



"... language is bound by context and culture ..."

Tools for Intercultural Language, Communication & Interoperability:

- Strategic Communication
- Intercultural Competence
- Transnational Police Interoperability & Cooperation
- Comparative Policing
- Police Integrity & Ethics
- Human Relations: social cohesion & engagement strategies
- Community Orientated & Intelligence-led Policing



SAINT | SSD PEACE • SECURITY • DEVELOPMENT
- the Human Dimension

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HöMS Partner Interview



Personal Details

1. What is your name?
2. In which town/city/area do you live?
3. What are your main interests? (sports, hobbies etc.)

Profession

4. What other employment have you had before joining the police, or did you join the police straight from secondary school or university?
5. What is your current assignment with the police and where? (e.g. patrol service, highway patrol, formed (riot) police, fraud, burglary etc.)
6. What year did you join the police?
7. Why did you join the police?



International Experience

8. Have you ever worked with police from another country in Germany? Yes / No
If **yes**, please provide details:
9. Have you ever been assigned to work in another country or external agency? (e.g. EUROPOL, Embassy, FRONTEX, UN/EU/OSCE Police Mission etc.) Yes / No
If **yes**: Where?

What was your position(s)?

Seminar

10. Do you have any specific police-related language needs from this seminar (e.g. tactical, legal, criminal, procedural, small-talk, report writing etc.)?
11. What are your expectations from this seminar?

(write needs and expectations on a Moderation Card)

Crime – Building Word Power



Task 1. Write the missing verbs in the text.

- A. arrest B. charged C. commits D. drop E. release
F. goes G. identify H. investigate I. question J. remain

When a person (1) _____ a crime the police carry out certain actions.

They (2) _____ the crime.

If they catch the criminal, they will (3) _____ and take them to the police station.

At the police station they (4) _____ the suspect, who may contact a lawyer.

The witnesses may (5) _____ the suspect from an identity parade.

If the police have enough evidence the person is (6) _____ with the crime.

If the police do not have enough evidence they (7) _____ the charges.

For serious crimes the person (8) _____ to court for trial.

Until the trial the suspect may be (9) on bail or, in serious cases, (10) _____ in custody.

Task 2. Arrange the steps of a crime scene investigation in chronological order (i.e., 1-5).

	Conduct a primary survey (walkthrough): to identify potentially valuable evidence, take notes, capture initial photographs of the scene and the evidence.
	Plan, communicate and coordinate: this may require gathering information from witnesses.
	Establish the scene dimensions and identify potential safety and health hazards.
	Document and process the scene: the crime scene team conducts a thorough, coordinated investigation of the scene, collecting all probative evidence.
	Record and preserve evidence: an inventory log is created
	Conduct a secondary survey (review), as a quality control step.
	Establish security: to control access, the scene may be cordoned off with yellow crime scene tape.

Task 3. Match each crime with its definition.

- | | | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Murder | b. Manslaughter | c. Kidnapping | d. Assault |
| e. Theft | f. Battery | g. Robbery | h. Forgery |
| i. Human Trafficking | j. Smuggling | k. Hijacking | l. Bribery |
| m. Money Laundering | n. Fraud | o. Blackmail | p. Counterfeiting |

	Killing of another through reckless or negligent conduct
	Intentional act that causes a fear of imminent harm or offensive touching
	Theft of property or money where the offender uses physical force or fear against a victim
	Taking somebody away illegally and keep them as a prisoner, especially in order to get money or something else for returning them
	Taking of a person's property without their permission
	Concealing the source of illegally obtained money
	Trading human beings for forced labour, sexual exploitation, etc.
	Using violence to take control over a vehicle/plane, etc.
	Taking someone/something illegally across the border
	Deceiving someone in order to induce him/her to give up possession of property or surrender a right
	Manufacturing or distribution of goods under someone else's name, and without their permission
	Giving money or something valuable to persuade someone to help you kill someone deliberately
	Demanding money or something else of value from a person by the threat of exposing a criminal act or discreditable information
	Unlawful or unauthorised application of force to another person
	Making a fake document, changing of an existing document, or making a signature without authorisation

Task 4.

A. Pair the words and phrases to form collocations

involuntary	theft
armed	robbery
identity	fraud
grand	assault
sexual	manslaughter
internet	rape
tax	murder
statutory	blackmail
domestic	evasion
first degree	violence

B. What crime has been committed in these situations?

1. A stranger sees you drop your credit card and decides to pick it up and use it to buy something.
2. The criminal purchased a passport from an accomplice and changed the picture and the biographical data.
3. The facilitator demanded a considerable amount of money to help the African family reach Italy.
4. The driver was texting on his mobile when the car started to go off the road. While trying to get back on the road he hit another car. The driver of the other vehicle died as a result.
5. The man approached an old lady and threatening her with a knife demanding her purse.

Task 5.

Choose the correct words in **blue** to complete the report.

The number of stolen cars detected in January at the border crossing point was 10 and increased (1) **slight / slightly** to 12 units in February.

There was a (2) **sharp / sharply** rise (3) **to / by** 17 in March (4) **due / led** to the use of state-of-the-art technology. This was followed by a (5) **slight / slightly**

fall in April when the number of stolen cars detected by the police dropped to eight. The thieves changed their modus operandi, and this resulted

(6) **in / from** a **dramatic / dramatically** fall in May. But the national authority took the necessary measures and the number of detections increased

(7) **steady / steadily to / by** 4 cars a month throughout June, July and August

until they stood (8) **in / at** 5 in September. The (9) **dramatic / dramatically** rise

to 10 in October resulted (10) **in / from** the training of police with the new system called Adesvet.

Crime Mysteries: *Problem Solving*

Group Discussion: *Solve the Cases*




Empty Cell Mystery

Andy is put in a cell with a dirt floor and only one window. The window is too high for him to reach. The only thing in the cell is a shovel. He won't be able to get any food or water and only has two days to escape or he'll die. Andy can't dig a tunnel because it will take him much longer than two days to do it. How will Andy escape from the cell?



Poisonous Drinks

Marissa and Juliana went out for drinks together. They ordered the same drink. Juliana was really thirsty and finished five in the time it took Marissa to finish one. The drinks were poisoned, but only Marissa died. How?




Suicide or Not?

A dead female body lies at the bottom of a multi-story building. It looks as though she committed suicide by jumping from one of the floors.

When the detective arrives, he goes to the first floor of the building, opens the closed window, and flips a coin towards the floor. He goes to the second floor and does the exact same thing. He continues to do this until he gets to the top floor of the building.

When he comes back down, he states that it was a murder and not a suicide. How does he know that?



Love at a funeral


A girl is at her mother's funeral. She meets a nice guy who she didn't know before at the funeral and they hit it off. She was busy at the funeral and didn't have time to ask him for his number before he left. She tried hard to track him down, but no one knew who he was or how to contact him. A few days later her sister dies and the police suspect it to be a murder. Who killed her sister?



Stolen ring

Nicole went to the police to report that someone had stolen her vintage ring. When the police got to her house they notice that the window was broken, there was a total mess inside, and there were dirty footprints on the carpet. But, there were no other signs of a break-in.

The next day, the police arrested Nicole for fraud. Why?



Thief at Sea


A Japanese ship was leaving the port and on its way to open sea. The captain went to go oil some parts of the ship and took his ring off so it wouldn't get damaged. He left it on the table next to his bunk. When he returned, it was missing. He had suspected three crew members could be guilty and asked them what they had been doing for the ten minutes that he had been gone.

The cook said, "I was in the kitchen preparing tonight's dinner."

The engineer said, "I was working in the engine room making sure everything was running smoothly."

The seaman said, "I was on the mast correcting the flag because someone had attached it upside down by mistake."

The captain immediately knew who it was. How?



Crime Mysteries: *Problem Solving*

Murder at school

Following the holidays, on the first day back at school, someone murdered a history teacher. There were four people at the school that the police suspected had done it: the landscaper, a math teacher, a basketball coach, and the principal. These were their alibis:


The landscaper said he was outside mowing the lawn.

The math teacher said he was giving a mid-year test.

The basketball coach said he was running practice drills with his players.


The principal said she was in her office.

After giving their alibis, the police arrested the killer immediately. Who killed the history teacher and how did the police know?



Poisonous pills

A serial killer kidnapped five different people and sat them down each with two pills in their hand and a glass of water. He told them to take one pill but warned them that one was poisonous and the other harmless. Whichever pill the victim didn't take, the serial killer would take. Every victim somehow chose the poisonous pill and died. How did the killer get them all to take the poisonous pill?



Honeymoon mystery


A couple went to Hawaii for their honeymoon. Unfortunately, the husband returned home alone because his wife had died in a horrible boating accident. The police contacted the travel agent he booked the trip with and arrested him for murdering his wife. How did they know he did it?



Crime Mysteries: *Problem Solving*

Science case


A chemist is murdered in his lab. The only evidence is a piece of paper that has the names of chemical substances written on it. The substances are nickel, carbon, oxygen, lanthanum, and sulphur. The chemist only had four people come by his lab on the day of the murder: fellow scientist Claire, his nephew Nicolas, his wife, and his friend Marc. The police arrested the murderer right away.



How did they know who it was?

Guilty in Court

A woman was in court for killing her husband. She said she wasn't guilty and that she dearly missed him. In the closing statement, the woman's lawyer stands up and says, *"Her husband is just missing. Everyone, look at the doors. He's going to walk through them in about 30 seconds."*



The entire jury stares at the doors waiting for waiting for this woman's husband to walk through the doors. The lawyer and the woman stare at the jury.

The lawyer concludes by saying, *"See! If you were so sure she killed her husband, you wouldn't be watching that door!"*

The jury immediately gave a guilty verdict. Why?



Case Studies

Although names have been changed, these are based on real scenarios.

Discussion Exercise:

1. What are the issues facing the police?
2. Ethically, what options do they have?
3. What should they do?
4. What would they do?
5. What would you do?

Case 1

(Germany)

Smith has kidnapped Susan and secured her in a sealed concrete drain. He has left her with very limited water; the summer sun is slowly turning the drain into a hot-box. He demands a large ransom from her millionaire father who promises not to contact the police in return for his daughter's life. Despite this, the father contacts the police, who persuade the father to let them control the handover of the money. Due to time pressure, in the handover Smith is immediately arrested, instead of more usual post-ransom surveillance. He is taken to a police station where he is questioned but refuses to admit his involvement in the case, or disclose Susan's location - but does state that he can imagine that she must now be dying from dehydration. Police are unable to locate Susan and are running out of custody time. They discuss whether they should exclude the solicitor from the interview and use some stronger tactics.

Case 2

(Australia)

Jones is a serious offender whom police believe is part of an organised paedophile ring. The police are desperate to catch him and his network before they kill a child. They are contacted by Jones' daughter, aged 15, who offers to provide information to the police 'covertly'. The police debate whether to use the daughter as an on-site informant in view of her age, reliability, the family relationship to their suspect and the possible dangers to her.

Case 3

(United Kingdom)

John is a local community-based police patrol officer. He is dealing with a series of complaints against an 11-year-old boy, who is racially harassing and abusing elderly residents in a housing estate. They demand that John takes some action and suggests a "*good clip round the ear*". The boy, when spoken to is rude, abusive and spits at John. John, angry and convinced that the boy will not respond to reason, slaps him hard. The boy's parents file an assault complaint against the officer. The local residents and local media support John's actions. Police Management have to decide what action to take against him.

Introduction to Community Policing



Community Policing Defined

The U.S. Department of Justice, defines Community Policing as:

“a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.”

Important points that need to be stressed and pondered upon are:

- Community policing is not a particular strategy, but a broad policing philosophy that might include various organizational strategies;
- Engaging a broad spectrum of community is one of the most important elements of community policing, therefore, law enforcement agencies must strive hard to build relationships with the community members;
- Community policing is a comprehensive approach that, through partnerships and systematic use of problem solving, addresses the root causes of problem, and not just the symptoms of the problem;
- Community policing is proactive, unlike the reactive nature of traditional policing;
- The focus of community policing is on building partnerships with the community not merely for addressing crime but also for tackling social disorder and fear of crime prevalent in the community.

Understanding Community

Oxford dictionary provides various definitions of community. In our context we can describe a community as “a group of people living together in a certain area, practicing common ownership and having particular responsibilities and interests in common.”

The following are the ‘big six’ groups in a community that must work together to make community policing initiatives successful:

1. Police and Public Security - includes all sworn and civilian personnel;
2. The Community – community groups, individuals; representatives, civil society organizations
3. Elected Officials – local, district, state and federal;
4. Business Community – local, small, large and corporate entities;
5. Public Agencies – social services (public and private), public health services; and,
6. The Media – electronic, print, and social.



Benefits of Community Policing

Community policing offers several benefits and advantages over traditional policing:

- A. **Enhanced Community-Police Relationship:** Police and their community work closely together, developing better relationships. The police gain a better understanding of community dynamics and their problems, whilst the community becomes more familiar with the police, their priorities, and constraints. Mutual understanding fosters an enhanced community-police relationship that engenders cooperation.
- B. **Community Policing is Democracy in Action:** Community policing requires the active participation of all segments of the community; where residents, government, civil society organisations, businesses and media partner to help address law and social disorder issues within their neighbourhood. Community and police collaborate through all stages of identification, prioritization, planning, execution and evaluation of their community policing initiative. Community policing does not only give voice to all stakeholders but helps them work alongside police to resolve public safety problems.
- C. **Better Integrated Community:** Community policing provides a platform for the community to take action. Collective effort towards crime prevention enhances community integration and strengthening community bonds.
- D. **Enhanced Safety and Morale of Police:** Regular interaction of police officers with the community allows them to be recognized and be known by the community members and develop closer ties through non-threatening and supportive interactions. Police officers working in familiar and friendly communities enjoy a heightened sense of support and safety. A pleasant working relationship with the community helps to boost police morale.
- E. **Cost Effective and Beneficial:** Community policing requires personnel dedicated to one small area. They are seen as being personnel intensive, less mobile, less functional and therefore costly. In contrast, reactive traditional policing is nimble, covers large areas with fewer personnel, and undertakes multiple roles. The key difference is prevention vs. response. Response infers that a crime has already happened: losses and injuries have been suffered. Response requires coordination, resources, and follow-up investigation. Prevention - though active presence and deterrence - stops crime before it happens. Community policing requires few resources. The focus is to proactively prevent crime and disorder by addressing root causes, deter through presence, and effectively pinpoint crime prone areas, and associated individuals.
- F. **Reduced Fear of Crime:** Increased police presence in the community reduces fear of crime and enhances the feeling of safety. The community becomes confident and assured that it can seek help from their readily available and easily accessible community police.
- G. **Valuable Information Sharing by Community:** An important outcome of effective community policing is that officers have better and willing access to valuable local information. The development of relationships between the police and their community, means that community members are more willing share valuable information on crime, suspicious persons, and activities that might lead to crimes.

Police and Community Relations



- The London Riots

Between 6 and 11 August 2011, thousands of people rioted throughout Greater London. The resulting chaos generated violence, **looting**, **arson**, and the mass deployment of police.



Protests began in the North London suburb of Tottenham, following the death of Mark Duggan - a local and **alleged** drug dealer - shot dead by police on 4 August 2011, during an **intercept** operation. As an ongoing investigation, transparency over the circumstances surrounding Duggan's death was drawn-out and murky, with police quickly accused of a cover-up.

The protest became **inflamed** after police **restrained** a sixteen-year-old girl who was alleged to have been acting in an aggressive and disorderly manner. Multiple violent clashes with police followed, along with the destruction of police vehicles, a courthouse, public transport and dozens of homes, as well as vandalism and looting businesses within the protestors own communities. In an environment of poor police response, gangs of **vigilantes** took to the streets to defend their homes and community against hooliganism.

The London Riots were also called the "Blackberry Riots" due to the role Blackberry Messenger (BBM), smartphones and social media played in **inciting** and strategically directing civil disobedience. Chaos reigned supreme.

In the aftermath some 4000 people were arrested, 2200 were formally charged. But the destruction and cost went well beyond material goods, damaging the relationship between the police and the communities it was sworn to serve and protect.

Vocabulary Building 1: Match the word with the correct definition.

- | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| A. looting | B. incite | C. vigilante |
| D. arson | E. restrain | F. inflame |
| G. intercept | H. aftermath | I. allege |

- | | |
|----|---|
| 1. | to arouse or intensify violent emotion |
| 2. | one who takes law enforcement into one's own hands |
| 3. | a consequence, especially due to disaster |
| 4. | to hold back; control, prevent; to deprive freedom |
| 5. | the crime of unlawfully setting fire to a building |
| 6. | to accuse/claim that someone has done something wrong |
| 7. | to provoke, stir up or urge on to action |
| 8. | to pillage and plunder |
| 9. | to seize, obstruct, impede, interrupt, block, detain |



- What caused the London Riots

Of course, Mark Duggan's death was not the true reason behind the riots, merely the catalyst.

It is important to note that unlike civil disorder from years before,

"There was no sense among the rioters of being part of a collective, no desire to change society, just an immature, anarchy-based desire to cause chaos and to profit from looting. The riots were not a protest in any way, but a mixture of confused rage, gang thuggery and teenage mayhem".

Those who have no self-worth fear no consequence.

Root causes have been summarised as:

1. Social and Economic Inequality

Marginalisation, deprivation, lack of social mobility (ability to move up) and social capital (of little worth in society).

2. Weak Police Response

This outbreak of mass criminality was *"unleashed by an weak police reaction to the initial incident"*. Because the police didn't crack down right away, it essentially *"gave permission for dozens of thugs to come and loot and burn the neighbourhood."* When a mob sees that police can't control a situation, it *"leads to adrenalin-fuelled euphoria"*.

3. High Youth Unemployment

Given the range and coordination of the rioting, *"this was clearly an event with far deeper causes than simple random hooliganism"*. Most of the looters and vandals were under 20, destroying the same low-income neighbourhoods they live in. With few prospects, these kids clearly *"had nothing else to do with themselves, and no reason to fear or feel responsible for the consequences of their actions."*

4. Moral Poverty and Opportunism

What set these riots apart is the deliberate, consumer-like looting. Whereas all riots loosen inhibitions, *"looting tends to involve a wider range of people - children, women, older people - because it does not involve physical violence."* And as more people get involved, more damage is done, with little sense of responsibility or guilt.

5. Racial Profiling

To anyone who asked them, the rioters made it very clear what their motives were: *"repaying years of police mistreatment."* That's especially true in *"communities where there is a relatively high percentage of blacks"*. The anger black people felt at being stopped and searched more often, combined with *"continuing deprivation, growing unemployment, a feeling of lack of opportunity"* made for a *"toxic mix."*





- Hypothesis: Culture

Culture can be defined as the “*the shared inherited and learned ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes and knowledge which characterises a society, group or organisation*”. This is most commonly expressed through national, ethnic and religious identity - and is often the source of stereotype.

Another form of culture is *organisational culture*, which is commonly seen in specialist professional closed environments, such as the police and military. A culture to which you do not belong can be experienced but you'll seldom be part of it.

Sociocultural beliefs and attitudes become **entrenched** over generations, therefore cannot be easily changed or altered. To an extent, the same can be said with organisational culture (e.g. institutionalised sexism, racial profiling etc.). Factors influencing behaviour are often associated with social expectation, custom, peer pressure, and certain **Pavlovian** conditioning traits.

London's boroughs have large concentrations of both lower socio-economic and immigrant communities - communities which often display disproportionately low income, high unemployment, a largely unqualified workforce and **disenfranchised** youth. In examining London's immigrant groups, all have their own language, culture, perspective, and attitudes. As immigrants, integration and acceptance by the wider [host] community is slow, if not reluctant; similarly adopting local norms by these new groups are also slow, if not actively discouraged.

The London Riots exhibited a clash of two cultural types, represented by two unlike cultural groups: mixed lower socio-economic [groups] vs. an organisational culture - the “System”, **embodied** by the police.

In the eyes of the British public, police ideally serve the interests of the community - ‘policing by consent’, performing their role in a ‘*transparent and accountable*’ manner. However, by those on society's fringes, London's Metropolitan Police were seen to **personify** the attitudes of *white middle class England* – a class and lifestyle the lower socio-economic groups can only dream of.

“White middle class” England had the social expectation of the ‘others’ to **conform** and integrate. Those groups who did not (or could not) were looked down on with **disdain**, or treated with suspicion and fear. In London, those clearly of immigrant background, within the lower socio-economic areas, were regularly targeted by the police using ‘*stop and search*’ tactics. Such tactics were seen as hostile, racist and repressive – strengthening the idea that these groups and the immigrant community were barely tolerated ‘outsiders’ – of little worth or social standing.

What was not considered before or after the riots was how the police were seen as an organisation by those on society's fringes. Many immigrants originated from countries where police corruption, violence and victimisation are considered normal. Therefore, any police presence was viewed with distrust and fear, reinforced by MPS *racial profiling* and *stop-and-search* practices. However, other parties viewed the British police and justice system with disrespect, regarding it as soft and **impotent**.

Mark Duggan was shot during an armed police intercept as part of *Operation Trident*. Operation Trident targeted gun crime in London, with special attention to shootings relating to the illegal sale of drugs and crime in Afro-Caribbean communities.



At the time it was not clear if Duggan had a criminal connection, nor was it clear if he had a gun, or indeed if he had actually shot at a police officer. But the lack of police transparency, past experiences of racial profiling, and suspicion that it was a police cover-up was enough to spark protest.

With large elements of the community turning against them, the police did not know how to respond. The tactic of letting the situation 'burn itself out', and not provoking the crowd by keeping a discrete distance had the opposite desired effect: it reinforced the belief of police impotence, leading to an escalation of the situation.

After five days, and the deployment of over 44,000 police officers in London, the riots did eventually burn themselves out. But the financial and social costs were heavy. And community trust in the police – as an organisation and partner – disappeared as quickly as flat screen TVs during the looting.

In the aftermath the 'blame game' was played, but ultimately the riots were a monumental failure to re-connect with the communities and identify their priorities.

A bulk of the responsibility was shouldered by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) for lack of forewarning, poor preventative measures and weak response. However, immediately following Mark Duggan's shooting (prior to the riots), the MPS did attempt to gauge the mood of the public by consulting community contact groups. But with budget cuts impacting Community Policing reliable engagement had been lost.

Vocabulary Building 2: Match the word with the correct definition.

- A. **impotent**
- B. **marginalise**
- C. **entrench**

- D. **Pavlovian**
- E. **personify**
- F. **disenfranchise**

- G. **embody**
- H. **conform**
- I. **disdain**

- | | |
|----|--|
| 1. | to deprive a person of their rights as a citizen |
| 2. | to push to the side specific groups of people |
| 3. | lacking physical strength to act effectively; helpless |
| 4. | automatic behavioural response due to conditioning |
| 5. | an idea or philosophy fixed in the cultural mind |
| 6. | represent or symbolise [police as government] |
| 7. | to become a visible form of an idea |
| 8. | to social fit in, to follow local customs |
| 9. | to look down on a person or social group |



Comprehension Check:

Which statement is **True (T)**, **False (F)**, or **not stated (NS)** in the article?

1. People in Tottenham came together to protest after police shot Mark Duggan _____
 2. Mark Duggan was considered a threat by police _____
 3. The police were accused of covering up facts relating to Mark Duggan's death _____
 4. The protest turned to riots over the alleged police assault of a 16-year-old girl _____
 5. Urban poverty and social deprivation have nothing to do with the riots _____
 6. It's stated that police practiced *racial profiling* and *stop-and-search* tactics _____
 7. UK law enforcement is done so with the *consent* of the community they police _____
 8. The lower-class view police as a tool of repression _____
 9. Immigrants either fear or don't respect the role and authority of the police _____
-

Group 1: Discussion

1. How would your police have dealt with the riots (before, during, after)?
2. At present British police do not have large scale Riot Units, instead maintaining small rapid response teams, supported by all uniformed officers as and when required.
What is your opinion of such a system? Is it an effective use of manpower?
3. Do you think rioting like this could happen in your state or country? Why? Why not?
4. What is the role of Community Police in preventing/deescalating such situations?
5. How does ethno-cultural diversity effect police relations in your community?
6. Are your police seen as a reflection of society?
7. Do such social conditions contribute to home grown *radicalisation* and terrorism?
What are the typical identifying traits?
8. As a backdrop to the riots were allegations of police corruption, disproportional use of force and racial profiling (incl. stop-and-search tactics), leading to lack of trust.
What measures would you take to reestablish faith and trust in the police?
9. What parallels do you see between the London Riots, and those witnessed in the US?

