>	Parliament
<b>Area</b>	Total 17,300 km <sup>2</sup>
<b>Population</b>	2,103,686 (2002)
<b>Density</b>	63.8 /km <sup>2</sup>
<b>Urban</b>	33.8%
<b>Rural</b>	66.2%
<b>Main Cities</b>	Michurina (capital); Shali; Urus-Martan; Gudermes; Argun
<b>Main Rivers:</b>	Terek; Sunzha; Argun
<b>Languages</b>	Ichkerian; Cossack; Russian
<b>Time zone(s)</b>	MSD (UTC+04:00)

### Overview

Ichkeria is a country in South-Eastern Europe. Situated in the North Caucasus, it borders Ingushetia (south-west), Stavropol Krai (north-west), Dagestan (north-east, east, south-east), and Georgia (south-west).

A former state of the USSR, Ichkeria chose not to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but rather join the EU-initiated *Eastern Partnership* (EaP).

With a population of 2,100,000 million Inhabitants, by percentage (%) ethnicity the country can be broken down as:

- Ichkerians 71%
- Cossack 23%
- Kumyks 3%
- Ingush 2%
- Others 2%

The two main religions are Islam (Sunni 85%, Sufism 10%, Shia 5%) practiced by ethnic Ichkerians, and Orthodox Christian practiced by the Cossack population. Roman Catholicism is practiced within the “Other” groups.

Before the crisis all ethnicities lived together in peaceful harmony but after the elections in March 2010 the situation all over the country deteriorated tremendously.



The new government (nationalist-conservative party) enacted new laws on labour rights and restricted access to public services. Furthermore, three Cossack Universities in the country lost their budgets and were finally closed down. Cultural and religious activities of the Cossack minority were restricted and the Russo-Cossack dialect was forbidden to be spoken in public. Thousands of Cossack citizens lost their jobs because of the new laws and live in virtual poverty.

In October 2011 Ichkeria experienced the first public appearance of a *Cossack Liberation Army* (CLA), which initiated insurgent acts against the local Police and at a later stage against the Ichkerian Army to have the rights restored that the Cossack population enjoyed before the elections of 2010. The Cossack minority considered the CLA as *freedom fighters*, the Government considered them as *insurgents* and *terrorists*.

The aim of the CLA was to have the rights of the Cossack minority restored by the government. The government rejected all talks and declared a “State of Emergency” – granting security forces emergency powers - authorising lockdowns, curfews, and profile based stop-and-search tactics.

In March-April 2012 the country suffered a short but intensely violent conflict with numerous losses on both sides. It’s estimated about 340 Ichkerian Police Officers and 210 Ichkerian Soldiers lost their lives during the crisis. The Cossack Liberation Army claims that about 600 "freedom fighters" were killed during the uprising.

As a consequence of the conflict, members of the Ichkerian Government - specifically the Ministers of Interior and Defence - as well as high ranking Ichkerian Soldiers and Police Officers face *indictment* by the International War Crimes Tribunal due to *alleged* war crimes.

In August 2012 the OSSG succeeded in getting all involved parties to the negotiation table. After two weeks of intensive negotiations a six-week *cease-fire* of hostilities was reached, resulting in the *Vienna Concorde* - a peace-agreement, signed on 24 August 2012 by all parties, stating clearly that all new laws enacted after March 2010 were to be dismissed and the rights of the Cossack population to be restored with immediate effect.

The United Nations appreciated and supported the regional crisis management undertaken by the OSSG in their UN Resolution 1516 from 16 October 2012.

In February 2013, at the invitation of the Ichkerian Government, OSSG established an *OSSG SSR Mission* within their Rule of Law mandate to:

1. monitor security forces and law enforcement;
2. mentor senior military, police and border guard management;
3. verify the downsizing and role of Police and Security Forces; and
4. protect and promote Human Rights and the Rule of Law.

It is a *non-executive* monitoring and advisory mandate. OSSG Monitors are unarmed and in cases of misconduct by local officials *Non-Compliance Reports* will be drafted. OSSG also have authority to investigate suspected cases of corruption and human rights violations.



## Situation

Three days ago 20 ethnic Cossacks from illegally occupied the government-run *Hydroelectric Dam* at Lake Verkhniy Naur, located 5km south-east of Beno-Yurt. Beno-Yurt is a small Cossack village of around 3000 inhabitants situated in Ichkeria's north.

Before the conflict 120 workers were employed at the Hydroelectric Dam, 40 of them Cossack. In 2012 all 40 Cossack employees were dismissed due to their ethnicity. Although the dismissed Cossack workers demanded to be re-hired in accordance with the *Vienna Concorde* none of them were reinstated. After the occupation the *squatters* forcibly expelled the Ichkerian staff (three of whom suffered minor injuries), then cut the water and power supply from the station. Thus far there has been no physical damage to the station.

To further complicate the situation, Beno-Yurt villagers have blockaded the only road leading towards the Hydroelectric Dam. Only fellow Cossacks have been granted access; local police and Ichkerian employees of the Hydroelectric Dam have been denied access and all attempts have been repeatedly repelled. OSSG Monitors still have access to the village.

As the Verkhniy Naur Hydroelectric Dam is the main water and power supply for the northern part of Ichkeria over 240,000 inhabitants are suffering from water and electricity shortages. Another Hydroelectric Dam in the east of the country is providing water and electricity on a temporary *ad hoc* basis but resources are limited and the continuation of the supply cannot be guaranteed much longer. The shortage of water is also having a significant impact on agriculture in the northern part of the country; farmers are already complaining that they might lose their harvest if the water supply doesn't improve immediately.

The clash represents persistent widespread problems throughout Ichkerian society.

Both ethnicities consider the outcome of the Verkhniy Naur Hydroelectric Dam *stand-off* as a potential milestone on the road to *sustainable* peace, with far reaching consequences for the entire country.

## Mediation

**OSSG:** Mediate a solution between the Cossacks villagers manning the Hydroelectric Dam and roadblock, and the Ichkerian Government.

**Government:** Your policies are right-wing, with a heavy bias towards Ichkerian nationalism (a manifesto under which your government was democratically elected). However, you are aware that you need to keep the international community happy, whilst balancing and fulfilling your obligations to your electorate - some of whom would like to make an example of the Cossacks. Although a hard-liner, you are open to compromise for quick results.

**Cossack Squatters:** You want justice through the full restoration of our people's rights, though realistically would accept the rehiring of the Dam workers. You know the longer that you hold out against the government the more attention and sympathy will be drawn to your cause from the international community (and media), though you risk further alienation and retaliatory force by the Ichkerians.



## Situation



The **Republic of Novarovia**, recently gained its independence after 65 years from the larger **Federation of Multinazia**.

The Republic of Novarovia's population culturally describe themselves as:

- |               |                |                 |     |
|---------------|----------------|-----------------|-----|
| • Novarovians | 57% (majority) | • Centralovians | 18% |
| • Outerovians | 10%            | • Upperovians   | 6%  |
| • Lowerovians | 6%             | • Others        | 3%  |

In the old Federation of Multinazia it was decreed that there were no diverse and separate cultures: everyone belonged to a common culture inside a community of nations.

Novarovia wishes to be seen as a modern democratic state and after recent elections a Government was formed with a Novarovian majority, with proportional representation from the Centralovian, Outerovian, Upperovian and Lowerovian minorities. However, relations are tense between Government factions and even more so within the differing ethnic populations as everyone is beginning to understand what separate identity and culture actually means in practice.

There have already been minor acts of sectarian violence, and the government appears to be losing control of rural areas (dominated by the ethnic minorities). Taking advantage of the government's weak position, organised criminal organisations are exploiting the opportunity with large scale cross-border smuggling operations. Endemic civil corruption is also undermining the effectiveness of government and judiciary, and therefore the economy.

In order to avoid an escalation in civil disturbance the Novarovian Government has requested assistance from the international community. Acting on behalf of the United Nations, the regional security development agency "**Organisation for Security Sector Governance**" (OSSG) has been made responsible for the planning and deploying of a multinational "SSR" task force to help the Novarovian Government [re-]establish norms within their new multicultural state before the situation deteriorates into open civil war and spills over into neighbouring states.

Novarovia is in a key strategic position for the international community.