Group 2: Assignment

At the request of the London Metropolitan Police, you have been assigned to give advice on how they should to deal with such civil disturbances in the future.

Key issues:

- | | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| • trust | • intervention | • de-escalation |
| • community partnerships | • social media | • limitation/confinement |
| • prevention | • crisis communication | • strategies and tactics |
-

Police and Community Relations



Case Study: Chicago

The 2011 London Riots were a short-term civil disturbance – a response to social conditions, but restrained by the *social contract*. In contrast, Chicago - well-known as the most violent city in the US - demonstrates how fragile the social contract can be, when an *organisational culture*, such as the police, fails to communicate, connect and engage.

*"In the aftermath of the Ferguson, Missouri, civil disorder and other highly visible 'use of force' incidents, public trust and confidence in the police has been shattered in cities across the United States. As a result, many police departments have sought ways to restore police legitimacy through community policing initiatives, training, and other strategies. In fact, many have turned to Chicago for direction, since the Chicago Police Department has been involved in such initiatives for several years."*¹

In May 2011 Garry McCarthy was appointed Chief of the Chicago Police Department (CPD), the USA's second largest non-federal police force. Based on similar social experiments with the New York and Newark Police Departments, he quickly transformed the CPD into 'America's laboratory of police science' - inviting in teams of criminologists, legal experts, and social scientists, with the aim of reducing violence, reforming police methodology and engaging divided communities. To achieve this, he needed to transform CPD's culture from a *force* to a *service*: from *warriors* to *guardians*.



McCarthy's rationale was that,

"Crime strategy needs to focus on people, places, and things that are going to cause crime. And that's where the academics come in".

His mission to reduce violence and engage Chicago's worst affected communities wasn't new, in 1993 the CPD implemented the city-wide *Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy* (CAPS) programme, in an effort to bring Chicago's diverse communities, police, and other city agencies together as a way to prevent crime rather than react after the fact.

To encourage mutual dialogue and cooperation,

"...eight or nine 'beat officers' are assigned to each of Chicago's 279 police beats. The officers patrol the same beat for over a year, allowing them to get to know community members, residents, and business owners and to become familiar with community attitudes and trends".

Under CAPS regular meetings are held between community members and the police to discuss potential problems, strategies and solutions. To support these efforts, in the late 1990's 'cultural diversity training' was introduced to,

"understand the impact that culture has on the administration of justice and the delivery of effective public safety service".

¹ McCarthy & Rosenbaum, "From CompStat to RespectStat: Accountability for Respectful Policing"



Unfortunately, the training didn't translate well to actual police-public interaction.

Several years later government agencies introduced "Cultural Competence" as a tool to improve service delivery, meeting the needs of both government and the people they serve. Cultural Competence is:

"the ability of an individual to understand and respect values, attitudes, beliefs and customs that differ across cultures, and to consider and respond appropriately to these differences in planning, implementing, evaluating, education and promotion programs and interventions".

The concept was quickly adopted by the CPD to recognise socio-cultural characteristics that define and influence the behaviour of different groups in society. Cultural competence assists officers effectively communicate with the different ethnic groups in a way that promotes mutual understanding - reducing suspicion, confusion, antagonism or chances of conflict.

As a further tool, the *Violence Reduction Strategy* (VRS) programme - an initiative for preventing gang violence - was introduced. VRS focuses on key gang member identification, using frontline intelligence and analysis techniques to identify target areas, as well as the group members at highest risk of violent victimisation or offending - and through home visits giving them individualised messages about their vulnerability. This approach is said to have reduced violence dramatically in 2013.

CAPS was revitalised in early 2013, with the programme decentralised and moved out to the 25 police districts it serves, with McCarthy declaring,

"Under the new initiative, each police district will be assigned a CAPS sergeant and two police officers, as well as a community organizer and a youth services provider. Four citywide coordinators will oversee community policing programs targeted at victim assistance, seniors, youth, and victims of domestic violence".

Despite CAPS upbeat slogan *"Together, we are working to identify and solve neighbourhood crime problems [...] and to improve the quality of life in Chicago's neighbourhoods"*, locals described CPD efforts as *"too much policing, too little policing – both at the same time"*. Even so, residents are not hesitant to call the police in times of need, but feel that there is a universal atmosphere of mutual contempt and hostility; and when police do respond it is usually with disproportionate force. Too much *Warrior*, not enough *Guardian*, which seems contrary to the ideology behind CAPS and VRS.

Of course, police officers are professionally suspicious, due to: their training, the nature of work, the people who they deal with, and the simple cautious act of self-preservation. Although a generalisation, having regular contact with [alleged] offenders can sour one's view of human nature, influencing future interactions with the public, including stereotyping. Such suspicions, views and experiences tend to create a passive divide between police officers and elements of the community - with the result of a police *esprit de corps*-driven closed *professional culture*. However, the closed nature of such a culture excludes external stimuli, perspectives and experiences, with internal views looping.

Police and Community Relations



With this in mind, CPD patrol officers assigned to *impact zones* – often ‘rookies’ – have adopted a pseudo-siege mentality. This stance is reflected in their belief that the idea of a guardian force implies passivity and weakness: “*You don’t stand guard in a war zone*” - an easily understood stance given the crime statistics.

In 2015 Chicago had a city-wide homicide rate of 17:100,000, compared with a national rate of 4:100,000; in the most violent districts, this rate was 62 (Iraq’s rate was 20). To compound this record, there were over 700 gang factions across the city, with the CPD confiscating more illegal weapons than in New York and Los Angeles combined. It’s no surprise that *street rappers* and film-makers have rebranded Chicago “Chi-raq”.



The so-called ‘impact zones’, where much of the violence occurs, could only be described as slums: run-down, impoverished, segregated (Black or Hispanic majorities), with over 25% unemployment, low income families, a largely unqualified workforce, and disenfranchised youth - without any hope of a positive future. A hauntingly familiar tune.

By embedding “Human Terrain” research teams, McCarthy endeavoured to change police culture, by changing the way they engage with society - making police approachable, with every encounter considered fair and polite.

Additionally, through problem-solving and collaborative police relations with the community stakeholders, all parties can be open to the desired balance of warrior vs. guardian. In public safety situations communities welcome the ‘warrior’ – especially if these actions are considered legitimate and procedurally impartial.

One approach was to develop a “procedural justice”² curriculum for the CPD, designed to improve officers' interactions with the public, focusing on attitude, approach and active communication, with the outcome of residents being more willing to trust the police. Such strategies are fundamental to police-community partnerships, with the police and criminal justice system must be seen to demonstrate its legitimacy to the public it serves. Referencing London’s Metropolitan Police Service ‘stop-and-search’ procedure, most individuals had no issue with the legitimacy of the practice itself, but rather the approach, attitude and frequency. When police officers make a visible effort to communicate and engage with members of the public - to serve - people become more cooperative.

McCarthy was terminated from his position following 17-year-old Laquan McDonald’s shooting by CPD Officer Jason Van Dyke (20 October 2014)³, and even though the city is still recovering from the fallout, McCarthy’s legacy remains. Although regarded a failure in Chicago, the “Chicago Model” has been adapted by police departments throughout the country, with the US Justice Department (DOJ) spending millions promoting its approach.

² **Procedural justice** (procedural fairness) describes the idea that how individuals regard the justice system as tied more to the fairness of the *process* and how they were treated rather than to the *outcome*.

³ On 5 October 2018, Van Dyke was found guilty of second-degree murder.



As the dust settles in Chicago, US law enforcement authorities have come to realise that:

- cultural competence develops legitimacy, trust, partnership and common ground; and
- cultural competency tools are an effective intelligence mechanism in their dealings with the ever-changing dynamics of the **Human Terrain** - where challenges go beyond diversity issues, and into the themes of civil unrest, gang culture, and violence.

The CPD became a grand experiment, using academics and scientific method to analyse and influence two dissimilar cultures: the police and their most problematic communities. There are many reasons why it didn't fulfil its promise in Chicago – but much had to do with fixed attitudes, impatience and politics.

On discussing events - the politics, the police, the street - McCarthy simply concludes that Chicago is a place where “*culture outdoes policy*”.

Endnote: in February 2015, *The Guardian* reported that the CPD “*operates an off-the-books interrogation compound, rendering Americans unable to be found by family or attorneys while locked inside the domestic equivalent of a CIA black site.*” The facility, the Homan Square Police Warehouse, “*has long been the scene of secretive work by special police units.*” Interviews “*describe operations that deny access to basic constitutional rights ... The secretive warehouse ... focuses on Americans, most often poor, black and brown ... Witnesses, suspects or other Chicagoans who end up inside do not appear to have a public, searchable record entered into a database indicating where they are, as happens*”

Discussion Questions:

1. Describe the *social contract* in your country's context: what is the relationship, does it work, and has it changed over the years?
2. Is the problem with Chicago's Police-Community relations a result of the local environment or *police culture* itself?
3. What reason(s) does the article give for the “experiment” not being a success?
4. What practical methods would you use to ensure the experiment's long-term success? How can you encourage the police and communities to work together?
5. Are the right people made stakeholders in the process? Do they share the same goals? Who, or what parties, should be stakeholders?
6. What are your views of placing rookie police officers in *impact zones* and *hot spots*?
7. One-in-five law enforcement officers are former military. Do you feel that utilising ex-military personnel in law enforcement increases police militarisation? In what way?
8. Many former military personnel have combat related *post-traumatic stress disorder* (PTSD). How should this affect police recruitment and the policy of reintegrating returning military personnel?

Transforming Policing: An Interview with Mike Bush - New Zealand's Police Commissioner



The country's crime rate has decreased drastically in recent years after the police commissioner shifted to a focus on crime prevention instead of prosecution.

Mary Calam (London) and Roland Dillon (Melbourne)

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New Zealand cut its crime rate by 20 percent in four years while boosting public satisfaction with policing. The country's police chief attributes its "180-degree shift" to a prevention-focused approach - a shift that holds lessons for other public-sector transformations.

When Mike Bush joined the New Zealand police service as a cadet in 1978, it was an organisation focused squarely on prosecution. The ethos was: *"Catch offenders, lock them up, and forget about the rest."* Thirty years later, as deputy commissioner, he began the transformation of the service by putting prevention first - a transformation he has continued as commissioner.

For Bush, this transformation has been deeply personal. *"It went back to my reason for being a police officer,"* he explained. In a previous role as an area police commander, Bush piloted an approach of intervening early to prevent crime and using the justice system as the final option. He saw how that made the police service better at keeping the population safe - and gave his fellow officers greater opportunities to change people's lives.



When he was promoted to the national role of New Zealand Police Commissioner in 2014, Bush made that innovative work the foundation for a national project called "Prevention First." It soon became the cornerstone of the New Zealand Police's operating strategy and helped spur the transformation of the entire police service.

Prevention First was *"a 180-degree shift from where we had been,"* he recalled. Persuading a decentralised workforce of more than 12,000 to try something new was no easy task: Bush estimated that two-thirds of the workforce saw the new operating strategy as a threat. *"When people feel threatened, they are going to opt out, they are going to challenge, they are going to resist,"* he said.

As the numbers show, Bush was able to overcome this resistance and bring the service with him on the transformation journey. New Zealand's crime rate fell by 20% between 2010 and 2014, while public satisfaction with policing rose from 79% to 84% over the same period¹. That has made New Zealand a global success story in policing - and a key case study in public-sector transformations.

In conversation, Bush reflected on three essential success factors of such transformations:

1. committed leadership; 2. compelling communication, and; 3. capabilities for change.

¹ Policing Excellence: The Transformation of New Zealand Police 2009–2014, New Zealand Police, December 2014, police.govt.nz

McKinsey: *We know from our research on government transformations that leadership commitment is critical in driving successful transformations. What did you do to demonstrate your personal commitment to the change?*

Mike Bush: People who delegate transformation out will never succeed. Unless the chief executive and leaders in the organisation own and champion the change, it will never happen.

Seeing senior leaders within that group championing the operating model of change makes a massive difference. Once people see you delegate transformation out, it is not important to your people because it is not seen as important to you. It's symbolic, because if you commit time, your people understand how important it is to you.

Being closely involved gives you a better understanding of where the barriers are and how to remove them. It brings that absolute, relentless focus. Because if you have your arms around something, you understand it. You're able to make things happen.

McKinsey: *That must have been a huge commitment in terms of your time.*

Mike Bush: My rule of thumb is - and I got this from others, so it's not my own rule - you need to dedicate at least 60 percent of your time inside the organisation to driving a transformation.

The police service in New Zealand is very decentralised, so it was critical for the leadership team to get out and about regularly to talk to officers and staff on the front line. And this starts right with new recruits. When we induct them, on day one, I meet with them all, which helps them understand our business.

McKinsey: *Can you give me an example of how that leadership commitment had an impact?*

Mike Bush: When we reached out for a mobility partner, I led the procurement and spoke to the chief executives of the major providers. I said, *"This is our vision. This is what we need—we do not want a provider or a supplier, we want a partner. We want to innovate. We want support."* So we wanted someone to come on the transformation journey with us.

Now three of the main CEOs that we approached all took different approaches. One quite rightly said, *"Too big for us."* The second thought, *"I got this in the bag. We're already there, no problem."* And the third company, the chief executives said, *"I'm going to own this. I'm going to champion it. I'm going to ensure that this happens. Because it's important to the organisation. And actually, I really like what they're trying to do."*

They won it. We're still really close partners. We're innovating. We're doing everything we said we'd do. Again, it was led from the top in our place. But it was championed from the top in their place as well. So that was worth it. What their chief executive did made the difference.

McKinsey: *Our research on government transformations highlights how critical communication is and that most organizations don't do it nearly well enough. How did you articulate the vision?*

Mike Bush: I spoke to another 40 new recruits yesterday, and I asked them why they joined. And the answer that always comes back to you is, *“I joined to make a difference.”* Understanding the “why” is critical. We reflected the purpose of policing right up front. The purpose of policing is to ensure people are safe and that they feel safe. Now, everyone in our business can articulate that. And we have performance measurements that are absolutely aligned to that. Reducing the number of people who are victims of crime is absolutely the *raison d’être* of policing, no one would argue with that - that’s the “be safe” part. But citizens are only going to “feel safe” if they trust the police - and we’ve set really high targets for trust, confidence, and satisfaction.



You also need to have the right plan to achieve the right outcomes. A big part of this is related to resource reallocation. A frontline officer who made an arrest for disorderly behavior could spend two hours preparing a file and then spend a day at court for a hearing, and yet ultimately there might still be no result. And we knew that prosecuting low-level offenses like these was not contributing to our vision of preventing crime and making people feel safe.

Implementing this new vision meant we took out 41 percent of the volume of referrals, which freed up capacity to dedicate to preventing people becoming victims in the first place, with more officers out on the street rather than in the office or waiting in court.

McKinsey: *And how was that vision communicated across such a large and geographically dispersed organisation?*

Mike Bush: In terms of bringing the organisation with you, the first mistake you can make is just assuming that because you have a good plan, and it is the right thing to do, that people are going to buy into [it]. It takes massive change management, massive leadership commitment, relentless communication and championing. It is continuous.

If you think about our new operating strategy, Prevention First, with victims at the center, that was a 180-degree shift from where we had been. From an organisation that was offender focused, that was prosecution focused - just catch bad people, lock them up, and forget about the rest. We went from being prosecution first to being prevention first. That, in some people’s minds, was absolutely the right way to go. But 60 or 70 percent of the organisation saw it as a threat to their traditional approach to policing.

I’ve been in the police service for 40 years. It was contrary to the organisation I grew up in. But I personally led the development of the new operating model. So I understood it. And it went back to my reason for being a police officer, for being in the New Zealand Police. So, my ability to say, *“That was then, this is now,”* was helpful. I was not parachuted in. This was the organisation I grew up in, and I understood its psychological drivers.

McKinsey: *Did you run into any roadblocks when communicating the vision?*

Mike Bush: Getting the messages right meant trial and error, and our messages evolved over time. At the start, people thought we meant enforcement and investigations were now less important than prevention work. We had to change tack, to make them understand that we know all the components of policing are important. It is just the order in which you think and act that makes the difference, putting prevention at the front and victims at the center.

For example, our detective branch saw their role as investigating serious crime and arresting serious and organised crime offenders. They thought, “*Prevention is in another part of the organisation.*” So it wasn’t communicated to them in a way that seemed relevant. If it’s communicated correctly, prevention becomes really relevant - arresting serious crime offenders quickly and effectively actually prevents further crime. Understanding the drivers of organised crime helps prevent a lot of other harm and crime. So we left quite a significant part of our organisation behind because the change was not championed by the leaders in that space, and it was not fully understood. That’s been corrected, and the detectives are massive champions now of our operating model.

McKinsey: *How did you go about building the new capabilities and ways of working?*

Mike Bush: We increased the training—whether it’s around prevention, whether it’s around response or investigation. There has been much more professionalisation of core policing skills, building a police officer’s judgment, and ensuring they bring their core skills and their intrinsic values to the job. It’s a two-and-a-half-year programme to roll out. We’ve got 12,000 through, soon to be 14,000 people.

It’s also about leadership skills, which is a big change for them as well. It’s going from a high-fear/low-trust leadership model, which is the model I joined under. Back then, you were scared of your bosses, and there was very little trust. But now we have moved - and it’s low-fear/high-trust. I’ve got to build capability in all my people, because I have to trust them when they’re out there day and night.

I’ve also learned to never assume. Never assume that because something is a better, and maybe even easier, thing to do, that people will adopt it. People adopt things for different reasons. The example I use is technology. You give everyone a smartphone. Tell them they can do whatever they like within the law on that device. And at the same time, use it for the policing purposes.

Never assume that they’re all going to adopt it. We only had a 50 percent uptake. So then we had to step back and say, “*How do we lead this change?*” So never assume.

McKinsey: *The last question: If you were speaking to someone who’s in a position like yours embarking on a five-year journey, what is the one thing you’d want them to know?*

Mike Bush: You have to own it and lead it. Without the leader, it will fail. Your leadership is critical, and you cannot delegate transformation. I’ve seen people delegate transformation and fail. It has to be central to your purpose.

Relations with all communities must ‘deepen and broaden’ to prevent another terror attack

Tina Orr Munro, **Policing Insight** (12 December 2019)

In March 2019, New Zealand suffered its worst ever terrorist attack when 51 innocent people were murdered and dozens injured as they attended Friday Prayer. Speaking at the International Conference of Crime Prevention in Dubai, New Zealand Police Commissioner Mike Bush discusses the implications the attack had for his force’s ‘Prevention First’ policy.



On 15 March 2019, a gunman entered the Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, and opened fire on worshippers. Minutes later, he drove to the Linwood Islamic Centre where he again fired on those attending Friday Prayer. He killed 51 innocent people and wounded dozens more. This horrific act of terror was motivated by hate yet the perpetrator, who was legally in possession of the firearms, had never come to the attention of any of the authorities, including the police.

“He had travelled to 70 countries. He had donated funds to ‘groups of concern’. He had joined a gun club and acquired semi-automatic firearms. You’d think that was enough to come to our attention. It wasn’t,” says New Zealand Police Commissioner Mike Bush.

Commissioner Bush revealed that that attack shone a light on force’s “Prevention First” approach to policing. Introduced in 2011, Prevention First had previously proved to be successful, but in this instance, as Commissioner Bush says, it had not enabled them to “*get ahead*” of the attack.

Prevention First is the operating strategy for the New Zealand Police Service, placing “*prevention at the forefront of the organisation and people at the very centre*”. In practice, it shifts the service’s focus from prosecution to prevention although the two are not mutually exclusive.

“Everything we do is important: preventing, responding, investigating and resolving. The principle here is that it is the order in which you think and act that makes the difference. If you put prevention at the front, you are honouring your reason for coming to work.”

Three-pronged strategy

The Prevention First operating model follows a three-pronged strategy. The first is to identify the **driver for demand**. *“You must understand what’s driving crime in your country, area or region. You must problem solve that and work in partnership with everyone that has the ability to resolve those drivers.”*

The second strand relates to **deployment**. Having a robust deployment intelligence model is critical, says Commissioner Bush, in understanding the demand on the business and the resources available for deployment.

The final strand relates to **changing police culture** which he described as a 'long journey'.

"How do you change the mindset of 13,000 people? It's not easy. Having one jurisdiction is helpful, but it takes huge change management processes, championing that philosophy and proving that it actually works."

The Prevention First model was tested when, between 2015 and 2017, aggravated burglaries across New Zealand soared by 50%, leaving many victims living in fear. The force applied the model, using the *crime triangle of offender, location and victim*. Alongside a high focus on offenders, staff were also deployed across the country to reassure communities. Around 1200 of the affected businesses were visited and given crime prevention advice which led to substantial improvements in their security. Around 300 repeat victims were also identified. Technology also played a key role and the force managed to secure \$1.8m NZD (£1.1m) from the government to install CCTV cameras in high risk locations. Tackling the robberies was made a priority, nationally, but also locally.

"Every district commander needed to understand what was going on in their area, address it and report back to the centre. When commanders are asked to account for what's going and ensure they have the solutions, performance improves," adds Commissioner Bush.

The approach worked. Data for 2016 -17 showed a 40% decrease in armed robberies with 61% of the crimes resolved. Not only did crime come down, but perceptions of safety increased significantly as did trust and confidence in the police. Overall, Prevention First was successful. Then 15 March 2019 happened.

Listening to Commissioner Bush talk about the events of that day and the police service's inability to prevent this horrific attack taking place, it's clear that it still weighs heavily on the service. What was frustrating for the police is that the perpetrator wasn't even on their radar.

"This person – an Australian who had lived in New Zealand for two years and who had travelled to 70 countries – had never come to the notice of the authorities including the police, mental health and immigration. How do you get ahead of people like that?"

The attack caused the force to reflect on the Prevention First model which revealed that while the police had many excellent relationships and partnerships with diverse communities, it wasn't enough.

"We have a big firearms community. This man was lawfully in possession of firearms used in that attack. He trained at a gun club. Did anyone in that community come to us? No. Would they have if we had better relationships? I think so."

‘We need to do more’

Commissioner Bush view is that every law enforcement organisation has to “*deepen and broaden*” their relationships with every community, including the online community, if they are to prevent an attack like this happening again.

“They [law enforcement] must be immersed in every community so you learn about the people that may pose a risk. You have to build that trust and confidence.”

While the police were unable to prevent the first attack happening, they did succeed in quickly foiling a subsequent plot - and were also able to reassure communities, keeping them safe in the aftermath of the first incident.

“We failed on one and succeeded on the other. Trust and confidence in the police rose by a significant amount because the way we policed this post event made people feel safe. People felt reassured.”

New Zealand’s Prevention First model remains very much at the heart of its approach to policing, but Mr Bush says it now needs to go further.

“We need to deepen it and broaden it. Everyone comes to work to ensure these things never happen. We need to sit and reflect. Are we doing enough? No, we need to do more.”

(note: Mike Bush retires from the New Zealand Police in April 2020)

Discussion Questions

1. In the context of police as an organisation, define *change management*. Does it differ to Security Sector Reform (SSR)?
2. How does Mike Bush’s leadership-style and approach compare to the leadership of your police?
3. When implementing police reform and priorities, what style is more important *leadership or management*?
4. How open/resistant to change are your police (*ref. management/culture/personnel*)?
5. How does your country compare to New Zealand’s approach on “Preventive Policing”? Give examples of preventive policing strategies already used in your country.
6. Both NZ’s Commissioner Bush and the former Head of Community Policing in Manchester (UK), stated that community-oriented preventive strategies are the key to reducing crime, as well as countering violent extremism, radicalisation and terrorism (VERT). Agree / Disagree?
7. How do you measure the success in preventive policing?
8. If you were promoted to the Chief of Police:
 - a. how would you change police ideologies and organisational culture?
 - b. what policing areas would you focus on?

Police and Community Relations

Democratic Policing and the Social Contract

An important function of the State is to provide *security* and *public order*. To do so, the State claims sole **monopoly** in **legitimate** physical **coercion** within its geographical and political **jurisdiction**. Police functions in a democratic society must:

- be operationally independent from the state and be responsible towards the needs of citizens; *and*
- be transparent, **accountable**, and guided by the rule of law & human rights standards.

In **autocratic** and fragile states, police are closely associated with maintaining the government - often 'securing order' through the misuse of force. Under these conditions law enforcement adopts a **militarised** approach, where normal civilian police duties (crime prevention) have been downgraded in favour of State Security (public order). Such practices are seen as obstacles to well-functioning policing and community engagement.



In liberal democracies, police are authorised to use proportionate force against the public - when considered necessary. On the whole, the public regard this arrangement as reasonable under the *social contract* - a theory which regards *use of force* as necessary to **uphold** law and order in maintaining a safe society.

Under the *social contract* individuals are understood to voluntarily surrender some of their rights to the State. Although government officials, police are seen as politically **impartial** in their role, themselves governed and restricted by rules and the same laws. The social contract views police as a protective force against crime and social disorder. This view is held widely by the general public, and even when faced with scandal (corruption, racism, disproportionate use of force, and abuse of powers), the police remain respected as both a public service and institution.

The social contract – and goodwill - is essentially the public's '**buy-in**': a socio-political and cultural relationship that often does not exist in international police interventions.

Police and Community Relations

Vocabulary Building

a. monopoly	b. legitimacy	c. coercion
d. jurisdiction	e. accountable	f. autocrat
g. uphold	h. impartial	i. at large
j. buy-in	k. militarised	l. Human Terrain

1. Having a _____ means the exclusive control, by one group, of a service.
2. _____ is the territory and range of legal authority of the judiciary, law-enforcement, or governmental body.
3. To _____ support and defend an idea, principle or structure.
4. An _____, a ruler who possesses absolute and unrestricted authority.
5. _____ means to be responsible to someone or for some action; answerable.
6. Being _____ is not having a prejudice or bias towards or against any particular side or party.
7. The _____ refers to the target population within a specific area.
8. To be _____ means to be *at liberty*, or refers to a group *in general*.
9. Police become _____ by adopting military practises normally used in war zones: tactics, weapons, uniforms, vehicles and force.
10. _____ is being authorised and acting in accordance with the law, whilst the having credibility and trustworthy to do so.
11. If you _____ to an idea, you actively agree and become a stakeholder.
12. _____ is governing by force.



An Introduction

From the streets of Ferguson, Missouri to the favelas of Brazil, the police use of force and firearms makes global headlines when it turns fatal.

In countless cases, including in response to demonstrations, police are too quick to use force instead of seeking peaceful conflict resolution. In many countries police deploy tear gas, rubber bullets and other weapons in arbitrary, abusive or excessive use of force, causing serious casualties, including killing and maiming people, often with little or no accountability.

“All too often, in many countries around the world, people are killed or seriously injured when police use force in violation of international standards or existing national laws,” says Dr. Anja Bienert, Amnesty International Netherlands’ Police & Human Rights Programme.

Nobody is disputing that police have a challenging, and often even dangerous, duty to perform. But governments and law enforcement authorities frequently fail to create a framework to ensure that police only use force lawfully and as a last resort.

The power to use force and firearms is necessary for police to carry out their duties, but that does not mean it is an inevitable part of the job – in fact, the underlying principle of the international standards for police is *not* to use force unless it is really necessary. In many countries police fall short of this mark, and often resort to the use of force and firearms in an indiscriminate, excessive or otherwise unlawful manner.

In all regions of the world there are examples where deaths and serious injuries have resulted from police use of force and firearms. In recent years these include:

- killings by police in **Brazil** which impact disproportionately on young black men;
- numerous police shootings in the **USA** resulting in the death of unarmed people, likewise with a disproportionate impact on African American men;
- in **Bangladesh**, special police forces carrying out heavy-handed police operations with lethal force, resulting in the death of many people;
- use of tear gas, rubber bullets and other means of force, sometimes even firearms, during public assemblies, resulting in serious casualties, including in **Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, Greece, Hong Kong, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela and Ukraine**.

This is due to a variety of reasons, including domestic laws that contradict international human rights obligations, deficient internal regulations, inadequate training and equipment, lack of command control and the absence of accountability for police who act outside the law.

“The UN Basic Principles are an acknowledgement that, in certain limited circumstances, police can and will need to use force to maintain law and order. But this must be done in compliance with international human rights law and it certainly must never be seen as a licence to kill nor as granting immunity to police officials: nobody is above the law, especially those who have a duty to uphold the law,” said Dr. Anja Bienert.

The Crisis of Police Militarisation



“Do Not Resist”

Based on articles by: Dexter Filkins, The New Yorker, 13 May 2016, and Stuart Miller, The Guardian, 30 September 2016

When the Chechen-born Tsarnaev brothers set off a bomb at the finish line of the 2013 Boston Marathon, killing three people and wounding 264, New York filmmaker Craig Atkinson looked on with as much horror as anyone else. But he noticed something else, too: Boston Police Department armored vehicles and heavily armed officers - dressed like combat soldiers - deployed onto the streets, fanning out across neighbourhoods as though they were an infantry division engaged in Afghanistan. Atkinson asked himself, when did local police forces, in their equipment and tactics, come to resemble armies of occupation?

The answer Atkinson came up with is “Do Not Resist,” a documentary film that traces the transformation of police departments across the United States into forces that often look like occupying ground troops - and all too often act like them. Watching “Do Not Resist,” is an eye-opening experience. The film takes a series of events that might appear unrelated - the heavy-handed police response to the demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014; the use of heavily armed SWAT teams in South Carolina to carry out routine drug arrests - and shows that they are part of a pattern that has taken hold in many police departments across the country. *“What we discovered is that there had been a massive change in the tactics used by SWAT teams,”* Atkinson told me. *“And that happened as the federal government was giving away military equipment to police departments.”*

Atkinson is not the first person to detail the militarization of America’s police¹. But he is the first to provide a visual account of how police forces across the country have changed - and how they are using the extraordinary weapons they’ve been given by the Pentagon.

This is demonstrated in a scene in which the Richland County Sheriff Department’s Special Response Team (SRT) practice close quarter combat (CQC) with assault rifles and submachine guns. It shows the SWAT teams enjoying the adrenaline rush of military-style training with heavy weaponry and armoured vehicles. One officer justifies it all by stating the need to be ready for ISIS, WMDs and *“situations like what they had in Missouri”*, saying that civil protests necessitate the use of armour and assault rifles.

The practice of donating unused military equipment to local governments began in 1997, when the *1033 program* was included in an otherwise unremarkable Department of Defense (DOD) budget authorisation. Under the 1033 program, the DOD publishes a list of surplus equipment that is available to local governments. But the turning point - as with so many other issues - came after 9/11. Since the 90’s, the DOD has donated some \$5bn worth of equipment. But the over-all value of military equipment acquired by police forces is actually much higher: local governments have received approximately \$34bn in grants from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to buy their own military equipment from private suppliers². That brings the total to \$39bn - more than the entire defence budget of Germany.

¹ The [Times](#), the [Washington Post](#), [USA Today](#), and the [Marshall Project](#) did it earlier.

² Oversight of who receives the equipment, and type have proved to be non-existent, with criminal organisations posing as law enforcement – as uncovered in a media sting

The Crisis of Police Militarisation

The 1033 and DHS programs have resulted in local governments around the country acquiring an astonishing range of military equipment, including armoured personnel carriers, assault helicopters, M-16 assault rifles, grenade launchers, and infrared gun sights, all of which were designed for combat. Among the vehicles routinely given to police departments is the MRAP (mine-resistant ambush-protected), designed to survive roadside bombs. According to the *Marshall Project*, some 600 MRAPs have been handed out to local authorities around the country; they cost about a million dollars each.



The Marshall Project has broken down DOD donations by county and city³. It turns out that NYPD has acquired surprisingly little under the 1033 and DHS programs: just two armoured personnel carriers and some non-lethal gear. The Brevard County Sheriff's Department (Florida) scored big, getting its hands on nearly \$7m worth of equipment, including thirteen helicopters, two armoured personnel carriers, and 246 assault rifles. In 2014, the Los Angeles Unified School District announced that it would return the three grenade launchers it had acquired but would keep its armoured personnel carrier and 61 assault rifles.

As the Pentagon was gifting free military equipment, something else was happening, too: there was explosive growth in SWAT team deployments, often armed with the same military equipment that was obtained from the federal government. According to Atkinson, SWAT teams were deployed about 3000 times a year across the country in the 1980's. By 2005, they were deployed 45,000 times a year; in 2015, as much as 80,000 times.

In one scene, the Richland County Sheriff's Department deploys its Special Response Team (SRT) to raid a home in a run-down neighbourhood where the inhabitants were suspected of keeping marijuana. The SRT members, who are dressed in military uniforms, helmets, vests, and assault rifles - smash the doors and windows, enter the house, and arrest the tenant's son. SRT seize \$873 in cash from the suspect, which he tells police is needed to purchase gardening equipment for his landscaping business⁴. They end up finding 1.5 grams loose marijuana (enough to fill a teaspoon). The suspect's mother tells the filmmakers, "*they tore down the house. My son went to jail for a gram and a half that they shook out of a bottom of a book bag.*" The lead TRT officer says with a shrug that drug raids are a "*50-50 proposition in terms of finding something worthwhile*".



³ <https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/03/the-pentagon-finally-details-its-weapons-for-cops-giveaway#dod-graphic>

⁴ Surveillance had misinterpreted frequent references to *grass* and *weed* as meaning marijuana

The Crisis of Police Militarisation

Atkinson states that the raid in South Carolina was typical of the dozen he went on with law enforcement officers from across the country. Atkinson shows that particular raid because he wanted to demonstrate how *civil asset forfeiture*⁵ has spiralled out of control. For all the military equipment and tactics that were used, very little in the way of criminal activity was ever discovered. *“We kept going out, but we never found much of anything,”* he said. *“Do you know the type of ill-will generated in these communities?”* he says. *“It makes the police seem like an occupying force.”*

The picture that emerges from *“Do Not Resist”* is that the acquisition of military equipment and the use of SWAT teams for routine arrests are feeding on each other - that heavy weapons are encouraging police to act in ways they otherwise would not.

Defending militarization, FBI Director James Comey gives a speech about *“so-called warrior cops, a term I have heard, and the militarization of police”*. Through an anecdote he states that *“monsters are real”*, to justify the need for these weapons. Unfortunately, the editing is selective: the clip ends before Comey importantly adds that *“the issue is the way in which we use it – when and how we deploy advanced equipment; when and how our officers are trained to use that equipment. The way we do it matters enormously.”* But Comey does not speak out for stronger gun control as a means to reduce the need for such equipment and attitudes.

“Do Not Resist” is interspersed with scenes from Ferguson, Missouri, where large demonstrations began after a police officer shot and killed Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager. When people gathered in the streets to express their anger, police moved in with armoured vehicles, riot gear, pepper spray and tear gas. Not surprisingly, events escalated.



Garry McCarthy, then Chief of the Chicago Police Department, told President Obama’s *Task Force on 21st Century Policing* that the heavy-handed response by the police had recklessly provoked Ferguson residents. *“What happened in Ferguson - the actual practice of how the demonstrations were handled - I think we were all embarrassed, quite frankly, in law enforcement,”* McCarthy said. *“In my book, if you fire tear gas, you’ve got a riot right now. You don’t have a demonstration.”*

For more than a century, US Federal Law has prohibited the military from being deployed inside the United States against American citizens. The far-sightedness behind that distinction is obvious, not least because while the military is trained to use maximum force, the police, ideally, should only use as much as is necessary to protect themselves or local citizens. *“Do Not Resist”* shows that the distinction between the two has been severely eroded.

⁵ where police confiscate goods and money for their own use before a suspect is even found guilty

The Crisis of Police Militarisation

Class Discussion: *Warriors vs. Guardians*

1. What are the issues at play?
2. What is the consequence of Police Militarization?
3. In the film, Dave Grossman plants the image of law enforcement as “*Super Heroes - constantly under threat - who need to meet force with superior force*”. What are your thoughts?
4. How do you view the US Defense Department’s 1033 programme and DHS grant?
5. How does militarized civilian law enforcement affect Community Relations?
6. What role does culture play?
7. How is a *search warrant* conducted in your country? When do you think an aggressive *no-knock* search warrant should occur?
8. What strategies would you employ to reform US Law Enforcement? What would be your priorities and focus areas?

Why Cops Need a 'Warrior' Mindset - and Why They Shouldn't Want One



North American policing is often heavily criticised for adopting what is called the warrior mentality - an "*us versus them*" approach to policing communities. RCMP Inspector Kevin Cyr looks at the nuances of this approach - and why we shouldn't give up on it altogether if we want to keep communities and police officers safe.

In May 2019, the Mayor of Minneapolis announced a ban on the city's police officers taking *warrior-style* training, stating that the training was "*fear-based*" and taught police officers to adopt a mind-set that "*threats are everywhere*". The mayor believed that warrior-style training would prevent the police from forming meaningful relationships with the communityⁱ.

This isn't new commentary. Critics have long worried that police officers who subscribe to a warrior-style mindset will adopt an "us-versus-them" approach in dealing with their communities, undermining their abilities to deliver quality policing. These concerns are not without merit, but the warrior mindset is an unfortunate necessity of policing and an inevitable reflection of the reality of the police officer's working domain. That said, it is a mindset that can be taken too far, and its limitations must be appreciated.



Most police officers believe that catching criminals is what being a cop is all aboutⁱⁱ. Never mind that actual crime fighting accounts for less than 25% of an officer's timeⁱⁱⁱ. We all grew up playing cops and robbers, not pretending to go to noise complaints or deal with social issues. We watched TV shows where police work is action-packed^{iv} and always ends with a bad guy going to jail: many police officers still define their role based on this aspect of the job.

Policing Culture

That the crime-fighting image of policing is deeply ingrained in policing culture is demonstrated by the extreme popularity of well-known police trainer Dave Grossman's¹ "sheepdog" description of police work^v.

In the sheepdog analogy – which is so prevalent in policing circles that it is almost cliché - society is divided into three groups. The law-abiding citizens are the sheep. This characterisation is meant to be descriptive, not derogatory, as the average citizen is a peaceful, productive person who is incapable of violence except under extreme provocation and who naturally expects others to be the same. Criminals are the wolves; they have a capacity for violence and use it to prey on the sheep. Finally, police officers are the sheepdogs tasked with protecting the flock. Like the wolves, they have a capacity for violence, but are guided by a morality that the wolves lack^{vi}.

This romanticised notion of policing is exactly the type of fear-based perspective that the Minneapolis mayor was concerned would create an us-versus-them mentality and teach officers that threats were constantly present, which does not seem to be supported by statistics on policing. Policing is not a [*physically*] hazardous occupation when compared to fishing or logging for on-the-job fatalities, and isn't even in the top 10 for dangerous occupations in Canada^{vii viii}. Why, then, is it necessary, to construct a view of policing that raises images of police officers forever in the crosshairs of violent criminals?

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel, U.S. Army (retired)



In Defence of the 'Warrior Mentality'

The necessity is that even if the police were to dismiss this combatant notion, dangerous criminals would not. It is well ingrained in the criminal ethos that the police are the enemy. Cop killer Robert Sand provided a glimpse into this mentality in a diary entry he wrote as he sat in a jail cell while on trial for the murder of RCMP Constable Dennis Strongquill^{ix}.

Robert Sand's words, written after he reviewed crime scene photographs of the slain officer as well as his brother, Danny, who had been killed by a police sniper, are chilling:

"I was looking at this man, on a table. And he had several shotgun wounds, to the side, back, chest, etc. And I started to think, he's just a man, and shouldn't be dead. He had a family and friends, and now he's a body on a table. I realized it's not the man I hated, but the uniform he wore. His flag, colours of war. But seeing him without his uniform I felt bad for the loss of his life.

I flipped to the pics of Dan, and my thoughts changed. Cos' now I felt that the other man is right where he should be. And losses on both sides are always expected, only Dan took my place. And when I looked up at the cop car I felt pride, and remembered the battle. I remembered how these enemy soldiers fled in fear and cowardice. I saw how much damaged I'd caused to their unit and smiled, from the knowledge, that the enemy isn't as strong as they want us to believe. But they should beware that the moment they fly their flag, wear their uniform. That their at war and people die in war, everyone has their enemies.^x [sic] "

While critics rush to condemn an "us-versus-them" policing model, they fail to realise that the "us" isn't the police, and the "them" isn't the public. The police and the public are the "them". The "us" are the criminals. Us-versus-them is the perspective of the predator, not the guardian, and we can't pretend it doesn't exist. If we reject the image of police as crime fighters because that does not constitute the majority of their work^{xi}, and because that is perhaps their most distasteful task, then we have to pretend that the police aren't the ones society calls upon to confront human aggression. The relative infrequency of violent encounters does not eliminate the need to be able to handle them when they happen. It isn't so much that the police are *constantly* at risk, it is that they are *unpredictably* at risk. Officer survival tactics are not practised on a whim; they are born out of hard-won experience that was paid for in blood.

To see the dangers of completely discarding a warrior-based mentality we can return to the wolves and the sheep analogy, but this time from Aesop's fables:

"Why should there always be this fear and slaughter between us?" said the Wolves to the Sheep. "Those evil-disposed Dogs have much to answer for. They always bark whenever we approach you and attack us before we have done any harm. If you would only dismiss them from your heels, there might soon be treaties of peace and reconciliation between us." The Sheep, poor silly creatures, were easily beguiled and dismissed the Dogs, whereupon the Wolves destroyed the unguarded flock at their own pleasure^{xii}."





Negative Impact

But it would be unwise to adopt a warrior-based mentality without understanding the baggage that comes with it. First, even entirely appropriate officer safety practices can have negative community impacts. Routine actions such as asking a person to take their hands out of their pockets or shining a spotlight into a car during a traffic stop may appear to an average citizen (who doesn't understand the threats the officer is trying to protect themselves from) as being rude, unnecessary, and perhaps overly coercive^{xiii}. It is difficult to fault police officers for wanting to reduce the threats they face, but risk can never be reduced to zero and some would argue that there comes a point when officer safety practices require coercive actions that the police should not be able to apply without some overt threat being present.

Second, the warrior mentality can be taken too far. Lt. Col. Grossman provided an example of the sheepdog mission by quoting the motto of one California law enforcement agency, *"We intimidate those who intimidate others."*^{xiv} What Lt. Col. Grossman failed to point out is that motto was from the LAPD Rampart Division CRASH Unit (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums), an anti-gang unit that was ultimately disbanded after allegations of assaults, theft of drugs, and framing of suspects^{xv}. Sheepdogs, it seems, can sometimes act like wolves.

Finally, when we provide police officers with a warrior-based mindset, we risk further isolating them from the society they serve. Most of society simply doesn't understand the reality of being a police officer, and social isolation is a well-established aspect of policing culture^{xvi}.

Every police officer has had the experience of meeting someone for the first time, disclosing their occupation, and then having to suffer complaints about undeserved traffic tickets or, at best, having to respond to legitimate interest in policing stories which the officer probably has limited interest in recounting. Indeed, *"the whole civilian world is an audience for the policeman [which] further promotes police isolation and, in consequence, solidarity."*^{xvii}

The problem with social isolation and excessive solidarity among the police is it can make it difficult for the police to discern society's expectations. Since the police are subject to incestuous social confirmation of their attitudes and beliefs by their limited peer group, any disagreement between what the police think is appropriate and what the public expects can be written off as a failure of the public to know *"how the world really is"*. Essentially, *"officers can lose the capacity to read nuance in the social landscape or even to cast a critical eye on their own behaviour."*^{xviii}

This was best summarised in the movie, *A Few Good Men*, when Colonel Jessop (Jack Nicholson) said, *"I have neither the time nor the inclination to explain myself to a man who rises and sleeps under the blanket of the very freedom that I provide, then questions the manner in which I provide it."*^{xix} Simply put, objections from the public can be dismissed as bleating of the sheep.

The warrior mentality is not an all-or-nothing separation. A police officer does not have to choose between either adopting an identity of a coiled cobra ready at any moment for a battle to the death or being completely apathetic to the potential danger of her occupation. Rather, those options represent the two furthest ends on a spectrum of attitudes^{xx}. An officer **must** be able to move along different points of that spectrum depending on the circumstances presented. Adopting the warrior mentality wholeheartedly no matter the circumstances is foolish, but abandoning it completely is dangerous.

Group Assignments

Group One: Present an objective synopsis of the article

Group Two: Present arguments/justifications for the Warrior approach

Group Three: Present argument for the Guardian approach

County Lines Gangs: How Drug-Running is Fuelling Knife Crime

UK criminals are using violence to force vulnerable teenagers to carry drugs from London estates to rural streets 200 kilometres away.

Mark Townsend, Guardian (9 March 2019)

As always, they were gathered in Andover Square, the tree-shaded courtyard in the middle of the Islington, North London housing estate. Another group stood on a nearby corner; another loitered outside the tower blocks of the Six Acres Estate. *"You see? They have taken over the streets,"* said Fawzia Addou, one of a group of mothers escorting reporters around the streets of Finsbury Park, north London. The mothers, dressed in disguise, were pointing out the drug-dealing spots where their sons worked.



The dealers were everywhere: behind the bowling alley, outside the tube station, at the top of Finsbury Park Road, as well as the bus stop opposite City and Islington College.

The mothers cannot understand why the drug trade is so brazen, so open. They say the police know all about the locations because they have repeatedly told officers.

Those who could identify their teenage sons were almost grateful. Many other children, aged under 16, have simply disappeared. Some emerge weeks later, hungry, exhausted. Some have been beaten, stabbed, and are visibly traumatised.

They are the victims of "county lines", a drug distribution system in which criminal networks exploit thousands of children and vulnerable adults to funnel hard drugs from cities to towns and rural regions across the country, often using the public transport network to move their illegal merchandise. The youngsters transporting the drugs are recruited by ruthless criminal organisations, who target them with a mixture of financial rewards and threats, often finding recruits outside schools or the pupil referral units to which they have been sent after being excluded from mainstream schools.

The destabilising influence of the county lines system has helped to drive fatal stabbings to the highest levels since records began. The mounting death toll has become increasingly politicised with government crisis meetings and warnings of a "national emergency".


But the controversy has changed little on the streets around the Andover estate. The mothers, all Somalis who fled their country during the civil war in the 1990s, say they have been abandoned by the state.

Many of their children, they reveal, have asked to leave London because of the violence or have been sent to Africa for their own protection. *"We are refugees, if we cannot keep our children safe, we move on,"* said Kameela Khalif.

Community representatives estimate that hundreds of British teenagers have left for Somaliland or Somalia – a country that in the recent past has seen car bombings, airstrikes and a deadly siege – because the UK has become too unsafe.

County Lines Gangs: How Drug-Running is Fuelling Knife Crime

Beyond its medieval centre, past St Benedict's church and the cobbled lanes, the west side of Norwich opens on to a network of housing estates. Here, among the streets of Heigham Grove, children from N4 – the London postcode of Finsbury Park some 180km away – have been discovered working county lines.



According to the latest police assessment, there are 27 county lines currently operating into Norfolk, most from London and most affecting Norwich, Great Yarmouth and King's Lynn.

A "hostile" strategy towards the drugs gangs, *Operation Gravity*, has seen 1,024 people arrested in Norfolk since November 2016. Analysis of these arrests produced a striking theme – the minority were locals. More than 800, in fact, did not have a Norfolk postcode. Of 18 girls, only three were from the county.

Further investigation found 500 gang members from London or elsewhere

had recently left a criminal "footprint" inside Norfolk. "It was a bit of an eye opener," said Chief Inspector Sonia Humphreys, of the Norfolk Constabulary.

Most children from London arrive into Norfolk by train. Those from Finsbury Park and Islington, whose mosaic of multi-ethnic gangs include *Easy Cash*, *Kelly Gang* and *Andover Boys* travel from King's Cross (London) direct to King's Lynn (170km). Further east across the capital a competing Somali-led gang, the *Mali Boys*, uses Liverpool Street station to travel direct to Norwich (180km away).

The Mali Boys, run by Somali "olders", are symbolic of a new wave of commercially aggressive county lines operations which have attempted to gain a Norwich foothold. "Historically, we've seen a lot of violence when the Somalis come up," said Humphreys.

Transport Police are briefed to look out for young black children travelling alone to Norfolk, often using first class, often paying with cash. Gangs are increasingly aware such journeys can seem conspicuous.

"White British children are now being targeted because gangs perceive they are more likely to evade police detection," states an internal Norfolk Police document.



County Lines Gangs: How Drug-Running is Fuelling Knife Crime

Although Norwich teenagers are increasingly joining county lines operations, recruits largely remain inner-city children exported elsewhere.

Last Wednesday, another seven Somali mothers gathered inside an Islington community centre to discuss their “lost generation”. Rakhia Ismail, Deputy Mayor of Islington is counselling 15 mothers who have lost sons to county lines and has dozens more terrified about trafficking.