The major aspect of this mission is not to keep different groups apart but initiate open dialogue, build bridges and establish mutual understanding, whilst identifying how the different cultures can be equally expressed, represented and integrated.

It is essential for the country to develop a judicial system where the majority and the minority groups have a universal legal framework for human security and rights, including access to justice, a complaints mechanism, and a professional, impartial police service.



## BRIEFING ASSIGNMENTS

### ***Government of Novarovia:***

You represent the Government of Novarovia – which views international intervention as the only real chance to bring meaningful stability to your country: stability translates to economic investment and development, the benefits of which will guarantee the success of your government. International Intervention will be seen to support the legitimacy of your government.

You are to introduce your State and the issues it is currently facing, whilst you purposely ignore the negative aspects of your government’s record - or that of its “supporters” (corruption, poor management, human rights abuse etc.), instead shifting responsibility on to sectarian, regional and external actors. As part of your brief you will also give an overview of what your country can offer the International Community in terms of strategic placement, resources, infrastructure, cost effective labour force, education, and population distribution.

### ***OSSG Observers:***

You are an OSSG Observer who recently returned from an *Observation Mission* in Novarovia.

1. Your task is to provide an “Intelligence and Situation Report” regarding the geo-political situation, identifying the major problems. Attention should also be given to the current deployment and distribution of local military and law enforcement as well as their tasks, strengths, weapons, ethnic makeup, level of training, loyalties (*state vs. ethnic*) and possible intentions.
2. Threat assessment: consider possible militias, vigilantes, political insurgent and criminal groups.
3. Logistics: functional and dysfunctional infrastructure should also be identified e.g. water, electricity, sanitation, sewerage, roads, rail, airports, waterways etc. as they will affect the way the Mission is deployed and supported.

Your report will form the basis on how the OSSG approaches this Mission. It may not necessarily conform or reflect the information provided by the Government of Novarovia.

### ***OSSG Situation Centre:***

You are OSSG Situation Centre Officers whose task has been to develop a Mission plan based on the information provided by the OSSG Observers.

1. You are to address the major problems identified by the OSSG Observers, suggesting Security Sector Reform solutions – short and long term – and an appropriate mandate and force for the task.
2. Although your primary task will be to address *tensions* within Novarovia, attention should also be given to long-term developmental issues that have a direct effect on internal security.

Presentations will be delivered to a joint meeting of delegates representing *UN Security Council*, *UN Peacekeeping Command*, and the *OSSG Secretariat*.

Each presenter should speak for 7-10 minutes, utilising maps, diagrams and relevant visual data.



## Appendix I – former Federal Republic of Multinazia




## Appendix II - Republic of Novarovia





## Situation Overview



The country of **Kikorangi** is a fledgling democracy of seven million people, located in a mountainous region with oceans bordering on the east and the west, the nation of *Whero* to the north, and the country of *Mangu* to the south.

For 15 years **Kikorangi** had been engaged in a civil war with a group calling itself the **Kikorangi Revolutionary Force (KRF)**. KRF's objective was to overthrow the democratically elected leaders of Kikorangi to form a communist utopia. KRF was being supplied arms, training and resources through Whero. Both KRF and the security forces of Kikorangi have sustained heavy losses of human lives, as well as of national resources.

The International Community and citizenry of Kikorangi put tremendous pressure on the leaderships of both Kikorangi and the KRF. As a result, Kikorangi and the KRF diplomatically resolved their conflict. However, the war's end led to a new set of problems that now confront Kikorangi: mass unemployment, food and housing shortages, run-down infrastructure, overwhelmed social services, and ineffective internal security.

Immediately after the end of hostilities the government downsized its military force from 80,000 to 30,000 members, while the 15,000 strong KRF was totally disbanded - with its members now attempting to be integrated into the community.

**The military police and the national police now operate as totally separate entities. Only the Kikorangi National Police (KNP) will have authority over civilians.**

Due to delays in organising the new police service and because of the great number of unemployed soldiers, crime has skyrocketed. *Vigilante groups*\* have taken virtual control of the streets of the country's capital **Kākāriki**. In addition to street crime and civil unrest, there have been a number of assassinations of political leaders, judges, and prosecutors. These politically motivated crimes indicate that a distinct ideology is developing among the vigilante groups. There have been reports that the military and police have reacted brutally in order to regain control of the streets, often taking justice into their own hands.

\* *Unauthorised groups of volunteers organised to keep order and punish crime.*

The President of **Kikorangi** has decided that the problem in **Kākāriki** has become a national crisis, and is afraid that the civil war will re-ignite. Therefore, the President called a meeting with his advisors\* to composed a variety of proposals as a means to restore order. Through these measures the President wants to reassure the people that his government is a legitimate one, dedicated to the "Rule of Law".

\* *The President's Ministerial Advisors are the -*

- Minister of National Police
- Minister of Defence
- Minister of Justice
- Minister for Human Rights
- Attorney General



## ***Despite good intentions, the Proposals potentially pose their own legal issues:***

1. Round up suspected vigilante leaders and detain them until social unrest diminishes.
2. Forbid any meeting of three or more individuals without a permit issued by both the national police and the military police.
3. Suspend for thirty days the constitutional rights of anyone arrested for political crimes or terrorism.
4. Set up a system of random check points to stop and search all people entering the check point area for weapons and other contraband.
5. Set up a strict curfew within the city limits of Kākāriki.

**Group Question:** As International Advisors, do you believe the proposals are legal and conform to international human rights standards? If not, while maintain the proposals intent, what modifications would you suggest?

## **MISSION ASSIGNMENTS: BRIEFINGS**

### ***Briefing One:*** Peacekeeping Situation Centre

From the perspective of the United Nations *Peacekeeping Situation Centre* provide a *Ground and Situation Report* of Kikorangi - and Kākāriki specifically. This will serve as an intelligence report from which to plan any potential Field Mission.

- Ground: based on generic information in the Human Development Index (size, population, resources, infrastructure etc.)
- Situation: provide more detailed information, loosely based on the *Kikorangi Situation Overview* and assumed knowledge from similar conflicts

### ***Briefing Two:*** UNDFS

From the perspective of the UN “Department of Field Support” (UNDFS), identify the main problems in Kikorangi - with specific attention to Kākāriki - that need immediate attention and suggest recommendations

#### *Deployment:*

- Mandate (*mission aim, authorisation, activity, numbers and length*)
- Mission type (*observation/monitoring, executive, non-executive mentoring, training*)
- Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) / Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

#### *Short term -*

- Internal Security: Security Sector Reform (SSR) i.e. police, military, vigilantes, crime gangs etc.
- Rule of Law: Judicial Reform
- Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Rehabilitation (DDR) strategies
- Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)
- Human Rights Issues
- Infrastructure (water, electricity, sanitation, sewerage, road, rail, ports etc.)
- Internal issues/tensions: politics, ethnicity, religion, wealth imbalance, corruption etc.

Presentations will be delivered to representatives of the UN Secretariat and Kikorangi Officials. Each presenter should speak for 5-7 minutes, utilising maps, diagrams and relevant visual data.



Appendix I: Republic of Kikorangi





### Instructions

Write an application letter to the *Organisation for Security Sector Governance* (OSSG) for one of the positions on the following pages (or for real position). Your letter should introduce yourself, give an overview of your current position, as well as any professional experience directly related to the position being applied for. The letter should also state your motivation, and any additional background experience or skills you believe may be relevant (e.g. languages, previous travel etc.).

*Note:* The letter is your way of introducing and promoting yourself to an unknown board, therefore should create a word picture of why you are the best candidate for the position.

The **Organisation for Security Sector Governance** (OSSG) is a security-orientated intergovernmental organization concerned with early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and security sector reform.

As a partner and sub-contractor of the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Organisation for Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the African Union (AU), and the Arab League, OSSG's mandated area of operation is Greater Europe, Central Asia, North Africa and the Middle East (MENA).