Addou, part of a network of 13 parents whose children have been taken by drug gangs, estimated that half – possibly as much of 70% – of Islington’s Somali community had been directly impacted by knife crime and county lines. *“The ones not affected are worried because they’re next,”* she said. Addou’s son has been found in King’s Lynn four times. Groomed by gangs in a football park outside his school, the first time he disappeared she traced him to a local dealer. *“He said that he couldn’t come home until Tuesday. They were holding him.”* She sent the 15-year-old to Somalia then Kenya.

Sahra Amburo, a prominent member of N4’s Somali community, told how her 15-year-old was top of his class, a risk factor in itself because gangs target the most intelligent or popular, knowing friends will follow.

Her son vanished one Sunday afternoon in 2017. After obtaining his phone records, she tracked him to Essex where he was being held by a group of dealers. She flew him immediately to Somaliland. *“I took him away otherwise he would have been killed because they knew our address,”* she said.


Another described how she learned her 16-year-old son had been taken 200km away to Hemel Hempstead. She hung dozens of posters of his face across the Hertfordshire town. After three days the gang handed him over. *“Straightaway he said ‘please take me away from this country’.”*

Last Wednesday, a new development tormented the group. One of their sons, aged 19, who had been sent to Kenya for safety, was being enticed by a gang via Snapchat to return to N4. *“The drug dealers want him. If he returns, I will lose him,”* said Iana Ali. On Friday, she flew to Mombasa to persuade him to stay.

When a teenager was fatally stabbed earlier this year, 300 metres from the town centre, the deceased’s 15-year-old Somali friend was told he was next. Within two days his mother put him on a one-way ticket to Mogadishu. *“Now he’s walking the land, living free,”* she said.

All the mothers have learned that county lines necessitate violence. Exploited children hoping to rise up the criminal food-chain must exhibit escalating brutality. Nick Davison, Assistant Chief Constable of Norfolk Constabulary, outlined the concept of “ultra-violence” where younger recruits maintain status by executing acts of increasingly outrageous savagery.

Beatings turn to stabbings in the buttock, then the chest, the face. *“If you don’t, you become vulnerable to becoming a victim of that behaviour,”* said Davison.



*The comparative safety of Somalia:
Mogadishu car bombing May 2019*

County Lines Gangs: How Drug-Running is Fuelling Knife Crime

Internal police documents confirm widespread violence – *“85% of forces report knives referenced in relation to county lines intelligence, 74% report firearms referenced”*.

Children who attempt to escape are tortured. A 16-year-old reported missing from London was found by Norfolk police in possession of a 15cm kitchen knife and 30 wraps of drugs. In custody they discovered his body was covered with scarring *“consistent with burns from boiling liquid”*.

And the gangs have long memories. The mother who rescued her child from Hemel Hempstead allowed him to return to London in November 2017, assuming he would be safe. Within days of arriving he was stabbed in the stomach, his assailant wiggling the blade inside the body to cause maximum harm. After 40 days in hospital he returned home and has not left since. *“Both my sons are too scared to leave the house,”* she said.

The family has received no counselling or trauma aftercare.

Others take drastic measures. One London gang member, stabbed multiple times, turned to religion to escape. Norfolk officers subsequently discovered he had travelled to fight in Syria.

The lack of safety has provoked outrage. *“We parents are fighting a war with the gangs to save our children,”* said Khalif. They argue that their sons have been denied a statutory right to a safe environment. *“The government must take responsibility,”* said mother-of-seven Addou. When her son was caught, he refused bail because it was safer in prison. Others complain their probation prevents them from leaving the country.

The mothers ridiculed government claims that there is *“no direct correlation”* between crime and police numbers. Davison, agreed that *“budgetary cut backs”* and the state’s inability to provide security outside the family had been adeptly *“exploited”* by criminals.

The mothers’ deepest grievance is police apathy. They, along with many in the community, have shared detailed intelligence with police. Since 2015, addresses, locations and movements of individuals have been offered that they say connect county line operations to its *“generals”*. *“I’ve told the police so many times but now I’ve stopped. I expect it be acted on, or at least given some feedback. It’s one-way communication,”* said Addou.

The Islington Somali Community (ISC) complains that eight neighbourhood police serve a ward, Finsbury Park, which has a population of 17,200. Dealing spots, others say, lie within an area of concentrated CCTV coverage. The breakdown in trust is so great that unsupported claims of collusion flourish.

“Some parents believe that some police are working with the gangs because nothing is done,” said Ali. There is also disquiet over the latest political outcry over knife crime, in particular that it took the death of a white teenager to prompt the outrage.

“It is absolutely tragic but it has taken a white girl to get killed for this to top the political agenda,” said Kalyfa Ismail. A year ago, three Somali youngsters in nearby Camden were knifed in 24 hours; two died and one just survived. *“Where was the emergency summit then?”* said Addou.

Another burning issue is the increasing evidence linking school exclusion rates and gang recruitment. Excluded pupils are 200 times more likely to receive a knife-carrying offence.

County Lines Gangs: How Drug-Running is Fuelling Knife Crime

Abdiwahab Ali, director of the Somali Youth Development Resource Centre (SYDRC), is conducting pioneering research into the issue. Early estimates suggest half of Somali origin children excluded permanently in Camden enter the criminal justice system. Then there are the “units” – the pupil referral units accused of being fertile grounds for gang recruitment. Ismail described gang members waiting in lines outside Islington’s unit.

Bilan Hoseen, who works with excluded Somali teenagers, said many are too petrified to attend the local unit. *“They get a taxi there because they feel too unsafe to walk,”* he said.

Secondary schools have also been targeted by police with 10 of Norfolk’s 50 sites having a dedicated officer to spot vulnerable children. *“Through this we have discovered kids who have gone missing from high school in Norwich travelling to London to pick up drugs to support county lines activities,”* said Davison.

The exploitation of thousands of children provides the labour for county lines. Latest figures for the National Referral Mechanism, the government system to identify trafficking victims, revealed drug gangs helped prompt a 66% increase to 2,118 cases in 2017. But first the children must be groomed. They are usually targeted between the ages of 13-14, with the optimum age of 15-16.

Addou said the gang gave her football-mad son a new ball and the offer of protection. Months later he was running drugs in Norfolk. A caged artificial-turf pitch, 100 metres from Andover’s central square, is a well-known recruitment ground for N4 county lines operations. One mother on the Andover estate said her nine-year-old son was already receiving money for sweets from gangs. Others describe 14-year-olds wanting to *“do Deliveroo”* when they turn 16, a code for couriering drugs.

Fast food joints in Finsbury Park are targeted by gang recruiters. In Norwich, officers are told to be vigilant in shopping centres. Recruiters, said Humphreys, seek a *“chink in the armour”* of adolescents using techniques indistinguishable from child abusers. Internal briefings by police forces have highlighted video interviews conducted by youth worker Paul McKenzie with gang recruiters. *“It’s like listening to an exploiter of sexual abuse,”* said Humphreys.

Once hooked, their families are threatened with violence or they are trapped through debt bondage. Although a county line can make a gang up to £5,000 a day, mothers say there is scant evidence of wealth distribution. *“Our boys come home hungry, tired, cold. They are still growing, their clothes no longer fit.”*

Both Norfolk’s senior officers and Islington’s Somali mothers concur that the solution requires ambition. Davison, whose force has closed down 21 county lines, agrees the answer is bigger than the level of policing. *“We will not arrest our way out of county lines. It needs a whole system approach, offering young people alternatives,”* he said.

Beyond removing children from the country, the mothers list various solutions; more parental involvement in schools; safe spaces; more vocational education; a de-radicalisation programme for groomed children.

In the absence of a concerted new approach, both police and parents know that the teenagers of N4 will continue to surface in Norwich while their younger brothers on the Andover estate receive new gifts from the guys in the square.

County Lines Gangs: How Drug-Running is Fuelling Knife Crime

Quick Facts

What is meant by county lines?

Gangs in major cities seek new markets outside urban hubs for their drugs, primarily crack cocaine and heroin. Network expansion into the regions often comes with exploitation.

Who are the victims of these operations?

Children and vulnerable adults are often coerced into ferrying and stashing the drugs. They can be homeless or missing people, addicts, people living in care, trapped in poverty, or suffering from mental illness. Even older and physically infirm people have been targeted. Gang members have been observed attending drug rehab to find potential runners.

How do they target people?

Initially they can be lured in with money, gifts and the prospect of status. But this can quickly turn into the use of violence, sometimes sexual.

How widespread are county lines?

NCA research shows police have knowledge of at least 720 county lines in England and Wales, but it is feared the true number is far higher. Around 65% of forces reported county lines being linked to child exploitation, while 74% noted vulnerable people being targeted.

How many children are at risk?

Children without criminal records - known in the trade as "clean skins" - are preferred because they are less likely to be known to detectives. Charity *The Children's Society* says 4,000 teenagers in London alone are exploited through county lines. The Children's Commissioner estimates at least 46,000 children in England are caught up in gangs.

By Numbers

✂	The number of county lines operating from London to Norfolk	27
✂	Total number of people arrested in Norfolk since 2016	1,024
✂	Number of gang members who left criminal footprint in Norfolk	500
✂	Islington Somalis affected by knife crime and county lines	70%
✂	Neighbourhood police serving Finsbury Park's 17,200 population	8
✂	Optimum age for recruiting children to work in county lines	15-16
✂	Increase in trafficked children, boosted by drug gang activity	66%
✂	The amount a gang can earn in a day from a county line	£5,000

Discussion Questions

1. Do *county lines* exist (or similar) in your country?
2. How much influence and reach does gang culture have on youths in your country?
3. Is gang recruitment of children/youths similar in your country? (carrot or stick)
4. What role does ethnicity, socio-economic and cultural backgrounds play in recruitment?
5. How does your prosecution system typically deal with juvenile offenders? Does it work? Can you see alternative solutions?
6. What are your views on children and youths being sent fragile states for refuge?
7. At the request of the London Metropolitan Police, you have been assigned to give advice on how they should deal with county lines, including disrupting child recruitment.

Kings of Cocaine: *How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade*



'They're sophisticated, clever – and they always deliver': from the ports of Europe to the streets of London, one criminal network is now at the top of the UK's £5bn trade

(based on an article by Mark Townsend, The Guardian, 13 January 2019)



Something had happened the night before and the guys on the corner were keen to offer advice: *"You don't want to be hanging around here too long,"* one said, refusing to explain. They were standing near a tower block on east London's "Gascoigne Housing Estate", undisputed territory of **Hellbanianz**.

The gang, an Albanian street crew of drug dealers, is known locally for its violence and more widely for their social media output featuring Bentleys, piles of £50 notes and gold Rolex watches to help enhance its reputation and recruit "youngsters". The Gascoigne Estate, built in the 1960s, is its historical home turf.

Hellbanianz belong to the "retail arm" of the cocaine trade. They are the street dealers and enforcers of the **Mafia Shqiptare**, the Albanian organised criminal syndicates who, the UK National Crime Agency (NCA) believe, are consolidating power within the criminal underworld and on their way to a near total takeover of the UK's £5bn (£5.94bn) cocaine market.

The gang's glossily produced rap music videos remind viewers *"HB are ready for violence"* and that they possess the necessary manpower and firearms. Even so, police sources say, Hellbanianz occupy the lowest position in the Albanian mafia.

To better understand the Albanians' remarkable rise in the UK one might climb to the 12th floor of the Gascoigne Estate's high-rise blocks. From there, the skyline of London, where much of their cocaine will be snorted, stretches west. In the opposite direction, several kilometres along the Thames, lie the mammoth container ports where their cocaine is offloaded in multi-kilo shipments. But it is across the Atlantic, to the jungles of Latin America, where the story of the Mafia Shqiptare starts.

How Albanians came to conquer the UK's cocaine market is a lesson in criminal savvy; the value of making friends with the world's most dangerous mafias; and the absolute threat of violence.

It began with a business model that was simple in concept, but sufficiently bold to subvert the existing order. For years cocaine's international importers worked separately from its wholesalers and the gangs. Pricing structure varied, depending on the drug's purity: the higher it was, the more it cost.

The Albanians ditched the entire model. They began negotiating directly with the Colombian cartels who control coca production. Huge shipments were arranged direct from South America. Supply chains were kept "in-house".

Intelligence obtained by British experts revealed that the Albanians were procuring cocaine from the cartels for about £4,000 to £5,500 a kilo, at a time when rivals thought they were getting a decent deal using Dutch wholesalers selling at £22,500 a kilo. The Albanians lowered the price of cocaine – and increased its purity. More massive consignments were brought into the UK.

Kings of Cocaine: *How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade*



Tony Saggars, former head of the Drugs Threat & Intelligence Unit at the National Crime Agency (NCA), spent 30 years analysing the rhythms of the global narcotics economy, said: *"What they have done very intelligently is say: 'OK, we've got these margins to play with and we're going to give a good slice of that to the customer.'"*

The *Albanian effect* has profoundly shaped the use, production and economy of cocaine. The drug is at its cheapest in the UK since 1990 and purer than it has been for a decade, which has caused record fatalities. The UK has the highest number of young users in Europe. More broadly, far bigger and more frequent shipments of the drug have been seized entering the UK as cocaine production in South America has hit record levels - up 31% on 2016.

Rivals to the Albanian gangs initially struggled to compete because they had an inferior, more expensive product. Their only option has been to buy cocaine sourced from the Mafia Shqiptare.

Saggars said: *"They have shown that you don't have to be greedy to dominate drug markets. They've gone down the route of sustainable prices, good quality."*

Mohammed Qasim, a Leeds Beckett University researcher in the drug trade, described the Albanian business approach as *"fantastic"*, adding: *"if they were a traditional listed business, they would be considered a Fortune 500 company."*

Yet for the Albanians' model to truly work it required control of Europe's ports. For that the **Shqiptare** needed to collaborate with the **'Ndrangheta**, the most powerful and globalised of the Italian mafias, which controls mainland Europe's cocaine trade.

There is considerable evidence that not only are the Albanians working with the 'Ndrangheta, but that they have formed the tightest of alliances. Sources say the Italian mafia consider the Albanians as equals. Saggars said: *"There's a strong Italian-organised mafia link with Albanians now, Albanians are working with them – not in competition with them. Plus, historically, the Italians have good contacts in Latin America."*

Rotterdam in the Netherlands is Europe's largest seaport, with eight million containers passing through each year. Many arrive via the direct *"Colombian express"* route before crossing to the UK. The second busiest European port is Antwerp in Belgium, which connects to the Thames port of Tilbury, 24 kilometres from Hellbanianz territory.

Kings of Cocaine: How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade



Collectively, the Belgian and Dutch ports employ 240,000 people, an army of whom, police intelligence indicates, also work for the 'Ndrangheta and Mafia Shqiptare.

"This gives the Albanians based on the near continent, direct access and control of it [cocaine] at the ports," said Saggars.

NCA describes Belgium and the Netherlands as *"key nexus points of consolidation and onward trafficking"* and confirmed Albanian groups were *"expanding their influence upstream"* – police-speak for strengthening their grip on international cocaine supply.

Anna Sergi, a specialist in mafia relationships, confirmed Albanians and the southern Italian crime group have joined forces. *"Whenever the 'Ndrangheta is shipping things over, they work a lot with the Albanians,"* she said.



In December 2018 *Operation Pollino*, named after the area of southern Italy where the 'Ndrangheta has its roots, arrested 90 suspects. Anti-mafia prosecutors described how the 'Ndrangheta relied on *"permanent groups working in ports and harbours"* along with Albanian criminal networks.

The most vulnerable point for drug smugglers is the port of entry. Security is tight, options are finite. Sources say that the 'Ndrangheta has outsourced this element of the supply chain to the Albanians.

"You need the best people to get it out of port. If you are good at moving things then you stay ahead of your competitors – and the Albanians are good at this," said Sergi.

Yet even the most senior Albanians are caught sometimes. Klodjan Copja, 30, who ran a £60m cocaine imports syndicate, was jailed in 2017 after his couriers were intercepted meeting drug-laden trucks arriving in Kent.

One striking aspect of what the NCA term the Albanians' *"increasing prominence"* is their having – so far – avoided becoming involved in tit-for-tat feuds with rivals. The latest UK criminal threat assessment says that the Albanians are unusually skilled at developing relationships and *"forging links with other OCGs [organised criminal gangs]"*.

Such relationship-building has left Liverpool as the only part of England not routinely selling Albanian-sourced cocaine. Not only has the Merseyside port its own direct access to South America, Saggars says that its turf is jealously guarded by the city's own criminal gangs.

Kings of Cocaine: How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade



Also working in the Albanians' favour is their reputation for violence. Saggars says the backdrop of the Kosovo conflict has given them a *swagger* comparable to that of Irish criminals during and after "the Troubles" (IRA insurgency).

"They are quite charismatic and known to prioritise relationship-building rather than competitive feuds. Also, when you come from a country where there's been conflict and you have a reputation for ruthlessness - the charisma is underlined with an element of 'actually, we do need to get on with these people'," he said.

Qasim also points to how the Albanian are regarded in criminal circles. *"They are sophisticated, professional and they do what they promise. They always deliver," he said.*

This has much to do with the Albanian code of **besa** – "to keep the promise" – but Sergi adds that the reputation of the Mafia Shqiptare must also be viewed through the ancestral code of **kanun**, the right to take revenge: that *"blood must pay with blood"*.

"You most trust the ones similar to you," she said. The concept was meant to keep things internal, close.

Then the younger generation began making flashy videos and waving money around.

Some might recognise the faces from YouTube where Hellbanianz posts footage to try to lure "falcons" – fresh recruits - with shots of scantily clad women, wheel-spinning Bentleys and abundant wads of money.



Saggars said: *"The retail market is the get-rich-quick environment. If they're importing kilos for a few thousand dollars, imagine how much money those youngsters are turning over if they're selling at £40 a gram?"*

Before its account was closed in November 2018, Hellbanianz had 115,000 Instagram followers. The video for "Hood Life", which opens with a drone shot of the Gascoigne Estate, has been watched more than 7.5m times. The gang's lyrics discuss defending the area with "kallash" (AK47s) – and dishing out threats to rival Albanian gangs. A video, released in late October 2018, states they are *"ready for war"*.

Hellbanianz's high life – the bling, the violence – has created tensions within the Albanian community, particularly the provoking of police. The "Hood Life" video shows gang members surrounding a Metropolitan Police patrol car. *"This goes against the Albanian culture. Some of their higher end drug dealers, international traders, don't like this behaviour. It exposes their activities. They want to be low-key, making profits without being caught,"* said Qasim.

Kings of Cocaine: How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade



Another repercussion of the Albanian model has, say some, helped fuel escalating knife crime and drug disputes by making cocaine affordable to smaller, younger street gangs. A recent report said gangs were moving from *postcode rivalries* to commercial enterprises focused on dealing cocaine.

Meanwhile, so long as Mafia Shqiptare keeps delivering their cocaine, recruiting teenagers to the Hellbanianz gangster life has never been easier.

Honour among thieves: gang's sacred oath of loyalty

Besa is extremely important in Albanian culture, especially in the rural North where most of the gangs come from.

- Just as the Italian mafia has the law of **Omerta** – silence – Albanian mobsters are governed by a code of honour they call **Besa**.
- Besa is the highest ethical code in Albanian culture and means “*keeping a promise*”.
- It is considered a verbal contract of trust.
- Muslim Albanians were honouring Besa when they helped protect Jews from the Nazis.
- Today, gangsters use the term Besa as a name for their “*code of honour*”.
- New recruits are required to take an oath that means each man gives his life to the rest.
- The close-knit nature of the gangs insulates them from outsiders and prevents police efforts to infiltrate their networks.
- Albanian gangsters have a much looser structure to their crime networks than their more famous Italian counterparts.
- Much like the Russian Mafia, Albanians are thought to work with a Leadership Council at the top of their criminal network.
- Each crime family will have a leader, known as the “**krye**” who chooses “**kryetar**” to work below them as underbosses.
- The krye runs an executive committee known as a **barjack** from which decisions are made on what businesses needs doing.
- Once decided, the orders are filtered down to the gangsters on the ground.

Discussion

1. What parallels and differences do you see to the drug trade in your jurisdiction/area of operation?
2. Organised crime gangs tend to operate either in dedicated geographic territories or in specific criminal activities (e.g. prostitution, drugs, counterfeit/fake merchandise etc.). In your jurisdiction, which “gangs” are known to operate in specific crime?
3. What strategies do you police use to tackle gang and organised crime? Do they work? Could the approach be improved, and how?
4. How do you deal with/approach *codes of honour* such as Besa?
5. What kind of relationship/dialogue does your police have with crime gangs?

Task 1. What is Frontex?

Task 2

- A. Read the text which describes the main tasks carried out by Frontex, then match headings 1–10 with paragraphs a–j

1. Coast Guard Functions	2. Respect for fundamental rights
3. Combatting cross-border crime	4. Returns
5. Cooperation with non-EU countries and international organisations	6. Risk analysis and vulnerability assessment
7. Operations	8. Situation Monitoring
9. Research and Innovation	10. Training

	a. The agency collects data on the situation at and beyond Europe's external borders. The data is used to identify trends in irregular migration and patterns in cross-border crime. The agency conducts annual stress tests to assess the ability of each EU member state to face challenges at their external borders.
	b. The agency deploys border and coast guard officers along with vessels, aircraft, helicopters and other equipment to assist countries requiring support at their borders. In emergency situations it can quickly deploy border and coast guard officers from the rapid reaction pool of at least 1500 officers.
	c. The agency assists the member states in the return of migrants who are ineligible to stay in the EU. The decision as to who should be returned remains the exclusive responsibility of the national authorities of the EU member states. A pool of monitors, escorts and return specialists will be created. The agency may also play a role in the organisation of voluntary departures.
	d. The agency enables swift data exchange between border authorities of EU member states, the European Commission and other agencies. It provides situation and crisis monitoring, delivering early alerts and updates about the events at the external borders. To assist in this task, the agency deploys liaison officers to the individual member states.
	e. The agency supports the cooperation of law enforcement authorities, EU agencies and customs at maritime borders. Vessels and aircraft deployed in its operations also collect and share information relevant to fisheries control, detection of pollution and compliance with maritime regulations.
	f. The agency develops cooperation and signs working arrangements with non-EU countries and international organisations to exchange information about trends in migration and cross-border crime and provides assistance in capacity building. The agency can carry out operations on the territory of non-EU countries neighbouring at least one participating member state, if it requires assistance due to high migratory pressure.

	g. The agency focuses on preventing smuggling, human trafficking and terrorism as well as other forms of cross-border crimes. The agency shares intelligence gathered at the borders on persons suspected of involvement in criminal activities with national authorities and European agencies.
	h. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency facilitates cooperation between border control authorities, research and industry. The agency assists the member states and the European Commission in identifying key border security technologies and draws up and implements the EU framework programmes for research and innovation activities in the border security area.
	i. The agency develops harmonised curricula and training standards for border guards in all EU countries. It conducts various courses to share knowledge and best practices, including capacity building programmes in non-EU countries. The agency delivers training on integrated border management and the coast guard functions to border and coast guards across the EU. It also trains experts who will carry out vulnerability assessments.
	j. Respect for fundamental rights is at the heart of all activities undertaken by the agency. Complaint mechanism – Any person who has been directly affected by the actions of staff involved in an activity of the agency can submit a written complaint regarding possible violations of his/her fundamental rights.

B. From the text, find words that mean:

1. Able to be easily physically, emotionally, or mentally hurt, influenced or attacked.
2. A general development or change in a situation.
3. Analysis of the ability of a Member State to manage challenges at the external borders.
4. To move people or equipment to a place.
5. Not allowed to do or have something, according to particular rules.
6. Happening or moving quickly, or within a short time.
7. Development and strengthening of human and institutional resources.
8. Speaking to people in other organisations in order to work with them and exchange information.

Task 3

Complete the text using the words from the box.

record	flows	Indications	toll	unprecedented
occurrence	displaced	triggered	hub	comprehensive
border	surpassed	response	assist	

The Mediterranean Migration Crisis

Faced with a migration crisis in the Mediterranean, Europe is struggling to assist people in need while securing its borders. Increased international attention has recently been paid to the ongoing and escalating irregular migration crisis in the Mediterranean Sea.