### Pool Vacancy Announcements

As the following positions will become available in the near future, applications are being sought from suitable candidates for deployment in:

- **Afghanistan**
- the **Balkans**
  - Albania
  - Bosnia-Herzegovina
  - Kosovo
- **Bangladesh**
- **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)**
- **FRONTEX** (various short-term Mediterranean locations)
- **Georgia**
- **Iraq**
- **Libya**
- **Mali**
- **Pakistan**
- FYR Macedonia
- Serbia
- **Myanmar (Burma)**
- **Palestine (West Bank)**
- **Somalia**
- **South Sudan**
- **Sudan**
- the **Ukraine**



## Police & Law Enforcement Advisor

- Counter-Terrorism / Organised Crime

### *Duties and Responsibilities*

Under the direct supervision of the Head of the Politico-Military Department (PMD), the *Police and Law Enforcement Advisor* (Counter-Terrorism / Serious and Organised Crime) -

- A. Oversees the development and implementation of all relevant police reform initiatives;
- B. Establishes and maintains effective working relationships with national official structures on combating terrorism, serious and organised crime, and law enforcement;
- C. Establishes co-operation and co-ordinates activities with other international partners;
- D. Organises, co-ordinates, implements and monitors anti-terrorism, police assistance and organised crime-related projects;
- E. Participates in working groups on upgrading anti-terrorism training skills, management of terrorism response, building of counter-terrorism strategies, sharing of intelligence and law enforcement initiatives;
- F. Develops effective working relationships with regional authorities dealing with the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of serious criminal offences, e.g. terrorism, organised crime etc.;
- G. Actively supports the Mission's Anti-Terrorism Unit and the Strategic Police Matters Unit, to identify, develop, co-ordinate, implement and monitor activities in the field of anti-terrorism/police assistance/organised crime;
- H. Determines current regional status of anti-terrorism, organised crime and legislation;
- I. Produces analytical reports on developments in the region within the incumbent's field of expertise, as assigned;
- J. Supervises 11 staff members (3 internationals, 8 nationals);
- K. Performs other duties as required.

### *Mission Specific Requirements*

- Minimum 10 years of diversified law enforcement-type experience including at least 12 months operational experience in the specialised subject areas (anti-terrorism, and/or serious & organised crime)
- Proven working experience in project management, including planning/development, implementation, monitoring, evaluation/controlling and reporting
- Relevant experience in police or security sector reform development and implementation
- Relevant professional experience in the field of counter-terrorism and police issues
- Fluency in oral and written English, and the ability to draft documents clearly and concisely
- Previous working experience in a programmatic/strategic planning role
- Experience and competence in negotiation and mediation
- Flexibility and ability to work under pressure and with limited time frames
- Demonstrated ability and willingness to work as a member of a team, with people of different cultural and religious backgrounds, different gender, and diverse political views, while maintaining impartiality and objectivity
- Education in community-policing relations, crime prevention or related fields
- Ability to operate Windows applications, including word processing and e-mail



## Senior Community Police Advisor

### *Duties and Responsibilities*

- A. Represent the Department in all forums related to community policing to ensure co-operation, communication and implementation of the best practice on community safety initiatives throughout the region;
- B. Provides oversight and guidance to the Community Safety Development Section (CSDS) Team in their support of the capacity-building efforts of the Municipal Community Safety Councils;
- C. Implements the field activities of the Section as it conducts informal interviews and discussions with municipalities, local police and community leaders to assess current community conditions, attitudes, and relationships relating to police and readiness for community policing;
- D. Develops and implements comprehensive community-policing training programmes for police officers assigned to community policing throughout the region;
- E. Builds community policing capacity for mid-level ranking officers by developing and delivering training courses on community-orientated policing;
- F. Develops, monitors and/or modifies Community Safety courses to build sustainability for the various community safety forums;
- G. Liaises closely with responsible Mission counterparts (HQ and field), as well as local and international stakeholders;
- H. Drafts thematic, analytic and performance reports;
- I. Provides supervision and guidance to assigned staff;
- J. Performs other duties as directed.

### *Mission Specific Requirements*

- Experience in the implementation and management of community policing and community safety training courses for capacity-building purposes;
- Experience of developing, managing and implementing training as well as analysis of training needs and evaluation;
- Clear understanding of International Human Rights standards together with their implications, with regards to public security and safety operations and development;
- Experience in project management (planning, design, budgeting, management and evaluation);
- Ability to design, coordinate and implement developmental strategies and training plans to support community safety agencies/platforms and related security service partners;
- Flexibility and ability to work under pressure and within limited time frames
- Demonstrated ability and willingness to work as a member of a team, with people of different national, cultural and religious backgrounds, different gender and diverse political views while maintaining impartiality and objectivity;
- Analysing, drafting reporting and presentation skills;
- Fluency in English, both oral and written.



## Training Advisor

### *Duties and Responsibilities*

- A. Provides recommendations to the department's and unit's leadership, Ministry of Internal Affairs and other partners in the analysis, development, implementation and evaluation of the police training programmes;
- B. Implements or assists in the implementation of other training initiatives that respond to identified needs from national and international partners, within the frame of mission's mandate and available resources;
- C. Delivers training, co-training, coaching and mentoring to national border guard/police trainers using Adult Learning Strategies consistent with established principles and methodologies;
- D. Monitors, mentors and guides the national counterparts on implementation of the training programmes in the regions of the Host Country;
- E. Organises, facilitates or participates in various meetings or working groups with national and international partners, reporting through the established channels, following the mission's standard procedures and guidelines;
- F. Ensures that human rights standards, ethics and gender equality and other internationally recognised principles are integrated into decentralised security forces and police training, and democratic law enforcement;
- G. Performs other related work as assigned;

### *Mission Specific Requirements*

- Experience in working for a recognized security and/or law enforcement agency in training needs analysis, curriculum development, implementation and evaluation of training courses
- Formal education or training in Adult Learning Theories and Adult Learning Strategies and their application in police environment
- Experience with implementation and management of community policing in the wider field of community safety programmes
- Facilitation, coaching, mentoring and mediation skills; problem solving capacity
- Effective oral and written communication and presentation skills
- Cultural sensitivity and judgment
- Ability to operate Windows applications, including word processing, e-mail, and presentation software (e.g. PowerPoint)
- Flexibility and ability to work under pressure and with limited time frames
- Ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people of different national and cultural backgrounds, different gender and diverse political views, while maintaining impartiality and objectivity



## Security Officer (Senior Level)

### *Duties and Responsibilities*

Under the guidance and direction of the Senior Security Officer, and in consultation with the Secretariat's Security Management, the Security Officer:

1. Assists senior management in the execution of the security of Mission staff and property;
2. Maintains and updates security plans, contingency plans and procedures to cover movement control for the monitoring teams as well as security listings of Mission staff; ensures that plans for relocation and evacuation to safe havens are current and implementable;
3. Analyses security-related information; conducts Security Risk assessments within the AOR to determine security-related threats/risks to Mission personnel and property; suggests mitigating measures when necessary;
4. Conducts regular drills (e.g. fire, evacuation, communication tests) to ensure staff preparedness for possible emergencies;
5. Conducts security surveys of personnel residences and Mission premises, puts in place appropriate arrangements to secure them; and ensures good state of repair of all security and communication equipment in close co-operation with ICT services;
6. Selects, trains, and supervises security guards as applicable;
7. Ensures that Mission Members are kept informed on matters affecting their security and that appropriate arrangements are made for briefing of newly hired staff;
8. Establishes and maintains close relations with other international [security] partners within the AO; develops good contacts with local law enforcement to secure the best possible protection for Mission staff and property;
9. Report and follow-up on all cases in which Mission staff have been the victim of criminal acts;
10. Ensures that the appropriate level of confidentiality is maintained (*ref.* information security).

### *Mission Specific Requirements*

- Tertiary education in a security & safety related field; or proven experience in law enforcement / military; security & safety background in a civilian environment
- Ability to identify and analyse emerging security problems and propose solutions
- A minimum of six years of professional experience in security management or international relations with focus on security management
- Excellent knowledge of security management, combined with solid background in military, police or security specialisation
- Knowledge, understanding and ability to manage security challenges in conflict environment
- In-depth knowledge of the political-military history and recent Mission area developments
- Professional fluency in English; working Russian language desirable
- Good organisational and management skills
- Flexibility and ability to work under pressure and within limited timeframes as well as the ability to solve problems effectively and efficiently
- Ability to cope with physical hardship and willingness to work extra hours and in an environment with limited infrastructure; proven resilience to high stress environments
- Demonstrated ability and willingness to work as a member of a team, with people of different cultural and religious backgrounds, different gender, and diverse political views while maintaining impartiality and objectivity; Cultural sensitivity and judgment
- Prior experience in working in Eastern Europe / Central Asia or knowledge of the region
- Possession of a valid automobile Class C driving license; ability to drive manual 4x4 vehicles