The combined death (1) _____ of more than 1 200 migrants in a series of shipwreck disasters occurring in mid-April 2015 largely (2) _____ this current upsurge in attention to the situation. Among these incidents was the worst single shipwreck tragedy on (3) _____, involving the death of an estimated 800 migrants. While by no means a new phenomenon, the number of sub-Saharan African and Middle Eastern migrants travelling across the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe – along with the associated death toll – is (4) _____ in scale.

The complexity of these migration (5) _____ is challenging current frameworks, and Europe is struggling to develop a (6) _____ architecture that balances efforts to (7) _____ persons in need with efforts to secure its borders.

The number of irregular migrant arrivals to Europe in 2014 (8) _____ the previous record seen in 2011, when a wave of immigration followed the revolutionary struggles of the media-named 'Arab Spring'. There are many (9) _____ that 2015 will see the highest number of migrants in the Mediterranean yet.

Given its geographic position as the (10) _____ between Europe, Africa, and Asia, the Mediterranean is particularly sensitive to the world's highest numbers of refugees and internally (11) _____ persons since World War II.

A joint policy brief presented by the Migration Policy Centre highlighted the fact that the Mediterranean Sea is the most dangerous (12) _____ between countries that are not at war with each other.

The existence of this level of mass migration without the (13) _____ of conventionally understood state versus state warfare presents significant challenges for state-led (14) _____ mechanisms.

Task 4

Read the text and answer the questions using no more than five words.

Europe's Asylum Seekers

Syria's brutal civil war is pushing a new wave of migrants towards Europe. Their numbers have surged, but many asylum seekers in Europe have also fled the conflicts and turmoil in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Horn of Africa. European governments are struggling to co-ordinate their response to the influx. Large movements of migrants from country to country quickly fuel suspicions that some politicians are trying to shift the burden onto their neighbours.

Greece and Italy – major entry points for migrants – say there must be more burden-sharing in the EU, especially as they have been hit hard by the euro area crisis. Migrants continue to board overcrowded, rickety boats, risking their lives. The recent deaths of hundreds of migrants in the Mediterranean highlighted their plight. Asylum is granted to those who say they are fleeing persecution and who can convince the authorities that they would face harm or even death if they were to be sent back.

Nearly a quarter of asylum applications in the EU are handled by Germany. France is the second biggest destination for asylum seekers. But often English-speaking migrants head for the UK, which is home to large communities from Pakistan, Somalia and Middle Eastern countries. Among the asylum seekers from Russia there are many Chechens, whose homeland was devastated by war between separatist rebels and Russian troops.

The asylum seekers from Serbia include many Roma and ethnic Albanians, who complain of discrimination in Serbia.

In the developed world the US is the top destination for asylum seekers, but Germany and France are second and third. Sweden, with a much smaller population, is fourth, ahead of the UK.

1. What is the cause that generated the flow of migrants?
2. What are the countries from where migrants enter Europe?
3. On what ground may asylum be granted?
4. Where do the communities from Pakistan, Somalia and the Middle East settle?
5. What are the first three destination countries for asylum seekers?

Biggest Causes of a Refugee Crisis

1 November 2019 • Mohamed Malim



Refugees are people who have been forcibly displaced from their home country and are seeking a better life elsewhere. They currently number more than 25 million people¹.

Refugees often have no other option but to leave their home country due to many reasons outside of their control. It's estimated that more than 37,000 people are forced to leave their home due to conflict and persecution per day.

To understand refugees, one needs to understand why people become refugees in the first place. Causes differ from country to country, the following list identifies some of the main reasons behind the refugee crisis and how they affect millions of people worldwide.

1. Persecution

There are various types of persecution which lead to a refugee crisis. These include racial, social, religious, and political persecution. This is perhaps the most common reason why people become refugees.

Religious refugees are present almost everywhere, from the Dalai Lama to Muslims being persecuted in Myanmar. Some of the numbers are staggering - for example, More than 900,000 people have fled Myanmar since 2017.

2. War

Most refugees are people who have been displaced due to either a direct or indirect result of a war. The first major international refugee crisis happened in the 20th century when more than 50 million people were displaced because of the Second World War. As of now, the Syrian refugee crisis has been going on since 2011, and has caused over 6.3 million people to displace internally and caused over 5 million people to leave the country.

According to official records, 2 million Syrian refugees have been registered by UNHCR in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, 3.5 million Syrians registered by the Government of Turkey, as well as more than 33,000 Syrian refugees registered in North Africa. The number is followed by 2.7m people from Afghanistan and 2.3m people from Sudan.

¹ <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html>

3. Climate Change

UNHCR recognises climate change as a major contributor to the refugee crisis. In December 2018, the UN General Assembly directly addresses this growing concern, recognising that *'climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements.'*



It is estimated that around 16.1 million people have been displaced due to climate-related reasons. Climate change has changed modern humanitarian needs, and agencies like the UN are struggling to match the ever-changing requirements. In fact, it cannot even yet be quoted as an official reason to seek asylum.

In Somalia alone, more than 49,00 people have been forced to leave their homes in search of food and water since January 2019. Today, the world is staring at a bigger humanitarian crisis due to the drought.

4. Violation of Human Rights

People in many countries face severe human rights violations at the hands of the rich and powerful. Often carried out by people who hold a position of authority and are fuelled by greed, corruption and power. Full-fledged corruption leads to severe unemployment, economic disparity, injustice and lack of public services (health, education etc.).

Regular violation of human rights and conditions which force people to flee their place of birth leads to either internal or international displacement. Either way, this puts a lot of economic and social burden on the refugees and the countries/cities supporting them. Recognition of such human rights violation is a much-needed step to solve the refugee crisis.

5. Financial Hardships

Poverty is a major cause of the global refugee crisis. An example of this is the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis. More than 4 million people have left Venezuela since 2015. What was once Latin America's fastest rising economy now has more than 32 million people being unable to afford food.

This has led to them fleeing to other countries, resulting in an 8000% increase of refugees since 2014. Financial instability, lack of access to food and healthcare and uncontrolled inflation are often the major reasons for a financially driven refugee crisis.

6. Hunger

The U.N. has declared the global hunger emergency the biggest humanitarian crisis since 1945. It is estimated that more than 20 million people all over the world face food insecurity. This results in mass displacement and the refugee crisis.

East Africa alone has 4 million refugees because of food scarcity and lack of resources along with an additional 11 million internally displaced people. This is often due to drought, corruption and political instability that forces hunger displacement.

7. Gender and Sexual Orientation



Gender and sexual orientation-based violence is an increasing reason for the ongoing refugee crisis. The UNHCR recognised this and made it a valid reason to seek asylum in 2012. As many as 77 countries in the world criminalise same-sex relations and seven countries punish it with the death penalty.

People in these countries are often targets of violence, death threats, discrimination and live under a constant state of fear.

This results in displacement to countries that offer asylum and accept LGBT+ individuals.

8. Conclusion

A refugee crisis can be caused by many reasons. The intensity and scale of these causes is what forces people to leave their homes and birth countries to seek shelter elsewhere. These factors like persecution, war, hunger, financial hardships, etc., force the mass displacement of people in hopes of survival. The limited ability of international organisations to control and later re-establish refugees leads to major social, political and economic burden on a global scale.

Addendum (International Crisis Group)

- The scale of the humanitarian crisis is beyond the capacity of any one state or regional grouping to resolve alone. Some states are playing a grossly outsized role in handling the crisis' fallout in a fashion that is neither fair nor sustainable;
- The refugee crisis is a distinct phenomenon. But it is part of a larger mass movement of people. There are over 170 million migrants globally. Demographic trends, economic stress, state weakness, climate change and growing inequality suggest that this trend is unlikely to recede; and,
- Managing all aspects of the crisis – and for states concerned there are factors in play of domestic politics, security, capacity, legal obligation, and international relations – will be beyond any one electoral cycle. It will demand a complex blend of immediate response, long-term strategy and careful, honest messaging.

Human Trafficking

Scenario 1:

In Vaslui, Romania, instead of immediately returning home from school 16-year-old Nadia enters a modelling competition, without her father's consent or knowledge. She is selected by the model agency to travel to New York with other successful candidates, leaving early the next day. Nadia explains that she doesn't have a passport, but the Agency offers to have it arranged on her behalf that day.

The following morning, after sneaking out of the house, Nadia enthusiastically boards the plane with the other model candidates. Upon arrival in New York the girls are bundled into a van and driven to a house in the suburbs. It quickly becomes clear that the house is a brothel. The girls are stripped naked, humiliated, threatened and abused.

Like the other girls, Nadia is trapped - guarded day and night, no passport, no money, no hope: forced into a life of sexual slavery.



Scenario 2:


Irena is a 19-year-old girl from Latvia. She comes from a small village, and until recently had a job at the local post office. Due to the economic recession her branch was closed, and she was made *redundant*. She was the main income earner in the family: her father is unemployed, and her mother has two low-paid jobs as a cleaner. Irena's inability to support her family makes her accept an offer to work in Italy as a waitress, offered through an employment brokerage company.

She did her best to pay the brokerage firm a deposit of €1000, part payment of €5000; the remainder of which was to be deducted – *plus* interest – from her initial pay over the first few months.

After a long journey smuggled in the back of a truck, upon arrival Irena discovered she was not in Italy but Kosovo. She has been told that the restaurant job *fell through*, but she still owes the brokerage company their fees. To pay off these fees she has been forced into prostitution. To ensure she doesn't runaway, they take away her passport, and threaten to get the money from her parents.

Irena works long, demanding hours, without breaks, regular food or sleep. She never leaves the room in which she works, sleeps and eats. The work has resulted in both physical and psychological health problems.

Of the pay earned through "trade", she is given €50 per day.



Human Trafficking

Scenario 3:

In Prague, Czech Republic, single mother and part-time waitress Helena - 23 years old - started dating successful and handsome Christian. After a couple of weeks he convinced her to travel with him to spend a weekend in Vienna, Austria – her first time out of the country.

They travel to his estate on the outskirts of the city, but when entering the house are encircled by a group of men. Christian is greeted with an envelope packed with euros and walks away... leaving her in the hands of the Traffickers and a room full of other hapless victims.



One of the traffickers shows Helena recent photos of her daughter Lilly, threatening to harm her unless she cooperates.

Neutralised and submissive, Helena is then flown to Glasgow to work as a sex slave.

Discussion:

1. Should you feel sorry for these young women? Do you believe that these young women knew the risk(s) or do you think they were naive? Are they to blame for the situation?
2. As a police officer would you approach these cases in the same way?
3. What are the typical features from the story to draw a victim profile of human trafficking?
4. What are the most frequent countries that people are trafficked from?
5. Why it is necessary for police to understand the victim's motives? Why are most victims reluctant to give evidence in court?
6. Why don't authorities charge trafficked persons as illegal immigrants?
7. The act of trafficking is composed of three elements:
 - The Act** (what is done)
 - The Means** (how it is done)
 - The Purpose** (why it is done)

Based on the UN Human Trafficking Protocol, give examples of each element

International legislation is currently being introduced in many countries to compensate victims of trafficking. The aim is to draw compensation funds from the traffickers' confiscated monies, however when this is not possible States are to create a fund.

8. Do you believe these people should be compensated?
9. Do you believe it's the State's role to provide compensation when confiscated monies are not available?

Migrant Crime in Germany

Part I: The Lost Sons of North Africa

Thousands of young men from North Africa come to Germany every year and many of them, like Samir, fall on the wrong side of the law. Officials would like to accelerate the deportation process, but the criminals aren't welcome back home either.



The inmates are still sleeping when Samir, 36, is woken by the prison guards. It is 5:30 a.m. in early April, and the sun hasn't come up yet. He is told to dress quietly before police officers - wearing black balaclavas - take the Tunisian national into the courtyard of the Dresden correctional facility.

Samir's brown hair is cut short, and his beard is full. He is wearing a red down vest and jeans. A black van is waiting to take him on his last trip through Germany.

They drive to the Leipzig/Halle airport, from where Samir is to be deported. Leipzig has developed into a deportation hub, with more than 2,100 foreigners flown out of its airport in 2016.

Germania flight ST 2828, which is to take Samir and 16 other deportees to Tunisia, is accompanied by 67 Federal Police Officers, two doctors and an interpreter. The words "Germany Escort" are printed on their cases. The airport's Terminal A was long used by the US Army as a stopover for soldiers being sent to Iraq or Afghanistan, but is now a regular starting point for deportation flights. A group of Tunisians, heavily guarded by the police, are sitting in the waiting area and two blue portable toilets have been set up outside the entrance. Prisoners who need to use the restroom remain handcuffed, with a police officer keeping his foot in the door.

The officers are especially cautious with Tunisians. Many of the deportees resist or injure themselves to avoid being sent out of the country. There have been cases of detainees swallowing the batteries from their cell phones, while others have stuck razor blades in their mouths or suddenly pulled box cutters from their belts. As a result, three "personal escorts" are assigned to guard each Tunisian.

Samir is required to undress completely for a full body search. A doctor examines all cavities on the lookout for items the detainee may be attempting to smuggle.

Afterward, Samir seems calm, to the point that officers have chosen not to keep him in handcuffs. "*In Tunisia, I had no hope and no future,*" he says. In 2008, he boarded a boat operated by traffickers from Libya across the Mediterranean to Italy, where he lived for a year before traveling to Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. He arrived in Germany in May 2014 where he applied for asylum. He says he had wanted to begin a new life in Germany and had hoped to find work. In Tunisia, he had left school at the age of 12 and worked for a hairdresser, but he has no other skills. When questioned in court, he said that he began regularly smoking hashish when he was 10.

Migrant Crime in Germany


The authorities denied his asylum application, but he was not deported, instead being given a certificate of suspension from deportation. He became a drug dealer at the main train station in Dresden, was addicted to crystal meth and drank seven to 10 bottles of beer or a bottle of vodka every day. Unfortunately for him, some of those to whom he sold hashish were plainclothes police officers. In July 2016, a court in Dresden convicted him of multiple theft and drug offenses and he was sentenced to a year and nine months in prison. Authorities believed that his drug addiction made it likely that he would commit crimes again in the future.

Flight ST 2828 takes off for Enfidha at 12:20 p.m. He is "*fed up with Germany*," says Samir shortly before departure. His European dream has come to an end.

A Traumatic Night

No other group of foreigners has fallen into disgrace in Germany in recent years as much as young men from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. In 2016, only 2.4 percent of asylum seekers came from these North African countries, and yet 11 percent of immigrants suspected of committing a crime are from the Maghreb region. In Cologne, random samples showed that in 2015, more than 40 percent of migrants from the Maghreb committed robbery or theft within the first year of their arrival, says criminal division chief Thomas Schulte, who headed the investigations after the 2015/2016 New Year's Eve assaults on women in Cologne.

It was that traumatic night that permanently altered Germany's view of the refugees, hundreds of thousands of whom had arrived in the country in the months prior. The image of the *criminal refugee* was born that night. Most of those suspected of having molested and robbed women were North Africans, or "Nafris," a slang term the police use to refer to habitual offenders from North Africa. That term, too, became controversial after police stopped hundreds of young foreigners they suspected of being "Nafris" during the most recent New Year's Eve celebrations in Cologne.



In Cologne and Düsseldorf, in particular, law enforcement has been struggling with criminals from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia for years, with police having investigated 400 suspects from the Maghreb region in 2016 alone. Recently, though, it has become clear how many North Africans commit offenses elsewhere as well. In Saxony, most migrant repeat offenders are from one of the Maghreb countries and North Africans dominate the drug trade in the neighbourhood surrounding the Frankfurt train station. In the southwestern city of Karlsruhe, a group of migrants committed so many robberies in such a short amount of time that local authorities formed a task force focusing on migrant repeat offenders, with many of the suspects having come from the North African coast. The police believe that one reason for the declining number of criminal offenses in Karlsruhe has to do with the falling number of migrants in the city.

Migrant Crime in Germany

Many of the criminal migrants are repeat offenders. A 34-year-old Moroccan who allegedly raped a woman in a bathroom in Hamburg's Reeperbahn district in December had a criminal record, and yet the local authorities felt they were not able to deport him.

In fact, only 660 Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians were deported in 2016, even though deportation orders had been issued for close to 9,000 of them. In response, the federal government now intends to speed up deportations.

The German parliament tightened asylum law once again in late May. The maximum duration of pre-deportation custody is being increased from four to 10 days, while rules governing pre-deportation detention and surveillance of those considered to be threats have been eased. The aim is to prevent plans by rejected asylum seekers, like Tunisian national Anis Amri, who committed the attack on a Christmas market in Berlin in December. But it isn't quite that simple. Many North Africans have destroyed their papers, some have gone into hiding, and their native countries have proven to be uncooperative.



Overwhelmed

Germany's police officers and authorities have been, in many respects, overwhelmed by the criminals from the lower classes of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. The young men often have a criminal record when they arrive in Germany, after having been street thieves or drug dealers in cities like Casablanca and Algiers. *"Many apparently did not go to school and some can't even write their own names,"* says Jörg Grethe, head of the Karlsruhe task force. Unlike Georgians, the North Africans are not usually members of gangs, he says, with most of the men having met in refugee shelters.

Many are drug addicts, say investigators. They are often so high on alcohol, marijuana and prescription drugs that they become insensitive to pain and adopt a *"devil-may-care attitude,"* says criminal investigator Schulte, who headed the "Nafri" police project in 2013, an extensive analysis of offenders from the Maghreb countries. He characterizes these offenders as being *"highly likely to commit violent acts,"* ruthlessly using knives during their robberies, injuring victims or police officers. They often use false identities, refuse to cooperate during interrogations and rarely exhibit remorse, Schulte says, adding: *"This reveals a high degree of contempt for our legal system."*

Until early 2016, more than a dozen young North African offenders lived in communal housing at the Wiesbaden correctional facility. But when they began to run riot and demolish their rooms, they had to be moved to adult prisons. Some had swallowed pieces of spoons or glass, according to prison management and many of them appear not to care about anything. One reason is their lack of a future in Germany: Less than 4 percent of asylum applications filed by Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians are approved.

Migrant Crime in Germany

Trying His Own Luck

Abdul, 19, is sitting in his blue prison uniform in the visitors' room at the Wittlich juvenile detention centre in the southwestern state of Rhineland-Palatinate. It is a small room with one window, a table and a few chairs. It is drizzling outside. Abdul and a Syrian, whose identity is doubtful, are scheduled for trial the next day, having been charged with assault and theft, among other offences. They allegedly attacked and robbed a man who was asleep at the main train station in the western city of Trier, during which the victim fell onto the tracks and was injured.

Abdul has been in pretrial detention for the last six months, and it isn't the first time. He has a previous conviction for theft. In his last trial, the juvenile court judge gave the Moroccan one last chance and placed him on probation, so that he could complete a training program as a metalworker. She must have seen potential in the young man, and perhaps she also pitied him.

Abdul says he was 10 when he left his village in Morocco. Without any money or belongings, he spent half a day walking on a dusty road toward Fez, a city in northern Morocco. At first, he was afraid that his father would catch him and beat him, but eventually Abdul realized that no one was looking for him - not his stepmother, who didn't like him, and not his father, who wanted to please his new wife. In Fez, Abdul stowed away on a train bound for the coast. After that, he lived on the street near the Spanish enclave of Melilla for a while.

He eventually met traffickers who gave him a job. Working at night, he helped make and paint wooden dividers and secretly install them in parked trucks. Several people could hide in the space behind the dividers and when the police shined their flashlights inside the trucks, they usually fell for the trick. The boy saw many Moroccans leave for Europe: "*Most of them are now in Luxembourg and have a lot of money,*" he believes.

Abdul eventually decided to try his own luck. He hung onto the undercarriage of a postal vehicle and made it onto a ferry to Malaga, Spain. "*That was a beautiful moment,*" he says.

In Spain, he was arrested for theft and sent to a home for unaccompanied, underage refugees. Then he went to France, where he spent most of his time "*begging and living on the street,*" says Abdul, sometimes finding a bed in a homeless shelter. Ultimately, he says, he wanted to "*see what it was like in Germany*" and on a July day in 2013, he boarded a train bound for Frankfurt am Main. In Saarbrücken, just past the border, police detained him and took him to a home for underage refugees; he was 15 at the time. He has had very little schooling, but he speaks French and Spanish "*pretty well*" and also claims to have learned German relatively quickly. "*I'm not stupid,*" says Abdul. His attorney Sven Collet, a public defender who has represented young North Africans in court for many years, says that he is a "*clever guy,*" compared to many others. "*When I get out of here, I really want to make something of myself,*" says Abdul.

Migrant Crime in Germany

Trying to Help

Mimoun Berrissoun, 30, wants to help young offenders. The Cologne social worker with Moroccan roots launched an award-winning project called "180-Degree Turnaround", which focuses on keeping young migrants away from a life of crime and preventing them from becoming radicalized. The social workers, who speak Arabic and Turkish, run a counselling centre in the Kalk neighbourhood of Cologne and spend a lot of time in the streets, also trying to interact with North Africans. *"We know many of the troublemakers,"* says Berrissoun. Many of them were only recruited into a life of crime once they arrived in Germany, he says. Without prospects for the future, they become easy targets for professional criminals, he explains.

Part II: What Can Be Done?

That's why Berrissoun would like to launch a pilot project with a select group of young men *"who are truly motivated."* The concept is an incentive system, in which the young men would collect points and eventually be rewarded with the right of residence. Participants would receive points for passing the German test, and another for finding a traineeship. He is aware of the legal complications. *"Nevertheless, we have to start developing new ideas if we want to solve our crime problem. The alternative is to deport these kids and wait for them to return, when they'll be even more difficult to reach. I think it's naive to believe that Europe can isolate itself. There will never be national borders without holes in them."*

Düsseldorf social worker Samy Charchira, who grew up in Morocco, is likewise an advocate of greater efforts at prevention and had appealed to North African cultural and sports associations in Germany to become more involved in youth outreach. *"They speak the same language and are familiar with the young people's culture and religion,"* he says. *"They can reach these boys much more quickly."* Of course, he admits, there are also hardened criminals who cannot be reintegrated into society. *"Even social workers are ineffective when it comes to such people,"* he says. But some young men simply need people to talk to and role models, someone they can look up to.

But many of the established North Africans who have lived in Germany for generations are just as uninterested as the rest of Germany in the troubled youth from poor neighbourhoods in Morocco and Algeria. New Year's Eve 2015 came as a *"shock to everyone,"* says Moncef Slimi, head of the German-Maghreb Institute for Culture and Media. *"We need to develop more effective networks and create new projects."*

In 2014, the Interior Ministry of North Rhine-Westphalia launched a prevention project called "Coping," which currently counsels 70 young people in the cities of Dortmund, Cologne and Duisburg. The mentors speak the Maghreb dialects or French and they counsel the young men, in addition to helping them cope with government bureaucracy and German lessons. They also provide support to those returning home. When asked about the project's success rate, ministry officials say that the programme to promote language and vocational training has produced *"good results,"* and that the number of crimes committed by those receiving counselling has been *"significantly reduced."*

Migrant Crime in Germany

Would more support have been enough to prevent Abdul from Trier from descending further into a life of crime? The sad truth is that he did receive plenty of support.

After he was detained by authorities on the train, he was taken in by the Don Bosco Helenenberg youth assistance centre. The centre is an attractive facility on a hill near Trier with residential groups for unaccompanied, underage refugees, basketball courts, a climbing wall and a weight gym. Abdul attended the school at the centre but, as he puts it, *"it was too difficult."* He was unable, at the age of 15, to suddenly develop a sense of responsibility and get up every morning to make up for almost a decade of lost schooling. Nevertheless, he was given a second chance and allowed to begin a training programme as a metalworker. But he ended up in prison before finishing the programme.

He even lived with a German foster family for a while, and they were *"really okay,"* as he says. But they too were unable to prevent him from drinking and getting into trouble. When Abdul appeared before the judge this time, he wasn't granted the same leniency as before. Taking his past into account, the judge sentenced him to two years and six months in juvenile detention. *"Germany gave these defendants the right to stay here, but they failed to appreciate it,"* says the judge. *"They have to learn to conform to our legal system."* But, she adds, it is an illusion to believe that they can achieve this on their own, given the way their life experiences have robbed them of the opportunity to mature.

Abdul's deportation is now approaching. He doesn't understand why he hasn't been recognized as a refugee, apparently not realizing that the lack of prospects is not grounds for asylum. *"After all, the Moroccan Consulate General confirmed that my mother is dead,"* he says. The German authorities are aware of this, he adds, and yet no one is helping him. *"If I'm deported, I won't stay in Morocco for more than a day,"* he says. *"What am I supposed to do there?"*

Two Bad Options

Morocco is considered to be a politically stable country. In contrast to Tunisia, where the people overthrew dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the Arab Spring did not lead to an uprising in Morocco and much of the population still supports King Mohammed VI. But the police in the country are notorious for their brutality. *"They beat you right away,"* says Abdul, *"even children."*

Human rights organizations lament that torture is still used in the Maghreb countries, which helps explain why a law proposed by the German government seeking to categorize the Maghreb countries as safe countries of origin was defeated in the Bundesrat, the arm of German parliament representing the 16 states. Those states in which the Greens or the Left Party are part of the governing coalition rejected the proposed legislation.

Algeria is dependent on petroleum and natural gas, and with prices for these commodities falling in recent years, the country's economy has suffered. More than 10 percent of Algerians are unemployed, with youth unemployment at 25 percent. Often the only education children receive is learning how to become pickpockets on the street. The country, with its autocratic government, has also produced many Islamist extremists.

Migrant Crime in Germany

Many Tunisian men likewise believe they have only two options: to board a boat to the Italian island of Lampedusa or join Islamic State. Six years after vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in protest in the town of Sidi Bouzid, triggering an uprising, youth unemployment in Tunisia is at 40 percent, and it's even higher in remote regions. Tunisia's economy is viewed as the primary reason why the country, despite being the cradle of the Arab spring, has become a breeding ground for terrorism. There is no other country in the world from which so many young men go to Syria, Iraq or neighbouring Libya to fight as jihadists. The government in Tunis puts the number at about 3,000, while other estimates are closer to 7,000. About 800 of these fighters have reportedly returned to Tunisia - ticking time bombs filled with hatred for their country and its young democracy.

Stranded in the Wilderness

At 1:35 p.m. on a Wednesday in April, *Germania flight ST 2828* from Leipzig lands in Enfidha-Hammamet, 100km south of Tunis. Samir, the deported drug dealer from Saxony, is one of the men on board. Just a few years ago, this was a lively town, with rows of taxis stretching along the palm tree-lined avenues and vendors selling dried fruit to vacationers. But ever since the 2015 terrorist attack on a beach near Sousse, about 50km south of the city, life has been extinguished here. The modern airport terminal looks like a spaceship stranded in the wilderness.

Tunisian border police remove the men from the aircraft. The procedure begins in the small offices, often used for interrogations, along the airport's endless corridors. The police officers question the returnees, presenting them with photos of Anis Amri and the perpetrator of the Nice terrorist attack, asking them about co-conspirators and how often they pray. Meanwhile, a few families wait outside in the arrivals hall for their lost sons. It is quiet and no one speaks; the families feel deeply ashamed of the returnees.

After nine-and-a-half hours, long after nightfall, the 17 men are finally allowed to leave the airport. They are quietly taken through a side entrance, where three of the families are reunited with their sons. The others are placed on two buses headed for Sousse and Tunis, Samir among them. None of his family members was waiting for him at the airport.

Two days later, he is sitting in the courtyard of his parents' half-finished house. He looks pale, has a cold and is still wearing the clothes he wore when he was deported: jeans, a black-and-green sweatshirt and the bright red vest.

He hasn't left the house yet. No one is to know that he has returned home after nine years in Europe - an offender, a deportee led away by the police. In the spring, there were demonstrations in Tunis against the returnees, with protesters holding up signs in broken German reading: "*Angela Merkel, Tunisia is not the garbage dump of Germany.*"

Now, Samir is keeping a low profile in his village on the edge of the desert. It's an attractive place, with cacti and canyon-like cliff formations, which are sometimes used as a backdrop for films about the war in Afghanistan. But the idyllic surroundings are deceptive. There is no work, and half of the young adults living there have no prospects of ever finding a job.

Migrant Crime in Germany

'What a Waste'

Samir is from El Guettar, an oasis settlement near the provincial capital of Kfsa. It is in phosphate mining region, with the phosphate being used to make fertilizer and laundry detergent. But it also contributes to high levels of radioactive heavy metals in the drinking water, which are blamed for the region's high cancer rates.

There were uprisings here nine years ago, with Samir's neighbours fighting against worker exploitation, the desecration of the environment and the regime of dictator Ben Ali. Because of the uprising, the Kfsa region is viewed as the nucleus of the Arab spring.

Samir was not one of the freedom fighters. He chose to go to Europe instead, becoming a "Harraga" - refugees who burn their papers before boarding the boat for Lampedusa.

Nine years later, he is sitting in his parents' living room like a stranger. With every sentence, it becomes clear that nothing he had claimed in Leipzig before his deportation was true. He claimed that he used his earnings in Germany to buy two taxicabs in Tunisia, and that he planned to expand the business in the future. He said that he saw a future for himself as a self-employed entrepreneur. And he also wanted to start a family.

He still boasts about his days as a drug dealer. It was *"a cool life,"* he says, *"full of drugs, money and women,"* and adds: *"What else could I have done, since they wouldn't let me work?"* He says that he took drugs for two years, which is why he had no scruples about selling the stuff. *"It didn't kill me, either. And if I didn't sell it, someone else would."*

But when his mother, a determined woman in her late 50s with a brown scarf wrapped around her head, begins to speak, it becomes clear that Samir has returned as a failure - and that his family is unforgiving. The two taxis never existed. He also didn't pay for the addition to his parents' house. That was funded by his brother, who sends the family money every month - money he earns legally as a cook in the German state of Thuringia.

It appears that Samir has always taken the path of least resistance, first in Tunisia and later as a drug dealer in Zürich's red-light district and then at the train station in Dresden. He hardly learned any German in nine years, avoids eye contact, is filled with rage and barks at his mother, telling her not to speak with the foreigners.

No one in the village looked forward to his return. *"We had to borrow several thousand dollars from the neighbours so you could leave, and we still owe them the money today,"* says his mother. *"And you have the gall to return home empty-handed? What a waste."*

Stepped Up Deportations

Opened in March, the *German-Tunisian Centre for Jobs, Migration und Reintegration* is located in the Tunisia Employment Agency, Tunis. For the past three months, employees of GIZ have worked in the small office, helping Tunisians and returnees from Europe find jobs, offering them retraining and continuing education. Tunisians willing to emigrate are also given information about legal paths to employment or studying in Germany. Men like Samir are not eligible for the services provided by the centre: it only provides counselling to voluntary returnees, not criminals.

Migrant Crime in Germany

The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees also plans to set up youth centres in Morocco soon to accommodate underage migrants who have been deported from Germany, including offenders. But the centres are primarily intended for street children. The centres will include schools, medical care and educational counselling. The Greens are critical of the plans, arguing that they promote the deportation of minors.

Since the New Year's Eve assaults in Cologne, Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière has urged North African countries to cooperate more extensively. For years, German authorities faced significant hurdles in deporting rejected asylum seekers to the Maghreb. They often lacked documentation, and the countries of origin were in no hurry to issue replacement passports. Or they simply claimed that the deportees were not their citizens.

In February 2016, de Maizière and a delegation flew to North Africa, shaking hands with interior ministers and heads of state in Tunis, Algiers and Rabat. Things improved somewhat as a result. But as the Anis Amri case shows, North African authorities often continued dragging their feet in repatriating their citizens. In the Amri case, the Tunisians delayed his deportation for months by failing to issue documents for him. It was only on 21 December 2016 that the Consulate General in Bonn confirmed that Amri was a Tunisian citizen - two days after he had murdered 12 people.

Whether the Tunisians have a guilty conscience or the subtle threats following the attack are working, the fact is that the country took back 50 of its nationals in the first three months of this year, compared to only 8 in the same period last year. Germany was able to deport 207 people to Morocco and Algeria, more than 11 times as many as in the first quarter of 2016. According to the German Interior Ministry, cooperation with the Maghreb countries in deportations of threatening individuals has improved considerably.

One Good Deed

Afternoon has arrived in El Guettar. The muezzin is calling the faithful to prayer, and Samir is becoming entangled in confused theories. Anis Amri wasn't driving the truck that slammed into a Berlin Christmas market, he claims, saying that it was all just a "*big conspiracy*" to "*deport people like me back to Tunisia.*" He is "*finished with Europe,*" says Samir. Then he grabs his red down vest and storms out of the house, without saying another word. What kind of a future does he have in Tunisia? His family will have to support him for the time being. Only once in his life, his mother says, did he do anything useful: donating a kidney to his ill sister.

Now, Samir's mother comforts herself with the thought that at least her son hasn't become an Islamist.

By Spiegel Staff Writers: Fiona Ehlers, Katrin Elger, Jan Friedmann, Annette Großbongardt, Wolf Wiedmann-Schmidt and Steffen Winter (9 June 2017)

Condensed by Simon de Saint-Claire, PhD (21 June 2017)

Migrant Crime in Germany

Group Presentation

The Ministry of Interior has tasked your group to formulate a strategy to help address illegal immigrant-based crime in your State.

The presentation should examine the following measures -

- Preventive
- Punishment
- Rehabilitation
- [Re-]Settlement

Issues to consider:

- What are the legal and policing issues associated with illegal immigrants?
- What measures can police take against criminally-orientated illegal immigrants?
- What are the issues behind the criminality?
- What are the legal, ethical and moral challenges?
- What are the political and popularist obstacles?
- What are is the difference between a migrant, refugee and asylum seeker?
- What projects or initiatives could be used to positively rehabilitate and integrate [*potential*] offenders?

All course participants will present a part of their group's strategy proposal.

Each speaker will talk for 5-7 minutes.

The aim of the presentation is public speaking, however supporting materials i.e. maps, graphs, illustrations, photos, and written summaries are permitted.

The Gladbeck Hostage Crisis

The Gladbeck hostage situation unfolded over 54 hours in the summer of 1988, after Dieter Degowski and Hans-Jürgen Rösner, both already convicts and armed, robbed a branch of Deutsche Bank in the Ruhr valley town and took hostages away in cars and a hijacked bus. Three people, including two teenage hostages, and a police officer whose vehicle crashed, were killed.



The gangsters' odyssey, from 16 to 18 August 1988, involved a road chase from the Ruhr, northwards to Bremen, and into the Netherlands before they were intercepted by police special forces on a motorway near Bonn.

The incident is notorious for becoming a media circus in Germany and the Netherlands.

Chronicle

16 August

In the early morning two armed and hooded offenders broke into a branch of the Deutsche Bank in Gladbeck before opening hours.


At 8:04 am an emergency call was made by a witness to the police. A parked police car was seen by the offenders as they left the branch. They went back into the bank and took two bank clerks hostage, demanding a car and ransom money, firing their guns into the air several times.

A radio station was the first to conduct an interview with them as the hostage crisis was happening. After several hours of negotiations, the abductors were given 300,000 DM and a white Audi 100 as a *getaway* car. At 9:45pm the getaway started. Marion Löblich, the girlfriend of Hans-Jürgen Rösner, boarded the car in Gladbeck.

17 August

After driving on the autobahn to Bremen, the abductors stopped and hijacked a public-transit bus with 32 passengers at 7:00 pm on 17 August. The media interviewed the abductors and the hostages without any interference from the police. Some hostages had a pistol pressed against their throats.

After the release of five hostages, the bus was driven to the autobahn service area of Grundbergsee, where the two bank clerks were released.



Two police officers arrested Marion Löblich, who was using the toilet. Demanding an exchange, Degowski and Rösner threatened to kill a hostage every five minutes. After the expiration of the ultimatum they shot a 15-year-old Italian boy, Emanuele Di Giorgi, in the head; he was said to be protecting his sister. Löblich was about to be released by the police on demand of the abductors but arrived too late because of a broken handcuff key and poor police communication. An ambulance arrived 20 minutes later, but the shot teenager died two hours later in hospital.

After this incident the bus was driven to the Netherlands. During the chase a police car collided with a truck, leaving one police officer dead and another injured.

The Gladbeck Hostage Crisis

18 August

At 2:30am on 18 August 1988, the bus entered the Netherlands. At 5:15am two women and three children were released, after the Dutch Police refused to negotiate as long as children were being held hostage. At 6:30am Rösner and Degowski were given a BMW 735i. The new getaway car had been prepared with a "kill switch", so that the engine could be stopped by remote control. While attempting to escape, Löblich and the bus driver were injured.

During a stop in Wuppertal the abductors went shopping at a pharmacy.

After stopping in a pedestrian area in Cologne at 10:30am, the car was surrounded by media and shoppers. Some reporters offered to guide the abductors on their way or to hand them pictures of police officers to prevent trickery if hostages were exchanged. A reporter - Udo Röbel - guided the abductors to a nearby rest area on the autobahn and accompanied them for several kilometres.

On the A3 close to Bad Honnef, a few kilometres before the state border between North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate, a police car rammed the getaway car at 1:40pm and rendered it immobile, triggering a gunfight. During the firefight, one of the hostages, Ines Voitle, was able to exit the car, the other - 18-year old Silke Bischoff - was fatally shot (presumably by Rösner). Soon after the abductors were arrested.



The remote control intended to stop the car engine was not used as the responsible police officers had forgotten to take it with them. Across the state border in Rhineland-Palatinate, Federal Police Special Forces (GSG9) were in position waiting to take action.

Trial

On 22 March 1991 Rösner and Degowski were pronounced guilty by the regional superior court of Essen, receiving life sentences. Löblich was sentenced to nine years. In 2002 the Higher Court in Hamm ascertained "*guilt of a very serious nature*" and Degowski's sentence was increased to 24 years. In 2004 the same Higher Court refused an application for parole and a request by Rösner to shorten his sentence. The court also declared a state of "preventive detention" ("Sicherungsverwahrung"). In October 2015, Rösner was allowed to leave prison for four hours the first time in 27 years. In November 2017 he went into a resocialization programme. Degowski was released from prison on 15 February 2018 with a new identity.

Aftermath

On 20 November 1988, the Bremen Minister of the Interior Bernd Meyer resigned over mistakes by the police. Several years after the incident, there was a public discussion at a local police academy about the incident with the judge who had sentenced Rösner and Degowski to life in prison and journalists including Udo Röbel, the reporter who had got into the vehicle with the hostage-takers and went with them, giving them directions out of Cologne. The judge praised Röbel for having prevented a potential bloodbath in Cologne. This was not a view expressed in the official report into the incident by a parliamentary enquiry in the state of the North Rhine Westphalia, which commented negatively on the journalists' ethics.

Emanuele de Giorgi was buried in Italy; his family returned there to live in late 1988. Silke Bischoff was buried in the family grave of her grandfather. Ines Voitle survived, but suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression.

The Gladbeck Hostage Crisis

Exercise – Lessons Learned



Group Discussion A:

1. Identify what went wrong with the police decision making process, including interagency cooperation and coordination.
2. What role did politics and public opinion play?
3. What effect did the media have on the case?
4. Make recommendations for the future handling of such cases.
5. If your group had been responsible for establishing the Incident Command System (BAO):
 - a. What steps would you have taken?
 - b. What would your priorities have been?

Group Discussion B:

Your group are on duty and have been informed that a 15-year-old girl - Jessica Sims - has been reported missing (for the last 18 hours). She left home upset after arguing with her parents about not being allowed to go to a party. The parents have had little luck in finding her: she's not answering her cell phone, and as they are new to the area (6 months) don't know their daughter's friend's last names.

1. What are the first steps you would take to discover her whereabouts?
2. Through enquiries you've established that *foul-play* may be involved? What happens now?

Crime and Social Relevance

- Bosphorus Serial Murders



The **Bosphorus Serial Murders**, a.k.a. the *Döner Murders* - the term used by the German media - were a series of attacks that took place in Germany between 2000 and 2007, leaving ten people dead and one seriously wounded.

The attackers called themselves the National Socialist Underground (NSU - *Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund*). The primary targets were **ethnic** Turks, but one Greek and one ethnic German policewoman were also killed.

The victims were mostly small business owners, including kebab vendors and greengrocers. They were murdered in daylight with gunshots to the face at close range with a *silenced* CZ 83 pistol. According to the parents of a Turkish victim who worked in an internet café, for much of the investigation police solely concentrated on the probable link to Turkish organised crime.

Policewoman Michèle Kiesewetter, was also shot and killed, whilst her patrol partner critically wounded. Other crimes, including two bomb attacks and 15 Bank robberies, have also been credited to the group.



German authorities identified three suspects (L-R) **Beate Zschäpe**, **Uwe Böhnhardt** and **Uwe Mundlos**, as responsible for the murders.

According to Rainer Griesbaum, *Acting Attorney General* of Germany, the suspects had Neo-Nazi links.

Böhnhardt and Mundlos were found dead by police after they robbed a bank on 4 November 2011.

Zschäpe surrendered on 11 November 2011. She has been charged with murder, attempted murder, **arson**, and belonging to a terrorist organization. Zschäpe said she was only willing to **testify** if she was considered a state witness, with **mitigation** of sentence. The police discovered an **alleged** hit-list of 88 names that included "two prominent members of the Bundestag and representatives of Turkish and Islamic groups".

Crime and Social Relevance

- Bosphorus Serial Murders



The Victims

Enver Şimşek, was a 38-year old businessman with Turkish roots who operated several flower stalls in southern Germany. When his employee running the stall in Nuremberg went on holidays, Şimşek himself stepped in, and on the afternoon of 9 September 2000 was shot in the face by two gun-men, and died from his wounds.

Abdurrahim Özüdoğru, was killed on 13 June 2001 by two shots in the head. Özüdoğru, who worked as a machinist in Nuremberg, had been helping out in a tailor's shop. The murder was discovered by a passer-by who looked through the tailor's shop window and saw the body sitting in the back, covered in blood.

Süleyman Taşköprü, aged 31, died in his greengrocer's shop in Hamburg-Bahrenfeld after being shot in the head three times on 27 June 2001 between 10:45 and 11:15 a.m.

Habil Kılıç, aged 38, on 29 August 2001, was shot at point-blank range in his greengrocer's shop in Munich-Ramersdorf. He was married and had a daughter.

Mehmet Turgut, died instantaneously when shot three times in the head and neck with a silenced CZ 83 on the morning of Ash Wednesday, 25 February 2004, between 10:10-10:20 in Rostock-Toitenwinkel. Living illegally in Hamburg, he was visiting Rostock and had been asked by an acquaintance to open up a kebab shop that day. Because of his link to Hamburg, Rostock police made the connection to Süleyman Taşköprü, thus establishing the term *Döner Murders*.

İsmail Yaşar, aged 50, owned a kebab shop in Scharrerstrasse, Nuremberg. On 9 June 2005 he was found dead at approximately 10:15 with five gunshot wounds.

Theodoros Boulgarides was killed in his Munich locksmith shop on 15 June 2005 between 18:15 and 19:00. He left a wife and two daughters. A Greek, he was the first non-Turk to die.

Mehmet Kubaşık was found dead in his Dortmund kiosk in the early afternoon of 4 April 2006. Like the majority of the other victims, he had been shot in the head.

Halit Yozgat, who ran an internet café in Kassel, Hesse, was also shot in the head with a silenced gun (6 April 2006).

However, during Halit Yozgat's murder, an agent of the Hessian Office for the Domestic Intelligence Agency was present. The agent first claimed to have left the premises shortly before the murder, but later changed his statement when presented with witness testimony concerning his presence when the murder happened. His involvement with the case gave rise to suspicions that government agencies might be linked to the organisation responsible for the murders or that there were rogue elements within German intelligence circles.

Crime and Social Relevance

- Bosphorus Serial Murders



Officer Michèle Kiesewetter

On 25 April 2007, Officer Michèle Kiesewetter and her duty-partner were attacked in Heilbronn during their lunch break. Officer Kiesewetter, aged 22, died on site and her partner was critically wounded but survived with no memory of the attack. Both were shot involving directly aimed headshots at point blank range while sitting in the patrol car with the shooters approaching their vehicle from both sides. While in the other cases the motive is assumed to be xenophobia and racism, it was initially unclear why Kiesewetter and her partner were attacked; theories include a variety of motives, however it appears there was a personal link between Kiesewetter's uncle (a police officer from Oberweissbach, Thuringia), and the alleged perpetrators - who also came from Thuringia – as well as for the acquisition of firearms. The duty-pistols of Kiesewetter and her partner were found on 4 November 2011 at the caravan where Böhnhardt and Mundlos died, giving rise to the belief that this attack was linked to the *Bosphorus Serial Murders*.



Ill-fated robbery

On Friday 4 November, 9.15am, two armed men stormed into a building society in the east German town of Eisenach. One was wearing a black balaclava, the other a gorilla mask. They demanded money, punching a bank teller before grabbing €70,000 from the safe then hopping on to bicycles they had propped up outside. They knew what they were doing – it was their 15th bank robbery in 12 years.

The thieves pedalled furiously, but not fast enough. Someone spotted them shoving the bikes into a white camper van and called the police. Soon 13 patrol cars were on site. Officers were hiding behind a wall in the car park when they heard two shots. Smoke appeared from the VW camper van's roof. When officers opened the door, they found two bodies: one was shot in the head, the other in the chest.



Crime and Social Relevance

- Bosphorus Serial Murders

Beate Zschäpe

At 3pm, 177km east in the Saxon town of Zwickau, a house in quiet Frölingstrasse exploded. Minutes before the blast ripped through the upper floors of No 26, a woman had rushed to the neighbouring house carrying two cages. She shoved them into the hands of a girl who answered the door and said: "Look after my cats; I'll be back very soon." Joseph Hergert, the girl's father, told the local paper: "She had her phone pressed to her ear, said 'I'm phoning the fire brigade,' and ran away. Shortly afterwards, we heard a bang."



By Saturday evening, German police had unearthed a link between the crime scenes in Eisenach and Zwickau. The two dead men were Uwe Mundlos (38) and Uwe Böhnhardt (34) - two of the most wanted neo-Nazi terrorists in Germany.

Officers joined the dots and figured out that the woman who offloaded the cats in such a hurry was not "Susann Dienelt", as her neighbours knew her, but in fact 36-year-old Beate Zschäpe, who had been on the run with the two Uwes since 1998, after their bomb making factory was discovered in their home town of Jena.

Three days after the two men's deaths, on Monday 7 November, Zschäpe turned up at a police station in Jena, flanked by a lawyer. "*I'm the one you're looking for,*" she said.

Detectives were so sure that the **perpetrators** of the "Döner Murders" were foreign gangsters, probably from Turkey, that they codenamed the investigation **Operation Bosphorus**. The victims' relatives were told their loved ones probably had mafia connections and were in all likelihood mixed up in a drug-smuggling **racket**.

That was until the police sat down to watch salvaged DVDs from the Zwickau explosion.

The bizarre DVDs used the Pink Panther to lay claim to the nine Döner Murders. The cartoon character is shown going on a "tour of Germany", counting down the murder victims, some of whose bloody corpses had been photographed, freshly murdered. The killers introduce themselves as the National Socialist Underground (NSU), "*a network of comrades united under the motto 'actions instead of words'.*" They then threaten future attacks "*if there are no fundamental changes in politics, the press and in freedom of speech*".



Crime and Social Relevance

- Bosphorus Serial Murders



There are claims that NPD activists had known for years where the trio were hiding. One ex-member told the German tabloid Bild that he had seen Zschäpe at a NPD Christmas party after she went on the run in 1998, and that she had also turned up at an event in Georgsmarienhütte, near the Dutch border, in March 2004. *"The Nazis thought she was hot stuff,"* said the man, who claimed she was known as a founder member of the National Socialist Underground.

In 2010, a CD entitled Adolf Hitler Lives was being circulated among right-wing extremist circles. According to the taz newspaper, the CD included a song called Döner Killer, which included the lyrics: *"Nine times now he has struck/There is fear and horror at every kebab stall/... Nine are not enough."*

Despite all this, the German authorities still claim they had no idea where the trio had been living since 1998; less still that they were responsible for the Döner Murders.

However, there is growing evidence to the **contrary**. It emerged that an agent from the Hessen branch of the Verfassungsschutz, Germany's **domestic** intelligence service, was present in April 2006 when Mundlos and Böhnhardt are believed to have shot dead a 21-year-old Turk in a Kassel internet cafe. Then, the German TV channel MDR claimed that local police had located them in the town of Chemnitz, near the Czech border, in 2001, but were not given authorisation to arrest them in time. There are also numerous reports that they were seen in the early 2000s in Winzerla, the rundown suburb of Jena where they had spent their formative years.

Beate Zschäpe, the sole survivor of post-war Germany's deadliest neo-Nazi terror cell, was sentenced on 11 July 2108 to life in prison for the murder of ten people in a seven-year campaign of shootings and nail bombings across Germany.