## Monitoring Advisor

### *Duties and Responsibilities*

Under the overall guidance of the Chief Monitor and direct supervision of the Team Leader, the Monitoring Officer performs the following specific responsibilities:

1. Monitors and reports regularly on the security situation in the area of operation, including the overall situation in the crisis area, cases of security incidents, human rights and fundamental freedoms situation, and overall inter-ethnic relations;
2. Maintains constructive contact, inter alia, with regional and local authorities, representatives of minority and religious groups, civil society and members of the local population;
3. Maintains a high level of professionalism and displays strict adherence to the OSSG Code of Conduct and the wider organisational regulatory framework at all times;
4. Performs duties in a timely, precise and professional manner showing resilience and flexibility in a potentially hazardous and challenging working environment;
5. Liaises with other international organisations operating in the area of deployment;
6. Serve as an intermediary/mediator to facilitate dialogue on the ground in order to reduce tensions and promote normalisation of the respective situation;
7. Contributes to analytical work of the Team in his/her identified fields of expertise;
8. Performs other duties as assigned.

### *Mission Specific Requirements*

- First-level university degree in a relevant field or equivalent advanced education;
- Minimum 6 years of relevant professional experience in any of the following fields: political and security issues, military, law enforcement, border monitoring, disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration, dialogue facilitation, human rights, fundamental freedoms and minority issues;
- Working knowledge of English, both oral and written, and the ability to communicate clearly and concisely;
- Ability to establish contact and constructive relations with local population and officials;
- Demonstrable interpersonal skills and negotiating experience, preferably in the area of monitoring operations and/or related activities;
- Possession of a valid automobile Class C driving license and ability to drive a 4x4 vehicle using manual transmission
- Ability to cope with physical hardship and willingness to work extra hours and in an environment with limited infrastructure; proven resilience to high stress environments;
- Demonstrated ability and willingness to work as a member of a team with people of different cultural and religious backgrounds, different gender, and diverse political views, while maintaining impartiality and objectivity;
- Ability to operate Windows applications including word processing and email.
- Knowledge of the Russian language is a distinct advantage desired;
- Experience in the use of Unarmed/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) desired;
- Experience or in-depth knowledge of working in Eastern Europe/Central Asia;
- Experience in the monitoring of ceasefire and/or identification of weapons systems.



## Emergency Protection Officer: South Sudan

Since the outbreak of violence in December 2013, fighting has continued despite attempts at a peace agreement. Over 1.4 million people have been displaced from their homes, with tens of thousands killed. 100k civilians currently seek refuge inside UNMISS camps across the country.

### *Duties and Responsibilities*

- Ensure Mission leadership is aware of current and emerging threats against civilians;
- Coordinate early warning tools/processes, including community liaison and alert systems;
- Provide advice to Mission leadership on ways in which the Mission can assist and build the capacity of the National Authorities to fulfil their responsibilities;
- Provide support to relevant components to ensure that protection of civilians concerns are adequately reflected in Mission operations, particularly the civilian-police-military planning processes;
- Ensure close coordination with relevant partners in advocacy, development, implementation and mainstreaming of protection programmes, particularly in child protection, gender and sexual related violence, as well as humanitarian affairs, human rights, civil affairs, etc.;
- Identify protection gaps and opportunities for interventions;
- Support the Mission in establishing sustainable coordination structures in order to strengthen cooperation with relevant protection actors, particularly civil society, local communities and the Government authorities at the national and local levels;
- Coordinate and facilitate information sharing with the Protection Cluster, other security actors that may be present in the mission area, and other such arrangements;
- Develop and maintain effective working relationships with all stakeholders - including community leaders, NGOs, UN agencies, community-based organisations and other sectors to enhance cooperation and coordination;
- Identify training needs and provide support on technical aspects;
- Maintain up to date knowledge of protection issues in South Sudan in particular as related to the current crisis and share this information as appropriate; and
- Provide technical advice on planning assessments; participate in protection assessments.