The verdict brought an end to a marathon five-year trial over the crimes of the National Socialist Underground (NSU) that raised serious questions about the German police's failure to realise it was dealing with a homegrown terror cell, and over how much German intelligence knew about the group's activities.

There was brief applause in the Munich court room as the verdict was handed down, but the 43-year-old Zschäpe showed no reaction.

She was found guilty of the racially-motivated murder of nine immigrants shot dead between 2000 and 2006, and the killing of a woman police officer who was shot with the same gun in 2007. She was also found guilty of a series of nail bombings which targeted immigrant communities, including one on in Cologne in 2004 in which 22 people were injured.

Crime and Social Relevance

- Bosphorus Serial Murders



The court also found Zschäpe was a fully active member of the NSU.

Lawyers for Zschäpe argued she was not involved in the murders. After refusing to speak for the first two and a half years of her trial, she admitted helping the two men and claimed it was because she was in love with Böhnhardt. But she claimed she knew nothing of the killings.

The court rejected her claims and found she was fully complicit in the group's campaign of shootings and bombings. The attacks could only have been carried out with the assistance of Zschäpe, and she was an accomplice of "essential importance", Judge Manfred Götzl found.

The killings had "Nazi racist motives" and were designed to spread "fear and insecurity" among immigrant communities, the judge found. The NSU also hoped to inspire other extremists to carry out similar attacks.

Four others were found guilty of lesser offences of aiding the terror cell. Ralf Wohlleben was jailed for ten years for providing the group with the gun used as the murder weapon. Another defendant named only as Carsten S under German privacy laws was jailed for three years for helping provide the gun. Holger Gerlach was jailed for three years and Andre Eminger for two and half years for providing help to the group's terror campaign.

But critics argued the trial had left unanswered questions over how much German intelligence knew about the NSU, after it emerged in hearings that several intelligence informants were in contact with the group, and an intelligence officer was close to the scene of one of the killings.

German authorities as a whole still have some very difficult questions to answer about how and why they failed to stop the fugitives' 13-year run of violence which resulted in 10 murders – including the killing of a police officer and a series of attacks on Turkish immigrants, 14 bank robberies and at least two nail-bomb attacks.

"Today's verdict is only one piece of the puzzle. As long as the extent to which the authorities knew and the involvement of the intelligence services is not cleared up, the state has failed," Victor Perli, an MP from the opposition Left Party said.

Crime and Social Relevance

- Bosphorus Serial Murders



A. Define the following words/phrases:

1. ethnicity	
2. Attorney General	
3. arson	
4. mitigate	
5. allege	
6. perpetrator	
7. racket	
8. contrary	
9. domestic	
10. adjutant	
11. custodial	

B. Discussion

Race relations and immigration are already an issue within both Germany and the European Union.

1. From a policing perspective, does immigration:
 - a. Promote criminal activity?
 - b. Pose a [national] security threat?
 - c. If so, how should these issues be dealt with?
2. All EU States have seen a surge in the popularity of nationalist political parties, and it is well known that core support comes from *far-right* groups. Germany is well known as being *centre-left* in its generalist politics but is likewise facing *far-right* challenges in the east of Germany.

Why do you believe this phenomenon feature so prominently in East Germany?

Crime and Social Relevance

- Bosphorus Serial Murders



3. It has been stated by German media that local law enforcement is unable to operate effectively against the neo-Nazi movement in east German states. Three reasons have been given:
 - a. lack of political will
 - b. sympathy
 - c. lack of resources

What is your opinion?

4. Germany is no stranger to extremist groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF), however since the 1990's extremism has been more closely associated with Islamist groups such as the Islamic State (IS/ISIL/ISIS), Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Al-Shabab and Boko Haram. With racially motivated *hate crime* on the rise within the EU, how should authorities counter violent extremism?
5. Extremism:
 - a. What are the root causes?
 - b. What attracts people?
 - c. What is a typical profile?

- Advisory and Mediation Exercise

“Justice at the Barrel of a Gun”

A rapid expansion in 2013 of vigilante militias – unauthorised civilian armed groups that claim to fight crime – has created a third force in Mexico’s ongoing cartel-related violence. Some of these militias contain well-meaning citizens and have detained hundreds of suspected criminals. However, they challenge the government’s necessary monopoly on the *use of force* to impart justice. As the militias spread, there is also concern some are being used by criminal groups to fight their rivals and control territory. The Federal Administration needs to develop a coherent policy for dealing with the vigilantes, so that it can work with authentic community policing projects while stopping the continued expansion of unregulated armed groups; this also requires demonstrating that the state has sufficient capacity to restore law and order on its own. If the government fails to deal with this issue, militias could spread across the country, triggering more violence and further damaging the rule of law.

The government faces well-armed, ruthless cartels that dominate portions of the country, as well as the problems presented by uncoordinated national, state and municipal law enforcement bodies and a legacy of *impunity*. The appearance of a growing number of armed groups in at least nine of the 31 states, from close to the U.S. border to the south east, however, has added another dangerous level of complexity to the security challenge. Their epicentre is in the Pacific states of Guerrero and Michoacán, where thousands



of armed men participate in a range of vigilante organisations. There have been hundreds of killings, either by or against the vigilantes, and they have become increasingly worrying hotspots of insecurity. While the vigilante killings are still only a fraction of the more than 10,000 cartel-related murders that have taken place across Mexico, the concern is that this new type of violence could expand across the land.



The vigilantism issue is complicated by the fact that many communities, particularly indigenous, have a centuries-old tradition of *community policing*. Many groups have shown themselves to be successful and have demonstrated legitimate ways of providing security. However, it is legally ambiguous how far such community groups can go in bearing arms and *imparting* justice. Furthermore, many of the new militias copy the language and claim the same rights

as these community police, even though they do not come from a local tradition or are not even rooted in indigenous communities.



The government needs to work with the authentic and unarmed community police and clearly define the boundaries of what they can and cannot do. Some rules can be guidelines that are being developed under state and federal laws or by expanding agreements being worked out between state governments and community leaders. In some cases, the government needs to require the disarmament of vigilante groups; in yet others, it needs to more aggressively detain and prosecute militias with criminal links. But the government also needs to significantly improve security in all the communities where militias have been formed. Many residents have taken up arms because the state has systematically failed to protect them. The outcry for security is legitimate; but justice is better served through functional state institutions than the barrels of private guns.

“Mexico's Wild West: vigilante groups defy president to fight cartels”

Lizbeth Diaz, Reuters, 13 September 2019

Surrounded by armed men, Commander “Toro” said Mexicans taking the law into their own hands in the western state of Michoacan will not listen to government calls to lay down arms because it would leave them at the mercy of violent gangs.

Toro - real name German Ramirez - was once a school teacher in Santa Maria Ostula, an impoverished, largely indigenous village in the municipality of Aquila in western Michoacan.

But he says that after suspected cartel hitmen kidnapped and shot dead his father six years ago, he found a new vocation training neighbours to resist brutal gangs fighting for control of the market for synthetic drugs and other narcotics.

“Every time they kill someone there are more angry families,” said Ramirez, 31. “That’s how people take up arms and our strength increases. This is what’s happening.”

The re-emergence of dozens of so-called self-defence groups that rose to prominence under the previous administration has exposed shortcomings in President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s strategy to bring down record levels of violence.

Some 17,614 homicides were registered between January and July this year, putting the death toll on track to surpass last year’s record. Of those, 809 were in Michoacan, 13% more than in the same period the previous year, official data show.

Ramirez says he has more than 200 armed civilians under him patrolling highways and roads in the area, throwing out - but not killing, he says - unwanted intruders from marauding gangs. He says local police rarely enter parts of rural Michoacan, let the self-defence groups operate and at times even provide weapons.

The ministry for public security did not reply to requests for comment.

Lopez Obrador took office in December vowing to pursue an amnesty with criminal gangs, saying it was time to take a less confrontational approach to curbing the violence. However, he never clearly spelled out how the scheme would work.



Since then, his government has sent mixed messages about how it will deal with the vigilante groups, which are not always clearly distinguishable from criminal organizations.

“The government is only worried about disarming us,” said Hector Zepeda, alias “Commander Tetos”, another self-defence group leader from Coahuayana, about 50 kilometres (30 miles) from Aquila.

In August, Obrador said the vigilante groups were outside the law and should disarm. However, other officials have suggested that the government is negotiating with them. Interior Minister Olga Sanchez told reporters last month the government was talking to “various groups” before stepping back from her comments.

The president says his newly-created National Guard (gendarmerie), will restore order.

Battle for Control

Security experts interviewed by Reuters say vigilante forces have helped contain violence in crime-stricken areas like Michoacan. But some of them have also struck alliances with criminal gangs in exchange for weapons and protection, they add.

“I don’t think the current government is proposing to change the situation,” said Erubiel Tirado, a security expert at the Iberoamerican University in Mexico City.

Ramirez, “El Toro”, acknowledges that some self-defence members deviated from their original path. Some, he said, had joined criminal gangs the vigilantes are fighting.

The groups began emerging after former President Felipe Calderon launched a military-led crackdown on cartels in Michoacan, his home state, shortly after taking office in December 2006.

Gangs fragmented, and the violence kept rising.

But it was not until Calderon’s successor Enrique Pena Nieto took power in 2012 that self-defence groups began fighting major battles with the cartels, making national headlines.

By early 2014, the government had reached an uneasy accommodation in Michoacan with vigilante groups whose aggressive campaigns beat down the Knights Templar, a cartel that was then the most prominent threat to the government’s authority.

In conjunction with the Sinaloa Cartel of captured kingpin Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, the Knights Templar once dominated the main trafficking routes on the Pacific coast.

The Templars’ displacement opened the door to incursions by rival outfit the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) from the neighbouring state of Jalisco, deemed one of the most dangerous transnational groups in the world by the U.S. government.

Offensives by the CJNG to secure smuggling routes for drugs like fentanyl and illegally-mined minerals have spilled into the sparsely-populated coast of Michoacan, which is sandwiched by two major ports - Lazaro Cardenas in the south of the state, and Manzanillo, a few kilometres north into neighbouring Colima state.

“Everything enters through Manzanillo, it’s no secret, even things that shouldn’t,” said Griselda Martinez, the mayor of Manzanillo, who survived a murder attempt last month.



Attempts to extort businesses in the iron-ore rich area that supplies steelmakers such as Ternium have added to headaches for villages caught in the middle.

"Now we don't just have to deal with the criminal gangs trying to control ports like Manzanillo and Lazaro Cardenas," Ramirez said, "now they're coming after us."

In September, social media erupted with images of vigilante groups fighting against suspected CJNG forces trying to enter nearby Tepalcatepec, Michoacan. Photos and video footage showed the bloody corpses of cartel foot-soldiers slumped in trucks and the sound of gunfire ringing out in remote villages.

"If we turn in our weapons, they will kill us," Ramirez said from his perch on a grassy hill in his village, guarded by dozens of men while women cooked and children played nearby.

The vigilantes say the president's pledges are falling flat.

Zepeda, "Commander Teto," who lost a brother to cartel violence six years ago, said he had no hope the government will bring peace to Mexico. Even residents of Colima state have turned to him for help as they lose family members in the bloodshed, he said.

"They know that the government doesn't care about us," Zepeda said. "So they want to know how to take up arms."

Original article, with photos:

<https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mexico-violence-vigilantes/mexicos-wild-west-vigilante-groups-defy-president-to-fight-cartels-idUKKCN1VY1GP>

Photo Essay:

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/02/mexico-vigilantes-violence-and-displacement-a-photo-essay>

Project

A senior officer from the Mexican Federal Police is visiting your Police seeking advice, strategic ideas and concepts on how to resolve the vigilante issue. He is especially interested to hear suggestions from officers working on the streets, as this is the level where such ideas are implemented and practiced; ultimately the work is the same.

- What would you advise?
- What works in your State? Would it work in Mexico?

Resulting from the visit, your country has been invited to establish a bilateral advisory SSR Mission. Based on the article, what areas would you concentrate on, and what stakeholders would you involve?

“If We Don’t Kill These People, They Will Kill You”

- Policing Africa's Largest Slum



As Kenya waits to hear if a police officer will be charged over the death of 23-year-old Carliton Maina, alleged unlawful killings in Kenya continue, leaving poor communities wondering if those charged with protecting them are simply killing with impunity.

At a meeting between police and community members in Kibera, Africa’s largest slum in Nairobi, Kenya, where crime is acutely high and mainly unreported, the two sides try to find common ground.

There are courteous introductions and then an appeal for openness – and information – to help the police tackle Kibera’s crime problems.

It’s a **frank** exchange of words, with the audience seeking confirmation of their rights when they come into contact with police. They remind the officers of the **overriding** principle of Kenyan law: *“an individual is innocent until proven guilty”*, not the reverse.

A young man asks why officers take bribes and **extort** money from the community. *“That is corruption,”* responds Inspector Nick Sulwe of Kibera’s administration police, firmly. *“To eliminate it you must comply with the law.”*

Background Brief

More than 60% of all African city dwellers live in slums. As the climate crisis continues to drive people away from rural areas and into cities, urbanisation has become a growing issue across the globe.

Many people living in Kibera work hard, long days. They pay high rents for **flimsy shacks** on land owned by the government and effectively **squatted** on by landlords. They have no services and the only taxation comes in the form of **protection money** demanded by police and gangs. Each day is a struggle to scrape together enough money and food to reach the next.

Electricity, clean water, toilets, healthcare and schools are either non-existent or not available to all residents. At any one time, 50% of Kibera’s 15- to 25-year-old women are pregnant. Abortion is illegal and contraception scarce. Rape and child sex abuse is **endemic**. Abuse of drink and drugs is **rife**. Food is cheap but unhealthy – fizzy drinks are easier to get than clean water.

“If you’re arrested, you will more than likely pay not to be arrested.”

Another person wants to know why officers hire out their guns to gangs, **perpetuating** crime against their community. *“That’s misconduct, such people are not fit to be policemen,”* Sulwe says. *“The government is doing its best to eliminate the problem.”*

The people here want more. They want answers about the number of police killings, or **“extrajudicial executions”** as they are known locally. Sulwe provides an explanation that goes to the heart of such shootings: **disillusionment**. *“If you tell me someone is a thief, they rob and rape women, and you ask me to arrest him – but with no evidence – the judge will ask for evidence. If there is no evidence, he is released and comes back to commit more crime.”*

“If We Don’t Kill These People, They Will Kill You”

- Policing Africa's Largest Slum



‘You’re just killing us’. A meeting between community members and police leads to a frank exchange.

Photograph: Rod Austin/The Guardian

A young woman refers to the case of Carilton Maina, a 23-year-old allegedly shot dead by police months earlier. She wants the inspector to explain why suspects were not simply taken into custody. *“You are just killing us,”* she tells him.

Maina was a football-loving student who had studied at Leeds University. In December 2018 he was heading home in the early hours, having watched a football match with friends in Kibera. An encounter with police resulted in a chase. Maina suffered four gunshot wounds to the chest and one to the head. Authorities say he was *“part of a gang terrorising local residents”* something strongly denied by those who knew him.

“When police officers raid a place ... trust me, they are not wrong,” responds Sulwe. *“There’s something there, there are criminals there. And normally when we come, they open fire. Are we supposed to run away? No, we don’t run away. We fire back. Trust me, if we don’t kill these people, they will kill you.”*



A police station in Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya

Photograph: Rod Austin/The Guardian

He is then challenged over the lack of protection for witnesses and those who provide information. Why are such people at risk, not only from suspects, but from corrupt officers working hand-in-hand with criminal gangs? The **perception** of the audience is clear. Despite a number of high-profile convictions, they believe police fail to protect them and commit crimes against them with **impunity**.

Kenya’s government claims to be making an effort to weed out **rogue** officers and bring them to justice. Figures relating to the number of killings in 2018 vary significantly. One organisation puts the figure at 121, another at 267 – which would mark a significant increase on the previous year, when there were an estimated 152.

Data collectors monitor police statistics, news and social media reports, but struggle to obtain accurate information about incidents in Kenya’s 10 slums. Many killings go unreported or the deceased are buried by relatives who say nothing for fear of **reprisal**.

Kibera in Numbers

- Estimates of how many people live in Kibera range from 250,000 to 1 million.
- Life expectancy is 30 years.
- The biggest killers come from diet and dirt. Diabetes is rife from cheap, high-sugar food.
- One in four children attends school.
- One toilet block serves approx. 50 shacks, with each shack housing roughly eight people.

“If We Don’t Kill These People, They Will Kill You”

- Policing Africa's Largest Slum



Kibera’s residents are not alone. In Pangani in north-east Nairobi, host to a largely Somali community, residents voice similar concerns. There, specialist police units like “Pangani-6”, led by Corporal Ahmed Rachid, have reportedly been involved in alleged unlawful killings.

Rachid openly admits that his mandate is to rid the streets of gangsters and criminals. *“Those we profile, we have to get them alive or dead,”* he told a television crew after he was captured on film shooting an apparently handcuffed, unarmed suspect. That was in 2017; it appears that in 2019 little has changed.

Maina’s case and a host of others raise fundamental questions about the conduct of Kenya’s police service. Has the government given certain officers an **undisclosed** mandate to kill suspects rather than bringing them before the courts? Is the government simply struggling to maintain police discipline? Or is the state simply turning a blind eye to the actions of certain officers in order to focus instead on gang crime and public disorder?

It has been alleged that some armed officers have openly engaged in robberies, there have been interventions in order to free corrupt officers from detention, and, in one case, a previously **maimed** suspect was kidnapped from hospital, and their body discovered days later with gunshot wounds.

The Kenyan government has to come up with a solution that fits the depth and gravity of the problem. Human rights watchers are still awaiting Kenya’s director of public prosecutions Noordin Haji to make a decision over whether or not the officer **implicated** in the shooting of Maina will be charged.

“The problem is complex,” says Irūngū Houghton, Head of Amnesty International in Kenya. *“Most officers work within the law. However, it appears that a few have given up on the judicial system, arguing that arresting suspects for serious crime is **futile** as many are found not guilty and the prisons are full. They take matters into their own hands. Others are simply corrupt, committing crime themselves. These factors fuel extrajudicial killings.”*

Kenya’s 60,000-strong police service is **plagued** with allegations of unlawful killings, corruption and other misconduct. As of March 2018, the country’s Independent Policing Oversight Authority were monitoring 9,878 outstanding complaints against police, of which 5,085 were **earmarked** for detailed investigation.

There are approximately 2.5 million slum dwellers in Nairobi, representing two thirds of the capital’s population. The largest is Kibera. Poverty and wrongdoing are apparent on a grand scale. Daylight protects communities from gang activity but allegedly allows some officers to extort money from shopkeepers already struggling to make a living. By night, residents face the savagery of gangs who rob, rape and extort, **undeterred** by police who tread carefully to avoid confrontation, remaining on the slum’s outskirts and entering only when absolutely necessary – and then only in sufficient numbers to stave off an ambush from gangs and resentful locals.

To add to Kibera’s violence, every four years political violence pollutes the slum as electioneering politicians bid for popularity. Residents allege the use of criminal gangs to sway voters, creating **mayhem** and turning Kibera into a **tinderbox** that sparks conflict in regions of Kenya.

“If We Don’t Kill These People, They Will Kill You”

- Policing Africa's Largest Slum



Elections often result in confrontations between residents and police.

Photograph: Marco Longari/AFP

It takes little to trigger angry confrontations between stone-throwing mobs and police, who retaliate with tear gas and automatic gunfire.

“During election time, politicians comes into slums like Kibera, they put Kikuyu against Luyha, Nubians versus Luo, encouraging violence,” says Kennedy Odede, founder of

Kibera-based charity Shofco. *“Politically people are used to kill each other. They come here and leave you killing your brother with pangas (machetes) whilst they go and drink champagne in the Serena Hotel. When Kibera cries, the whole of Kenya cries. People are used to kill each other.”*

In 2007, post-election violence claimed more than 1,000 lives across Kenya. In August 2017, 24 people died following the presidential vote, including a six-month old baby who died after reportedly being struck numerous times by a baton when officers entered a home *“looking for protesters”*, discharging tear gas and beating the occupants. Earlier this year, an inquest ruled that 36 officers should be held liable for the death.

In 2017, Kenya’s police force recorded just 77,992 crimes. In 2018, there were 88,268 recorded crimes, a 13% increase across a population of 52 million.

In Kibera, few crimes are reported or registered. Instead, police admitted, officers maintain a “black book” of offenders. We were told that once your name finds its way into this book it is difficult to have it removed.



Insp. Nick Sulwe leads officers on patrol in Kibera, May 2019.

Photograph: The Guardian

“If we find that someone is committing burglary we go and see their parents and give them a warning. If the person does not respond, then when we catch up with them we act,” said Sulwe, who would not be drawn into explaining what “act” meant.

“Once your name is in the book it is likely that you will be killed by the police unless you can pay to have it removed,” said one person who did not want to be named. *“If not, they hunt you, kill you, and plant a fake gun on your body to say you were carrying a weapon. Then they say that you were terrorising the community, or were about to commit crime.”*

Arrangements were made to interview the superintendent in charge of policing Kibera. He agreed, and then later declined unless we offered payment.

The exact number of killings and enforced disappearances across Kenya is not known. Independent monitors suggest that between 2013 and 2017, at least 765 people have been unlawfully killed by police. It is alleged that 572 people have been **“summarily executed”** in circumstances similar to those surrounding the death of Maina.

“If We Don’t Kill These People, They Will Kill You”

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According to *Democracy in Africa*, victims were mainly men aged 18–24, killed “on their way to commit a crime”. Most cases were reported by the victim’s mother or wife, rather than by police.

Sulwe and his officers make an effort to interact with Kibera’s residents. The ex-teacher attends community meetings and is optimistic that police and residents can work together to **resolve** local disputes and reduce crime.

He hopes that meaningful dialogue will reduce deaths on both sides. He says officers have been killed for no apparent reason other than doing their job. But he is realistic. The community needs to trust their police service and officers of all ranks must abide by the law.

“All Kenyans, not just the rich, have the right to be safe from unlawful killings, torture and ill-treatment,” says Houghton. “The vicious cycle of violent crime and brutal policing can and must be broken. It requires deeper community policing strategies with youth organisations. We will continue to hold commanding officers responsible for those who report to them, as well as [demanding] closer oversight by parliamentary bodies and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority.”

In a written response, a spokesperson for Kenya’s police force said there are no policies, orders or directives to support unlawful killings.

Parliament has oversight of the police through parliamentary committees. Kenya’s constitution enshrines human rights, and an independent police oversight authority has been established. Kenya plays a leading role in international initiatives to uphold the rule of law across Africa.

*“In cases where the cause of death is not outrightly clear, an **inquest** is held by a magistrate to establish the cause of death. Any person found **culpable** is charged in accordance to the law,” the spokesperson stated.*

*We strive for the highest standards of professionalism and discipline amongst officers, who are expected to operate in accordance to the rule of law. Officers found **flouting** the law are prosecuted like any other citizens without any special considerations.*

Unfounded statements against the police not only dents a good image but has the potential to discourage would-be investors and visitors to our country.”

Rod Austin (The Guardian, 6 August 2019)

“If We Don’t Kill These People, They Will Kill You”

- Policing Africa's Largest Slum



Exercises

Vocabulary Building 1

Match the word(s) with definition (write letter into corresponding box)

1. frank		A. to identify and set aside for a specific purpose
2. overriding		B. deserving blame
3. extort		C. a lower-level judicial officer (judge) for minor cases
4. flimsy		D. to illegally occupy/reside in a property
5. shack		E. to execute immediately
6. squatting		F. having precedence over everything else
7. protection money		G. no longer believing in something, especially having learned of the problems with it
8. extrajudicial		H. potential source of widespread violence; explosive situation
9. disillusion		I. money taken by criminals in exchange for not hurt victims or or damage their property
10. impunity		J. legal inquiry
11. rogue		K. dishonest, mischievous, operating outside of the law
12. maim		L. a rough cabin or hut
13. futile		M. without material strength
14. plagued		N. done without permission / outside of the legal system
15. implicate		O. direct, straightforward
16. earmark		P. to show that someone is involved
17. tinderbox		Q. to annoy, to trouble
18. summarily [execute]		R. incapable of producing a result, ineffective
19. inquest		S. to cripple, to disfigure, to deprive the use of a limb
20. magistrate		T. to act without fear or limitation of punishment
21. culpable		U. to take money from someone through intimidation

“If We Don’t Kill These People, They Will Kill You”

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Vocabulary Building 2

Gap fill: place the correct word in the matching sentence.

a. undeterred	b. flout	c. inquest	d. endemic
e. undisclosed	f. mayhem	g. resolve	h. perception

1. Even though negotiations had failed before, the mediator was _____.
2. Transparency International’s findings are unlikely to surprise anyone who has ever worked in Nigeria: corruption at all levels is considered _____.
3. Rwanda and Ethiopia, with dark pasts of civil war, genocide and _____, are now among the fastest-growing economies in the world.
4. The story indicates that Israel is continuing to _____ international law, preventing Palestinians access to their properties.
5. The attack was conducted as a _____ for U.S. military participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.
6. Assange was in the Ecuadorean embassy in London, Snowden an _____ location in Russia.
7. That _____ is false and often reflects not just ignorance but also elitism and racism.
8. Concerning Kashmir, Modi has ordered his army commanders to strike back hard at dissident forces to demonstrate Indian _____.