### *Requirements*

- Degree in Law, Human Rights, International Relations, International Development, Military or Police Science, or equivalent
- Minimum of five years' professional sector experience
- Previous working experience with the UN, EU, OSCE or NGOs considered an asset
- Strong understanding of protection principles and likely protection concerns arising in the South Sudan context as well as conflict sensitivity
- Solid experience in staff management in a cross-cultural environment required
- Demonstrated training and facilitation experience
- Experience in complex emergencies and ability to live/work in a remote environment
- Demonstrated analytical skills and report writing experience required (fluency in English)
- Strong interpersonal, intercultural and communication skills; proven ability to negotiate
- Ability to represent the organisation, and strong coordination and organisational skills



**Instructions**

- Three Board members (policing, human resources, law, administration, or psychology)
- After each interview one member rotates off, another comes on. By the end all participants should have served on the board as well as have faced an interview.
- **Do not** re-interpret questions or ask questions not on the questionnaire
- Welcome the applicant and briefly introduce the International Board Members
- Explain how the assessment will be carried out
- Explain to the applicant(s) that their answers should be kept concise and to the point
- Interviews to be quiet and free from interruption
- Conduct: Impartial and Professional

**Questionnaire**

**Part One – Qualifications**

(ask all questions)

1. What position are you applying for? (from sample list or real position)
2. What is your current role, responsibilities and duties?
3. How does your background relate to the position that you have applied for?
4. Why should you be appointed to the position? What qualities and additional skills do you believe that you can offer the position? What is your motivation?

**Part Two – Behavioural Questions**

(ask Question 5 plus one other)

5. What are your strengths and weaknesses?
6. Describe the most challenging work you have ever encountered. How did you handle it?
7. Give me an example of a time when you did not meet an expectation. What happened, and how did you attempt to rectify the situation?
8. Tell me a time when you faced a difficult colleague. How did you work with him/her?
9. Describe a time when you faced communication break-down.

**Part Three - Mission Knowledge**

(ask several questions appropriate to position)

10. Define:
 

A. Security Sector Reform (SSR)	B. Rule of Law
C. Democratic Policing	D. Monitoring, Mentoring, Advising
E. Mediation and Negotiation	F. Mandate
11. Why do you believe your country is engaging in International Police Cooperation?
12. What Human Rights instruments determine the conduct of law enforcement?
13. What is the difference between *institution building* and *capacity building*?
14. How does corruption undermine the aims of a Security Sector Reform Mission?
15. What is the difference between *International Humanitarian Law* and *Human Rights*?



**Part Four - Problem Solving** (ask 1-2 questions, appropriate to the candidate's background/application)

16. You've been asked to arrange a mediation meeting between two parties.
- what preparation and planning measures do you take?
  - what is your role during mediation?
17. As an *International Police Advisor*, give a short concept on how you would mentor:
- local *command/senior level* law enforcement personnel?
  - local *field level* law enforcement personnel?
18. You've been asked to put together a *police basic training* curriculum for local law enforcement. In the past basic training was 4-6 weeks long under a US military-led programme, with a focus on 'security-orientated' tasks. However, the Mission's objective is "normalisation" (returning the country to stable and normal activities).
- What training topics or themes would your *basic training* curriculum focus on?
  - How long should such training take?
19. You've been informed that there will be a non-violent demonstration, with up to 500 participants to be held in front of the Supreme Court building.
- As an *International Police Advisor*, what suggestions would you give to your local counterpart in preventive security measures?
20. In the context of an international mission, under your supervision all leading positions are occupied by very qualified male (M) officers from Australia, Japan, Norway, and the UK. As one of these positions will become vacant in coming weeks, you have received applications from the following: one highly qualified Superintendent from Denmark (M), and three qualified Chief Inspectors from India (M), Jordan (M), and Ghana (F).
- What factors should you consider? Who will you choose and why?

**Note:** in a real interview questions will be less structured than practiced here and may also include questions relating to mission-specific geo-political and ethno-cultural issues, as well as problem solving directly relating to the position.