Group Assignment

The United Nations Regional Headquarters in Nairobi has called on your *SSR Task Force* to conduct a *Needs Assessments* on how to address issues highlighted in the article.

1. identify issues important to both the police and the community
2. make recommendations on how to satisfy the community, whilst fulfilling police duties
3. slum security in the evenings is a major issue, suggest how can police restore order
4. make suggestions on how to deal with police corruption and vigilante police officers
5. make suggestions on how to rebuild trust between police and the community

PROS

and

CONS



Encyclopaedia Britannica (13 November 2018)

1. Marijuana legalization boosts the economy.

The marijuana industry (adult-use and medical) in the United States could exceed \$24 billion in revenue by 2025. For every \$1.00 spent in the marijuana industry, between \$2.13 and \$2.40 in economic activity is generated. Tourism, banking, food, real estate, construction, and transportation are a few of the industries that benefit from legal marijuana.

The legal marijuana industry generated \$7.2 billion in economic activity in 2016 and added millions of dollars in federal taxes paid by cannabis businesses. One study on adult-use marijuana in Nevada projected \$7.5 billion in economic activity over the first seven years of legalization, including \$1.7 billion in labour income. A study by the University of California Agricultural Issues Centre estimated that the legal marijuana market in California could generate \$5 billion annually.

In Colorado, marijuana brings in three times more tax revenue than alcohol. The state raised \$78 million in the first fiscal year after starting retail sales, and \$129 million the second fiscal year. Washington collected a total of \$220 million in tax revenues in its second fiscal year of sales.

2. Legalizing marijuana results in decreased teen marijuana use

Researchers at the Washington University School of Medicine found that,

“the rates of marijuana use by young people are falling despite the fact more US states are legalizing, or decriminalizing marijuana use and the number of adults using the drug has increased.”

Marijuana use among 8th graders (13–14-year-olds) in Washington state decreased following legalization in 2012, from 9.8% to 7.3% in 2014/2016, according to a Dec. 2018 report from RAND. A study from the Centres for Disease Control (CDC) found that past-year marijuana use decreased by 17%, from 15.8% in 2002 to 13.1% in 2014, among US kids ages 12 to 17. Colorado teens between 12 and 17 years old reported a nearly 12% drop in marijuana use just two years after adult use was legalized, according to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health.

The Marijuana Policy Project, an organization that leads marijuana legalization campaigns, said, *“Study after study has confirmed that marijuana policy reforms do not cause rates of youth marijuana use to increase... The most in-depth state surveys suggest modest decreases in rates of youth marijuana use in Colorado and Washington.”*

Even though retail marijuana shops opened in Colorado and Washington in 2014, past-year marijuana use among teens in those states was lower in 2015-2016 than in 2014-2015.

3. Traffic deaths and arrests for “Driving Under the Influence” do not increase, and may decrease, when marijuana is legalized

Traffic deaths dropped 11% on average in states that legalized medical marijuana. Arrests for *driving under the influence* (DUI) have decreased in Washington and Colorado. Benjamin Hansen, an economics professor at the University of Oregon who studied traffic deaths post-medical marijuana legalization, stated that *“Public safety doesn’t decrease with increased access to marijuana, rather it improves.”*

Studies show that drivers under the influence of marijuana tend to be more cautious and take fewer risks than drunk drivers, such as making fewer lane changes and reducing speed. A fact sheet about marijuana’s effects on drivers posted on the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration website stated that *“Some drivers may actually be able to improve performance for brief periods by overcompensating for self-perceived impairment.”*

4. Legal marijuana is regulated for consumer safety

People buying marijuana on the street have no way of knowing if what they’re ingesting is covered with mould, fungus, pesticides, or other harmful substances. Once marijuana is legalized, the government is able to enforce laboratory testing and regulations to ensure that marijuana is free of toxins. For example, Washington law requires health warnings, quality assurance, labelling for the concentration of THC, and other important regulations for consumers

Colorado, Washington, Oregon, and Alaska all passed regulations to prevent kids’ exposure to marijuana, including child-resistant packaging. Legalization allows the government to set age restrictions on buyers and to license and regulate the entire supply chain of marijuana, including growers, distributors, retailers, and testing laboratories. California regulations include limitations on the serving sizes for edible marijuana products, seed-to-sale testing and tracking, and 24-hour video surveillance at retail stores.

5. Legalization of marijuana is phasing out black markets and taking money away from drug cartels, organized crime, and street gangs

Data from the US Border Patrol show that marijuana seizures have decreased by millions of pounds and are at their lowest levels in over a decade, indicating that legal domestic production is decreasing demand for marijuana smuggled in from Mexico. A Mexican cannabis farmer told NPR, *“If the US continues to legalize pot, they’ll run us into the ground.”* According to the ACLU, legalization in Colorado and Washington has cost Mexican drug cartels an estimated \$2.7 billion in profits.

Stephen Downing, a retired deputy chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, said, *“There’s no question that ending today’s prohibition on drugs — starting with marijuana — would do more to hurt the cartels than any level of law enforcement skill or dedication ever can.”* By the year 2020, an estimated 90% of the marijuana market in Colorado will be supplied by licensed and taxed vendors, demonstrating that the black market can be replaced by legal, regulated sales.

6. The enforcement of marijuana disproportionately impacts ethnic groups

Statistics show a significant racial disparity in the enforcement of marijuana laws: even though white and black people use marijuana at roughly the same rate, a black person in the United States is 3.73 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession on average. In Iowa, the state with the highest inequity, black people are 8.3 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than white people. In New York City, 15.8% of marijuana possession cases involving white people result in conviction, compared to 32.3% involving black people and 30% involving Hispanic people.

Marijuana possession convictions can impact people's ability to get public housing, financial aid for school, loans, and jobs. Over the past ten years, drug sentences for black men have been 9% to 13% longer than those received by white men. Margaret Dooley-Sammuli, Criminal Justice and Drug Policy director for the ACLU of California, stated, *"Racial disparities in marijuana enforcement are widespread and longstanding."* Legalizing marijuana would help correct the disparity.

7. Crime goes down when marijuana is legalized

Studies show that medical marijuana dispensaries decreased crime in their neighbourhoods because of an increased security presence and more people walking around the area.

Research indicates that people drink less and alcohol sales drop in places where marijuana is legalized. The amount of crime and violence caused by alcohol use is ten times higher than by marijuana use and alcohol is a factor in around 40% of violent crimes. A shift from drinking to cannabis use will decrease crimes associated with alcohol, such as domestic violence and assault. According to FBI crime statistics, violent crime in Washington decreased in the years after legalization.

Taylor West, former deputy director for the National Cannabis Industry Association, said, *"We're not seeing any increase in crime rates through marijuana — we're seeing lower crime rates, and there are good rational reasons for that: we're really beginning to cripple the criminal market, which is where violence actually occurs."*

8. Legalizing would end costly enforcement and free up police resources

Arresting people for marijuana possession costs the US between \$1.19 and \$6.03 billion annually. These costs include police, judicial, legal, and corrections expenses. Incarcerating marijuana offenders costs the US an estimated \$600 million per year. Harvard economist Jeffrey Miron has estimated that marijuana legalization would save between \$7.7 and \$13.7 billion annually.

Instead of arresting people for marijuana, police officers could focus on serious crimes including rape, assault, and homicide. Marijuana legalization in Washington significantly freed up law enforcement resources; marijuana possession arrests dropped from 5,531 the year before legalization to 120 the year after.

Howard Wooldridge, a police detective from Michigan who co-founded "Law Enforcement Against Prohibition", said, *"Marijuana prohibition is a horrible waste of good police time. Every hour spent looking for pot reduces public safety."*

9. Marijuana is less harmful than alcohol and tobacco, which are legal.

Alcohol and tobacco are legal, yet they are known to cause cancer, heart failure, liver damage, and more. According to the CDC, six people die from alcohol poisoning every day and 88,000 people die annually due to excessive alcohol use in the United States. There are no recorded cases of death from marijuana overdose.

Three to four times as many Americans are dependent on alcohol as on marijuana. A study in the *Lancet* ranking the harmfulness of drugs put alcohol first as the most harmful, tobacco as sixth, and cannabis eighth. A national poll found that people view tobacco as a greater threat to health than marijuana by a margin of four to one (76% vs. 18%), and 72% of people surveyed believed that regular use of alcohol was more dangerous than marijuana use.

“In several respects, even sugar poses more of a threat to our nation’s health than pot,” said Dr. David L. Nathan, a clinical psychiatrist and president of Doctors for Cannabis Regulation.

10. Taxes from legal marijuana finance important public programs.

Tax revenues in legal marijuana states provide funding to the police, drug treatment and mental health centres, and housing programs, along with school programs such as anti-bullying campaigns, youth mentoring, and public-school grants. *“The impact is really felt at the local level. Some counties have done 20 years of infrastructure work in just one year’s time. They’ve provided lunch for kids who need it,”* said Brian Vicente, partner at Vicente Sederberg LLC, a law firm specializing in the marijuana industry.

In Colorado, \$40 million of marijuana tax revenue went to public school construction, while \$105 million went to housing programs, mental health programs in jails, and health programs in middle schools in 2016-2017.

11. Legalizing marijuana creates thousands of needed jobs.

There were an estimated 122,814 legal full-time marijuana jobs in the United States as of Jan. 2017. A report from New Frontier Data found that the cannabis industry could create a quarter of a million new jobs by 2020. An economic impact estimate from the Marijuana Policy Group forecast the creation of more than 130,000 jobs in California following legalization. Within a few years of legalization, approximately 18,000 additional full-time jobs were created in Colorado annually, both in the actual marijuana business as well as in related fields such as security and real estate. Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-OR) stated that the cannabis industry in the United States *“is expected to produce nearly 300,000 jobs by 2020 and grow to \$24 billion by 2025.”*

12. A majority of Americans support legalizing marijuana

A 2018 opinion poll found a record-high 66% support for legalizing marijuana, up from 12% in 1969, the first year marijuana was a theme. The poll first surpassed 50% support in 2011. “The transformation in public attitudes about marijuana over the past half-century has mirrored the liberalization of public attitudes about gay rights and the same-sex-marriage movement.” While Democrats (72%) and Independents (67%) have been more likely to back legalization, a majority of Republicans (51%) now agree. Polls by CBS News and the AP both found that 61% of Americans favour legalizing marijuana.

The public clearly supports changing our failed anti-marijuana policies. More than half of US states have legalized medical marijuana, and 40 states took some action to relax their drug laws (such as decriminalizing or lowering penalties for possession) between 2009 and 2013.

13. The government doesn’t have the right to tell adults what they can put in their own bodies

David Boaz, Executive Vice President of the Cato Institute, said, *“people have the right to live their lives in any way they choose so long as they don’t violate the equal rights of others. What right could be more basic, more inherent in human nature, than the right to choose what substances to put in one’s own body?”* More than 3,500 people die from drowning every year in the United States, but the government wouldn’t arrest people for owning swimming pools. Over 30,000 people are killed annually in car accidents, but the government doesn’t outlaw driving. Adults should be allowed to make adult decisions about how they choose to relax or have fun without government interference, especially when they’re not hurting anyone.

US Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) said, *“There is no doubt in my mind that the federal government should not be in the marijuana prohibition business... From every perspective - a libertarian perspective, fiscal conservative’s perspective, Christian evangelical perspective, progressive perspective - marijuana prohibition is just wrong.”*

1. Legalized marijuana creates costs that far outweigh its tax revenues

Marijuana use harms more than just the person using the drug. Societal costs of marijuana use include paying for increased emergency room visits, medical care, and addiction treatment for the uninsured; more victims of drugged driving accidents; increased crime; and a negative impact on health from second-hand smoke.

Annual societal costs from alcohol (\$223.5 billion) and tobacco (\$193 billion) far exceed the \$24 billion in tax revenues they raise. Money raised from legal marijuana taxes generally accounts for less than 1% of a state's tax revenue.

Legalizing marijuana would put one more harmful substance in our society that potentially costs more than the revenue it generates. According to the Pew Research Centre, *"the most frequently mentioned reason why people oppose legalization is that marijuana generally hurts society."*

2. Legalizing marijuana increases use by teens, with harmful results

The percentage of 12- to 17-year-olds using marijuana is higher in every legal marijuana state than the national average. For example, 16.21% of Colorado teens and 18.86% of teens in Alaska reported marijuana use in the past year, compared to an average of 12.29% for the United States overall in 2015-2016. Colorado past-month teen marijuana use jumped 20% in the two-year average after marijuana was legalized for adults.

Marijuana is especially dangerous for young people, because human brains are not fully developed until around age 25 (four years past the legal age in states that allow recreational marijuana). The American Academy of Paediatrics said that adverse effects of teen marijuana use include "impaired short-term memory and decreased concentration, attention span, and problem solving, which clearly interfere with learning. Alterations in motor control, coordination, judgment, reaction time, and tracking ability have also been documented; these may contribute to unintentional deaths and injuries." Studies show that students who use cannabis perform worse in school.

3. Traffic accidents and deaths increase when marijuana is legalized

Marijuana-related traffic deaths rose 62% following the legalization of marijuana in Colorado. Jim Leal, Chief of Police of Newark, California, said of legalizing marijuana, *"You are commercializing a product that is just going to put more impaired drivers on the road, worsening a problem that we already have. What officers are seeing with THC levels being very high is they are seeing impairment being far worse than they have ever seen in the past."*

The AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety reported that fatal crashes involving marijuana doubled after legalization in Washington. Marshall Doney, President and CEO of AAA, said, *"Marijuana can affect driver safety by impairing vehicle control and judgment."* The Highway Loss Data Institute found an increased crash risk in legal marijuana states and said collision claims in Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington increased 6% as compared to states that don't have legal marijuana. A meta-study by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS) concluded that *"Cannabis use prior to driving increases the risk of being involved in a motor vehicle accident."*

4. Marijuana is addictive - drug dependence will increase with legalization

Heavy users who stop using marijuana may suffer withdrawal symptoms such as insomnia, depression, anxiety, nausea, chills, and stomach pain. According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, as many as four million Americans meet the diagnostic criteria for a marijuana use disorder, such as abuse, dependence, or addiction. Dr. Drew Pinsky, a board-certified internist and addiction medicine specialist, said, “I’ve been treating cannabis addiction for 20 years. When people are addicted to cannabis, cocaine and alcohol the drug they have the most difficult time giving up is the cannabis.”

A study in the *Journal of Drug Issues* found that the number of US daily marijuana users has risen dramatically since 2002 and now 68% of users report daily or near-daily use. Kevin Sabet, director of Smart Approaches to Marijuana, wrote, “The scientific verdict is that marijuana can be addictive and dangerous... Many baby boomers have a hard time understanding this simply because today’s marijuana can be so much stronger than the marijuana of the past.”

5. The black market and organized crime benefit from legalization

Law enforcement says that legal marijuana has actually enhanced opportunities for the black market. Prices charged by state-licensed sellers can easily be undercut by cartels. A drug dealer told *Vice News*, “*Right now with the way the tax structure is in Washington, the black market is going to thrive.*”

In Colorado, a sharp increase in marijuana-related charges filed under the state’s *Organized Crime Control Act* coincided with the legalization of marijuana, indicating a rise in organized crime. The Colorado Attorney General’s office stated that legalization “has inadvertently helped fuel the business of Mexican drug cartels... cartels are now trading drugs like heroin for marijuana, and the trade has since opened the door to drug and human trafficking.” Local officials said that Mexican cartels were growing marijuana under the cover of legal operations in Colorado and using that to fuel the black market in other states.

6. Legalization leads to more marijuana-related medical emergencies

After retail marijuana stores opened in Colorado, emergency room visits related to marijuana shot up nearly 30% and hospitalizations related to marijuana rose 200%. “*The emergency department has seen increased visits for primary care, breathing problems related to inhalation of marijuana, including asthma, bronchitis, upper respiratory tract infections, as well as psychiatric needs, accidental or intentional overdoses and, unfortunately, increased paediatric patients with issues related to marijuana,*” said Dr. Karen Randall, an ER physician in Colorado.

People are used to the idea that a candy bar is a single serving size, but a candy bar with marijuana could have four or more times the recommended dose of THC, depending on the state’s regulations. People end up in the ER with anxiety attacks or psychotic-like symptoms from eating sweets infused with more marijuana than they were expecting – or, in some cases, not expecting at all.

Marijuana exposure cases for kids ages 9 and under increased more than five-fold in Colorado after legalization. NAS found “*increased risk of unintentional cannabis overdose injuries among children*” in legal marijuana states. The University of Colorado burn centre reported a “*substantial increase*” in the number of marijuana-related burns after legalization.

7. Marijuana legalization will increase mental health problems

Cannabis use may increase the risk of developing schizophrenia, depression, and other psychiatric disorders. Researchers at Harvard found that recreational marijuana smokers showed abnormalities in the shape, volume, and density of certain areas of the brain.

Dr. Hans Breiter, a psychiatrist at Northwestern Memorial Hospital says, *“People think a little marijuana shouldn’t cause a problem if someone is doing O.K. with work or school. Our data directly says this is not so.”* A British Journal of Psychiatry study stated, *“There is good evidence that taking cannabis could lead to acute adverse mental effects in a high proportion of regular users.”*

A survey published in *Drug and Alcohol Dependence* journal reported that 22% of marijuana users experienced *“acute anxiety or panic attacks following cannabis use,”* and 15% had psychotic symptoms following use.

8. Marijuana harms the health of users and people around them.

Smoking marijuana can damage lung tissues and cause respiratory problems; second-hand marijuana smoke is also dangerous. Research shows that smoking one marijuana joint is as damaging to the lungs as five tobacco cigarettes. Marijuana may contain five times as much carbon monoxide concentration and three times as much tar as tobacco. There is a higher risk of heart attacks and strokes in the hours immediately after smoking cannabis.

A study found that using a vaporization device *“likely leads to enhanced ingestion of toxic ammonia known to result in neurobehavioral impairment.”* Ammonia ingested while vaping can result in lung irritation, nervous system effects, and asthma attacks.

9. Commercialized “Big Marijuana” will exploit for profit, targeting children

“Big Marijuana” is already using similar tactics to “Big Tobacco,” which marketed cigarettes using ads that appealed to kids, including the Joe Camel cartoon character. Marijuana food products that are colourful, sweet, or branded with cartoons are most likely to attract children. Marijuana is available in kid-friendly forms such as gummy bears and lollipops, and products sometimes resemble familiar brands, such as “Buddahfinger” or “KeefKat” in wrappers that look like a Butterfinger or KitKat candy bar.

Mark A. R. Kleiman, a drug policy expert, said, *“[I]f you’re in the [for-profit] cannabis business, casual users aren’t much use to you while heavy users are your best customers, accounting for the bulk of your sales... the commercial interest demands maximizing problem use.”*

Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, senior economist at RAND Corporation, said heavy marijuana users account for the *“vast majority of the total amount sold and/or consumed.”*

10. Legalization causes preventable accidents and lost productivity

Workplace incidents involving employees under the influence of marijuana increased from 6% to 20% the year after legalization in Colorado. Employees who screened positive for marijuana use had 55% more industrial accidents, 85% more injuries, and absenteeism rates 75% higher than those who tested negative, according to a study done on postal workers. Paul L. Bittner, partner and vice chair of the Labour and Employment Group at Ice Miller law firm, said, *"You not only lose productivity, but the bigger concern for employers is potential liability if there's an accident and someone gets hurt or killed."*

Researchers found that using marijuana even just once a week can impact the parts of the brain that are linked to motivation, sometimes in irreversible ways. Long-term marijuana users produce less dopamine, a neurochemical considered crucial to summoning motivation. People who smoked marijuana in the previous year reported less dedication to their jobs than non-marijuana users, according to a study in the journal *Addiction*.

11. International treaties prevent the US from legalizing marijuana

Three United Nations treaties set worldwide drug controls. As a party to the treaties, the United States has agreed to limit the use of marijuana *"exclusively to medical and scientific purposes."* The move by some US states to legalize adult-use marijuana has upset the UN monitoring organization, which stated that legalization *"cannot be reconciled with the legal obligation"* to uphold the Single Convention treaty.

"It is a path the United States - with its strong interest in international institutions and the rule of law - should tread with great caution," wrote Wells Bennett, a Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings Institution.

12. Marijuana is opposed by major public health organizations.

Some of the public health associations that oppose legalizing marijuana for recreational use include the American Medical Association (AMA), the American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM), the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and the American Academy of Paediatrics.

"Legalization campaigns that imply that marijuana is a benign substance present a significant challenge for educating the public about its known risks and adverse effects," the American Academy of Paediatrics said. The ASAM *"does not support the legalization of marijuana and recommends that jurisdictions that have not acted to legalize marijuana be most cautious and not adopt a policy of legalization until more can be learned."* The AMA *"believes that (1) cannabis is a dangerous drug and as such is a public health concern; (2) sale of cannabis should not be legalized."*


13. Growing marijuana harms the environment.

Marijuana cultivation results in deforestation, soil erosion, habitat destruction, and river diversion. Cannabis plants require nearly double the amount of water needed to grow grapes or tomatoes. Rosamond Naylor, Senior Fellow at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, said, *“Taking water directly from rivers and streams in the summer [to grow marijuana] not only reduces the water available for agriculture but also threatens wildlife species... Regardless of the legal status of marijuana, the way we are currently managing its impacts on water and wildlife in California just doesn’t work.”*

Legal indoor growing requires a lot of electricity for lighting, heating, and ventilation. This produces an amount of greenhouse gas emissions equal to that of three million cars each year, and places a burden on public utilities.



Fonsamnis a district of Bellagri,
in the east of **Menastan**



Total Area:	1,245.27 km ²
Population (31/12/2016)	
Total:	305,198
Density:	250/km ²



Uniformed Patrol Strength

(per 8 hour shift = 3 shifts in 24 hours)

Area Station	Population	Operating Hours	Patrol + Shift Leader(s)	Patrol Vehicles	Alert Status
Fonsamnis HQ	148,677	24/7	24 + 1	6	
Airport	* 1,200±	24/7	2 + 1 +1	1	
Arce Domum	25,757	24/7	12 + 1	2	
Byron	21,657	0600-2200hrs	2 + 1	1	
Del Pontem	31,949	0600-2200hrs	2 + 1	1	
Aquam	15,695	0600-2200hrs	2 + 1	1	

Alert Status Legend

Hot Spot (violence, drug-related crimes)
Raised Awareness
Former Crime Hot Spot
Normal

* 8-hour average of 850,000 passengers per year + Flight Crew + Airport Service Personnel.

Task:

As a move to tackle increased criminality in the District's south, the District Administrator (responsible for all local governmental services) has authorised the reallocation of Patrol Service personnel and resources. In the past the Fonsamnis HQ Station has provided additional cover for Day Stations (as required), at a loss of a patrol team/vehicle within their own area of responsibility (AOR). Travel times from Fonsamnis HQ to satellite areas vary from 20-40 minutes.

The District Administrator has tasked you with composing workable suggestions and recommendations for:

1. the creation of a *new* Police Station;
2. the strengthening and expansion of an existing station; or
3. an alternative "third" option not previously examined.

Considerations: you may only draw on existing personnel and resource strengths (i.e. to build up a new solution, numbers need to be drawn from other stations within the district).

Note: Abovementioned strength numbers exclude non-Patrol Service Personnel:

- Community Police Officers i.e. one seasoned officer based in all satellite towns
- All Criminal Investigation Departments and Traffic Police are based in Fonsamnis HQ
- Fonsamnis does not have its own Formed Police Units (Riot Police) or Police Special Forces, but can call upon those of Bellagri - the regional authority (50km north).